*/
/**
- * smack_ptrace - Smack approval on ptrace
- * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
* @ctp: child task pointer
*
* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
*
* Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
*/
-static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct task_struct *ctp,
- unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_ptrace(ptp, ctp, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
- rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
- if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ rc = smk_access(current->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ if (rc != 0 && capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ rc = smk_access(ptp->security, current->security, MAY_READWRITE);
+ if (rc != 0 && has_capability(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
return rc;
}
*/
file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
- if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
}
* account for the smack labels having gotten to
* be different in the first place.
*
- * This breaks the strict subjet/object access
+ * This breaks the strict subject/object access
* control ideal, taking the object's privilege
* state into account in the decision as well as
* the smack value.
*/
- if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || __capable(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return rc;
{
char *newsmack;
- if (!__capable(p, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
/*
* Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
* and supports no sane use case.
if (p != current)
return -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
return -EINVAL;
struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.name = "smack",
- .ptrace = smack_ptrace,
+ .ptrace_may_access = smack_ptrace_may_access,
+ .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
.capget = cap_capget,
.capset_check = cap_capset_check,
.capset_set = cap_capset_set,
* all processes and objects when they are created.
*/
security_initcall(smack_init);
-