swapfile: fix memory corruption via malformed swapfile
authorJann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Thu, 10 Nov 2016 18:46:19 +0000 (10:46 -0800)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Thu, 23 Feb 2017 03:50:59 +0000 (03:50 +0000)
commit dd111be69114cc867f8e826284559bfbc1c40e37 upstream.

When root activates a swap partition whose header has the wrong
endianness, nr_badpages elements of badpages are swabbed before
nr_badpages has been checked, leading to a buffer overrun of up to 8GB.

This normally is not a security issue because it can only be exploited
by root (more specifically, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN or the ability
to modify a swap file/partition), and such a process can already e.g.
modify swapped-out memory of any other userspace process on the system.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477949533-2509-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

index dbd2b67..960b0da 100644 (file)
@@ -1913,6 +1913,8 @@ static unsigned long read_swap_header(struct swap_info_struct *p,
+               if (swap_header->info.nr_badpages > MAX_SWAP_BADPAGES)
+                       return 0;
                for (i = 0; i < swap_header->info.nr_badpages; i++)