net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size
authorAndrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Wed, 29 Mar 2017 14:11:20 +0000 (16:11 +0200)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Mon, 5 Jun 2017 20:13:54 +0000 (21:13 +0100)
commit 2b6867c2ce76c596676bec7d2d525af525fdc6e2 upstream.

Subtracting tp_sizeof_priv from tp_block_size and casting to int
to check whether one is less then the other doesn't always work
(both of them are unsigned ints).

Compare them as is instead.

Also cast tp_sizeof_priv to u64 before using BLK_PLUS_PRIV, as
it can overflow inside BLK_PLUS_PRIV otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net/packet/af_packet.c

index 2235fe5..3a5a58f 100644 (file)
@@ -3637,8 +3637,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
                if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
                        goto out;
                if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
                if (unlikely(req->tp_block_size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
                        goto out;
                if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
-                   (int)(req->tp_block_size -
-                         BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
+                   req->tp_block_size <=
+                         BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))
                        goto out;
                if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
                                        po->tp_reserve))
                        goto out;
                if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
                                        po->tp_reserve))