/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
+/* number of audit rules */
+int audit_n_rules;
+
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* pointers at syscall exit time).
/* The per-task audit context. */
struct audit_context {
+ int dummy; /* must be the first element */
int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
enum audit_state state;
unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
#endif
};
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
+{
+ int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
+ if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
+ n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
+ return n & mask;
+}
+
+static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
+{
+ unsigned n = ctx->major;
+ switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
+ case 0: /* native */
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
+ audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+ case 2: /* open */
+ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
+ case 3: /* openat */
+ return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
+ case 4: /* socketcall */
+ return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
+ case 5: /* execve */
+ return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PPID:
- if (ctx)
+ if (ctx) {
+ if (!ctx->ppid)
+ ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
logged upon error */
if (f->se_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+ selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
/* ignore this field for filtering */
result = 1;
break;
+ case AUDIT_PERM:
+ result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
+ break;
}
if (!result)
context->return_valid = return_valid;
context->return_code = return_code;
- if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
+ if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy && !context->auditable) {
enum audit_state state;
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
}
get_context:
- context->pid = tsk->pid;
- context->ppid = sys_getppid(); /* sic. tsk == current in all cases */
- context->uid = tsk->uid;
- context->gid = tsk->gid;
- context->euid = tsk->euid;
- context->suid = tsk->suid;
- context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
- context->egid = tsk->egid;
- context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
- context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
- context->personality = tsk->personality;
+
tsk->audit_context = NULL;
return context;
}
const char *tty;
/* tsk == current */
+ context->pid = tsk->pid;
+ if (!context->ppid)
+ context->ppid = sys_getppid();
+ context->uid = tsk->uid;
+ context->gid = tsk->gid;
+ context->euid = tsk->euid;
+ context->suid = tsk->suid;
+ context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
+ context->egid = tsk->egid;
+ context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
+ context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
+ context->personality = tsk->personality;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+
+ mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
else
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
+
audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
if (context->filterkey) {
audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ if (selinux_sid_to_string(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ if (selinux_sid_to_string(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
context->argv[3] = a4;
state = context->state;
- if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
+ context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
+ if (!context->dummy && (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT))
state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
return;
context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
context->in_syscall = 1;
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+ context->ppid = 0;
}
/**
* audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
* @dname: inode's dentry name
* @inode: inode being audited
- * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ * @parent: inode of dentry parent
*
* For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
* can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
* unsuccessful attempts.
*/
void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
- unsigned long pino)
+ const struct inode *parent)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (!dname)
goto update_context;
for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
- if (context->names[idx].ino == pino) {
+ if (context->names[idx].ino == parent->i_ino) {
const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
if (!name)
}
update_context:
- idx = context->name_count++;
+ idx = context->name_count;
+ if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed and losing %s\n",
+ found_name ?: "(null)");
+ return;
+ }
+ context->name_count++;
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
context->ino_count++;
#endif
context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
else
audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], inode);
+
+ /* A parent was not found in audit_names, so copy the inode data for the
+ * provided parent. */
+ if (!found_name) {
+ idx = context->name_count;
+ if (context->name_count == AUDIT_NAMES) {
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG
+ "name_count maxed and losing parent inode data: dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu",
+ MAJOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
+ MINOR(parent->i_sb->s_dev),
+ parent->i_ino);
+ return;
+ }
+ context->name_count++;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+#endif
+ audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], parent);
+ }
}
/**
unsigned long p, next;
void *to;
- if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context))
+ if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
return 0;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p,
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
+ if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
return 0;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- if (likely(!context))
+ if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
return 0;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
git.openpandora.org / pandora-kernel.git / blobdiff