x86/tls: Disallow unusual TLS segments

Users have no business installing custom code segments into the
GDT, and segments that are not present but are otherwise valid
are a historical source of interesting attacks.

For completeness, block attempts to set the L bit.  (Prior to
this patch, the L bit would have been silently dropped.)

This is an ABI break.  I've checked glibc, musl, and Wine, and
none of them look like they'll have any trouble.

Note to stable maintainers: this is a hardening patch that fixes
no known bugs.  Given the possibility of ABI issues, this
probably shouldn't be backported quickly.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # optional
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
index e7650bd..3e551ee 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -39,6 +39,28 @@ static bool tls_desc_okay(const struct user_desc *info)
        if (!info->seg_32bit)
                return false;
 
+       /* Only allow data segments in the TLS array. */
+       if (info->contents > 1)
+               return false;
+
+       /*
+        * Non-present segments with DPL 3 present an interesting attack
+        * surface.  The kernel should handle such segments correctly,
+        * but TLS is very difficult to protect in a sandbox, so prevent
+        * such segments from being created.
+        *
+        * If userspace needs to remove a TLS entry, it can still delete
+        * it outright.
+        */
+       if (info->seg_not_present)
+               return false;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+       /* The L bit makes no sense for data. */
+       if (info->lm)
+               return false;
+#endif
+
        return true;
 }