* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*/
-#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
sbsec->sb = sb;
sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
sb->s_security = sbsec;
return 0;
Opt_context = 1,
Opt_fscontext = 2,
Opt_defcontext = 4,
+ Opt_rootcontext = 8,
};
static match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_context, "context=%s"},
{Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
{Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
+ {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
};
#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
+static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec)
+{
+ int rc;
+ rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+ FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
+ char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
const char *name;
u32 sid;
int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
switch (token) {
case Opt_context:
- if (seen) {
+ if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_free;
break;
case Opt_fscontext:
- if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
+ if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
goto out_free;
}
- context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
- if (!context) {
+ fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fscontext) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
seen |= Opt_fscontext;
break;
+ case Opt_rootcontext:
+ if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!rootcontext) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (!alloc)
+ alloc = 1;
+ seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
+ break;
+
case Opt_defcontext:
if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
rc = -EINVAL;
if (!seen)
goto out;
+ /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
+ if (fscontext) {
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ sbsec->sid = sid;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
+ * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
+ * the superblock context if not already set.
+ */
if (context) {
rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
if (rc) {
goto out_free;
}
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
- FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+ rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
- FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
- if (rc)
+ if (!fscontext)
+ sbsec->sid = sid;
+ sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
+
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ }
+
+ if (rootcontext) {
+ struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
+ "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
+ rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
goto out_free;
+ }
- sbsec->sid = sid;
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_free;
- if (seen & Opt_context)
- sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
+ isec->sid = sid;
+ isec->initialized = 1;
}
if (defcontext) {
if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
goto out_free;
- rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
- FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto out_free;
-
- rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
- FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
+ rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
if (rc)
goto out_free;
if (alloc) {
kfree(context);
kfree(defcontext);
+ kfree(fscontext);
+ kfree(rootcontext);
}
out:
return rc;
goto out;
isec->sid = sid;
break;
+ case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
+ isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
+ break;
default:
- /* Default to the fs SID. */
+ /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if (sbsec->proc) {
FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
}
+/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
+static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
+ struct task_struct *ctx)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ tsec = ctx->security;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
+}
+
#define MAY_LINK 0
#define MAY_UNLINK 1
#define MAY_RMDIR 2
/* Default to the current task SID. */
bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
- /* Reset create SID on execve. */
+ /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
tsec->create_sid = 0;
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
if (tsec->exec_sid) {
newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
{
return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
+ match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
+ match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
}
static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
}
-static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
+static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
- ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
- return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
+ ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
+ return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
}
static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
- /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
+ /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
+ tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
+ tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
/* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
}
+static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
{
/* See the comment for setuid above. */
return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
+static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
+}
+
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
}
-static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
+static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
+}
+
+static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid)
{
u32 perm;
int rc;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
+ rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
if (rc)
return rc;
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
perm = signal_to_av(sig);
-
- return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+ tsec = p->security;
+ if (secid)
+ rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+ else
+ rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
{
int err = 0;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 newsid;
if (kern)
goto out;
tsec = current->security;
- err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+ newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
+ err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ u32 newsid;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
tsec = current->security;
+ newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
- isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
+ isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
isec->initialized = 1;
return;
static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
int err = 0;
- u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+ u32 peer_sid;
+
+ if (skb->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+ selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(skb->sk->sk_socket),
+ &peer_sid);
+ else
+ peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
-
-
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct av_decision avd;
int err;
err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
- tsec = current->security;
-
- avd.allowed = 0;
- avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
- cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
-
if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
return err;
}
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
{
- if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ int err;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+ ad.u.cap = capability;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
sid = tsec->exec_sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
sid = tsec->create_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
else
return -EINVAL;
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
else
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+ error = may_create_key(sid, p);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
+ } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
struct av_decision avd;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
+ unsigned long flags)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
struct key_security_struct *ksec;
return -ENOMEM;
ksec->obj = k;
- ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
+ if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+ ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
+ else
+ ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
k->security = ksec;
return 0;
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
+ .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
.task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
.task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
+ .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
+ .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
.task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
.task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
.task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
+ .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
.task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
.task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
/* Add security information to initial keyrings */
- security_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current);
- security_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current);
+ selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
+ selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
+ KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
#endif
return 0;
git.openpandora.org / pandora-kernel.git / blobdiff