security: Fix setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable()
[pandora-kernel.git] / security / smack / smack_lsm.c
index 1b40e55..87d7541 100644 (file)
@@ -87,27 +87,46 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace - Smack approval on ptrace
- * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp,
-                       unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
        int rc;
 
-       rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp, mode);
+       rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
        if (rc != 0)
                return rc;
 
-       rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
-       if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+       rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+       if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                return 0;
+       return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+       int rc;
+
+       rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
+       if (rc != 0)
+               return rc;
 
+       rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+       if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+               return 0;
        return rc;
 }
 
@@ -923,7 +942,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
         */
        file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
        rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
-       if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+       if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                return 0;
        return rc;
 }
@@ -1164,12 +1183,12 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
         * account for the smack labels having gotten to
         * be different in the first place.
         *
-        * This breaks the strict subjet/object access
+        * This breaks the strict subject/object access
         * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
         * state into account in the decision as well as
         * the smack value.
         */
-       if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || __capable(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+       if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
                return 0;
 
        return rc;
@@ -2016,9 +2035,6 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 {
        char *newsmack;
 
-       if (!__capable(p, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-               return -EPERM;
-
        /*
         * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
         * and supports no sane use case.
@@ -2026,6 +2042,9 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
        if (p != current)
                return -EPERM;
 
+       if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
                return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -2552,7 +2571,8 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
        .name =                         "smack",
 
-       .ptrace =                       smack_ptrace,
+       .ptrace_may_access =            smack_ptrace_may_access,
+       .ptrace_traceme =               smack_ptrace_traceme,
        .capget =                       cap_capget,
        .capset_check =                 cap_capset_check,
        .capset_set =                   cap_capset_set,
@@ -2729,4 +2749,3 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
  * all processes and objects when they are created.
  */
 security_initcall(smack_init);
-