netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets

commit b71812168571fa55e44cdd0254471331b9c4c4c6 upstream.

We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.

The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.

Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.

Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 45f93f8..3a011b8 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -2004,7 +2004,9 @@ static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
                if (match_kern)
                        match_kern->match_size = ret;
 
-               WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
+               if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left))
+                       return -EINVAL;
+
                match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
        }
 
@@ -2061,6 +2063,15 @@ static int size_entry_mwt(struct ebt_entry *entry, const unsigned char *base,
         *
         * offsets are relative to beginning of struct ebt_entry (i.e., 0).
         */
+       for (i = 0; i < 4 ; ++i) {
+               if (offsets[i] >= *total)
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               if (i == 0)
+                       continue;
+               if (offsets[i-1] > offsets[i])
+                       return -EINVAL;
+       }
+
        for (i = 0, j = 1 ; j < 4 ; j++, i++) {
                struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32;
                unsigned int size;