#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
-/* Inotify handle */
-extern struct inotify_handle *audit_ih;
-
/* Inotify events we care about. */
#define AUDIT_IN_WATCH IN_MOVE|IN_CREATE|IN_DELETE|IN_DELETE_SELF|IN_MOVE_SELF
-extern int audit_enabled;
-
void audit_free_parent(struct inotify_watch *i_watch)
{
struct audit_parent *parent;
if (e->rule.fields)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
inotify_init_watch(&parent->wdata);
/* grab a ref so inotify watch hangs around until we take audit_filter_mutex */
get_inotify_watch(&parent->wdata);
- wd = inotify_add_watch(audit_ih, &parent->wdata, ndp->dentry->d_inode,
- AUDIT_IN_WATCH);
+ wd = inotify_add_watch(audit_ih, &parent->wdata,
+ ndp->path.dentry->d_inode, AUDIT_IN_WATCH);
if (wd < 0) {
audit_free_parent(&parent->wdata);
return ERR_PTR(wd);
return -EINVAL;
watch = audit_init_watch(path);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(watch)))
+ if (IS_ERR(watch))
return PTR_ERR(watch);
audit_get_watch(watch);
static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
struct audit_entry *entry;
- struct audit_field *f;
+ struct audit_field *ino_f;
int err = 0;
int i;
if (f->val & ~15)
goto exit_free;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
if (err)
}
}
- f = entry->rule.inode_f;
- if (f) {
- switch(f->op) {
+ ino_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
+ if (ino_f) {
+ switch(ino_f->op) {
case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
{
int err = 0;
struct audit_entry *entry;
- struct audit_field *f;
+ struct audit_field *ino_f;
void *bufp;
size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
int i;
f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->se_str = NULL;
- f->se_rule = NULL;
+ f->lsm_str = NULL;
+ f->lsm_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
case AUDIT_UID:
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
} else
- f->se_str = str;
+ f->lsm_str = str;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
if (f->val & ~15)
goto exit_free;
break;
+ case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
+ if ((f->val & ~S_IFMT) > S_IFMT)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
default:
goto exit_free;
}
}
- f = entry->rule.inode_f;
- if (f) {
- switch(f->op) {
+ ino_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
+ if (ino_f) {
+ switch(ino_f->op) {
case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
entry->rule.inode_f = NULL;
case AUDIT_EQUAL:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
- audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
new = audit_init_watch(path);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(new))) {
+ if (IS_ERR(new)) {
kfree(path);
goto out;
}
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
- char *se_str;
+ char *lsm_str;
- /* our own copy of se_str */
- se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!se_str))
+ /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+ lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
return -ENOMEM;
- df->se_str = se_str;
+ df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+ (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
+ "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
audit_set_auditable(current->audit_context);
nwatch = audit_dupe_watch(owatch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nwatch))) {
+ if (IS_ERR(nwatch)) {
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
audit_panic("error updating watch, skipping");
return;
list_del_rcu(&oentry->list);
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&oentry->rule, nwatch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry)))
+ if (IS_ERR(nentry))
audit_panic("error updating watch, removing");
else {
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)ino);
static void audit_put_nd(struct nameidata *ndp, struct nameidata *ndw)
{
if (ndp) {
- path_release(ndp);
+ path_put(&ndp->path);
kfree(ndp);
}
if (ndw) {
- path_release(ndw);
+ path_put(&ndw->path);
kfree(ndw);
}
}
/* update watch filter fields */
if (ndw) {
- watch->dev = ndw->dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
- watch->ino = ndw->dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ watch->dev = ndw->path.dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ watch->ino = ndw->path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
}
/* The audit_filter_mutex must not be held during inotify calls because
*/
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- if (inotify_find_watch(audit_ih, ndp->dentry->d_inode, &i_watch) < 0) {
+ if (inotify_find_watch(audit_ih, ndp->path.dentry->d_inode,
+ &i_watch) < 0) {
parent = audit_init_parent(ndp);
if (IS_ERR(parent)) {
/* caller expects mutex locked */
}
/* Log rule additions and removals */
-static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
- struct audit_krule *rule, int res)
+static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid,
+ char *action, struct audit_krule *rule,
+ int res)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
if (!ab)
return;
- audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u", loginuid);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u", loginuid, sessionid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
* @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
*/
int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
+ size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sessionid, u32 sid)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct audit_netlink_list *dest;
err = audit_add_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "add", &entry->rule, !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "add",
+ &entry->rule, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
err = audit_del_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sid, "remove", &entry->rule,
- !err);
+ audit_log_rule_change(loginuid, sessionid, sid, "remove",
+ &entry->rule, !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
tree = entry->rule.tree;
nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule, watch);
- if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
+ if (IS_ERR(nentry)) {
/* save the first error encountered for the
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
git.openpandora.org / pandora-kernel.git / blobdiff