orinoco_cs: add ID for ARtem Onair Comcard 11

[pandora-kernel.git] / kernel / ptrace.c

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4c8bcd7..29dc700 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -25,6 +25,17 @@
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a new task whose father had been ptraced.
+ *
+ * Called from copy_process().
+ */
+void ptrace_fork(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long clone_flags)
+{
+       arch_ptrace_fork(child, clone_flags);
+}
+
 /*
  * ptrace a task: make the debugger its new parent and
  * move it to the ptrace list.
@@ -72,6 +83,7 @@ void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
        child->parent = child->real_parent;
        list_del_init(&child->ptrace_entry);
 
+       arch_ptrace_untrace(child);
        if (task_is_traced(child))
                ptrace_untrace(child);
 }
@@ -115,6 +127,8 @@ int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 
 int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
 {
+       const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+
        /* May we inspect the given task?
         * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
         * and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
@@ -127,13 +141,19 @@ int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
        /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
        if (task == current)
                return 0;
-       if (((current->uid != task->euid) ||
-            (current->uid != task->suid) ||
-            (current->uid != task->uid) ||
-            (current->gid != task->egid) ||
-            (current->gid != task->sgid) ||
-            (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+       rcu_read_lock();
+       tcred = __task_cred(task);
+       if ((cred->uid != tcred->euid ||
+            cred->uid != tcred->suid ||
+            cred->uid != tcred->uid  ||
+            cred->gid != tcred->egid ||
+            cred->gid != tcred->sgid ||
+            cred->gid != tcred->gid) &&
+           !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) {
+               rcu_read_unlock();
                return -EPERM;
+       }
+       rcu_read_unlock();
        smp_rmb();
        if (task->mm)
                dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
@@ -163,6 +183,14 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)
        if (same_thread_group(task, current))
                goto out;
 
+       /* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
+        * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace.
+        */
+       retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
+       if (retval  < 0)
+               goto out;
+
+       retval = -EPERM;
 repeat:
        /*
         * Nasty, nasty.
@@ -202,6 +230,7 @@ repeat:
 bad:
        write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
        task_unlock(task);
+       mutex_unlock(&current->cred_exec_mutex);
 out:
        return retval;
 }