tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()

[pandora-kernel.git] / security / commoncap.c

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b7..7790e48 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -140,12 +141,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
        int ret = 0;
        const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+       const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
 
        rcu_read_lock();
        cred = current_cred();
        child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+       if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+       else
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
        if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
-           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
                goto out;
        if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                goto out;
@@ -332,7 +338,8 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
  */
 static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
                                          struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-                                         bool *effective)
+                                         bool *effective,
+                                         bool *has_cap)
 {
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
        unsigned i;
@@ -341,6 +348,9 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
        if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
                *effective = true;
 
+       if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
+               *has_cap = true;
+
        CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
                __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
                __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
@@ -424,7 +434,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
 {
        struct dentry *dentry;
        int rc = 0;
@@ -450,7 +460,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective)
                goto out;
        }
 
-       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective);
+       rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
        if (rc == -EINVAL)
                printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
                       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -475,11 +485,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
        struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-       bool effective;
+       bool effective, has_cap = false;
        int ret;
 
        effective = false;
-       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective);
+       ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
        if (ret < 0)
                return ret;
 
@@ -489,7 +499,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
                 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
                 */
-               if (effective && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+               if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
                        warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
                        goto skip;
                }
@@ -510,6 +520,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        }
 skip:
 
+       /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+       if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+               bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
        /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
         * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
         */
@@ -971,3 +986,4 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
        }
        return ret;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_file_mmap);