#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
break;
+ case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, rip):
+ /* Check if the new RIP address is canonical */
+ if (value >= TASK_SIZE)
+ return -EIO;
+ break;
}
put_stack_long(child, regno - sizeof(struct pt_regs), value);
return 0;
case PTRACE_CONT: /* restart after signal. */
ret = -EIO;
- if ((unsigned long) data > _NSIG)
+ if (!valid_signal(data))
break;
if (request == PTRACE_SYSCALL)
set_tsk_thread_flag(child,TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
case PTRACE_SINGLESTEP: /* set the trap flag. */
ret = -EIO;
- if ((unsigned long) data > _NSIG)
+ if (!valid_signal(data))
break;
clear_tsk_thread_flag(child,TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
set_singlestep(child);
}
}
-#define audit_arch() (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32) ? AUDIT_ARCH_I386 : AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64)
-
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
/* do the secure computing check first */
&& (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
syscall_trace(regs);
- if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_entry(current, audit_arch(), regs->orig_rax,
- regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
- regs->rdx, regs->r10);
-
+ if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
+ if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
+ audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
+ regs->orig_rax,
+ regs->rbx, regs->rcx,
+ regs->rdx, regs->rsi);
+ } else {
+ audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
+ regs->orig_rax,
+ regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
+ regs->rdx, regs->r10);
+ }
+ }
}
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)