{
struct path path;
int error = -EINVAL;
- int follow;
+ int lookup_flags;
- if ((flag & ~AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) != 0)
+ if ((flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH)) != 0)
goto out;
- follow = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
- error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, follow, &path);
+ lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ? 0 : LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ if (flag & AT_EMPTY_PATH)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_EMPTY;
+ error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (error)
goto out;
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
+ static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
+
+ if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
+ f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
+
inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, mnt);
f->f_path.dentry = dentry;
f->f_path.mnt = mnt;
f->f_pos = 0;
- f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
+ if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
+ f->f_op = &empty_fops;
+ return f;
+ }
+
+ f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
+
error = security_dentry_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
- ima_counts_get(f);
+ if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
validate_creds(cred);
- /*
- * We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. Historically
- * callers got away with not passing it, but we must enforce this at
- * the earliest possible point now to avoid strange problems deep in the
- * filesystem stack.
- */
- if (!mnt) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s called with NULL vfsmount\n", __func__);
- dump_stack();
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- }
+ /* We must always pass in a valid mount pointer. */
+ BUG_ON(!mnt);
error = -ENFILE;
f = get_empty_filp();
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fd_install);
+static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, int mode, struct open_flags *op)
+{
+ int lookup_flags = 0;
+ int acc_mode;
+
+ if (!(flags & O_CREAT))
+ mode = 0;
+ op->mode = mode;
+
+ /* Must never be set by userspace */
+ flags &= ~FMODE_NONOTIFY;
+
+ /*
+ * O_SYNC is implemented as __O_SYNC|O_DSYNC. As many places only
+ * check for O_DSYNC if the need any syncing at all we enforce it's
+ * always set instead of having to deal with possibly weird behaviour
+ * for malicious applications setting only __O_SYNC.
+ */
+ if (flags & __O_SYNC)
+ flags |= O_DSYNC;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have O_PATH in the open flag. Then we
+ * cannot have anything other than the below set of flags
+ */
+ if (flags & O_PATH) {
+ flags &= O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH;
+ acc_mode = 0;
+ } else {
+ acc_mode = MAY_OPEN | ACC_MODE(flags);
+ }
+
+ op->open_flag = flags;
+
+ /* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
+ if (flags & O_TRUNC)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+ /* Allow the LSM permission hook to distinguish append
+ access from general write access. */
+ if (flags & O_APPEND)
+ acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
+
+ op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
+
+ op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
+
+ if (flags & O_CREAT) {
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_CREATE;
+ if (flags & O_EXCL)
+ op->intent |= LOOKUP_EXCL;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & O_DIRECTORY)
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
+ if (!(flags & O_NOFOLLOW))
+ lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
+ return lookup_flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * filp_open - open file and return file pointer
+ *
+ * @filename: path to open
+ * @flags: open flags as per the open(2) second argument
+ * @mode: mode for the new file if O_CREAT is set, else ignored
+ *
+ * This is the helper to open a file from kernelspace if you really
+ * have to. But in generally you should not do this, so please move
+ * along, nothing to see here..
+ */
+struct file *filp_open(const char *filename, int flags, int mode)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
+ return do_filp_open(AT_FDCWD, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(filp_open);
+
+struct file *file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
+ const char *filename, int flags)
+{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, 0, &op);
+ if (flags & O_CREAT)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (!filename && (flags & O_DIRECTORY))
+ if (!dentry->d_inode->i_op->lookup)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
+ return do_file_open_root(dentry, mnt, filename, &op, lookup);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(file_open_root);
+
long do_sys_open(int dfd, const char __user *filename, int flags, int mode)
{
+ struct open_flags op;
+ int lookup = build_open_flags(flags, mode, &op);
char *tmp = getname(filename);
int fd = PTR_ERR(tmp);
if (!IS_ERR(tmp)) {
fd = get_unused_fd_flags(flags);
if (fd >= 0) {
- struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, flags, mode, 0);
+ struct file *f = do_filp_open(dfd, tmp, &op, lookup);
if (IS_ERR(f)) {
put_unused_fd(fd);
fd = PTR_ERR(f);
if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->flush)
retval = filp->f_op->flush(filp, id);
- dnotify_flush(filp, id);
- locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ if (likely(!(filp->f_mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
+ dnotify_flush(filp, id);
+ locks_remove_posix(filp, id);
+ }
fput(filp);
return retval;
}
git.openpandora.org / pandora-kernel.git / blobdiff