* in exit.c or in signal.c.
*/
-/* determines which flags the user has access to. */
-/* 1 = access 0 = no access */
-#define FLAG_MASK 0x44dd5UL
+/*
+ * Determines which flags the user has access to [1 = access, 0 = no access].
+ * Prohibits changing ID(21), VIP(20), VIF(19), VM(17), IOPL(12-13), IF(9).
+ * Also masks reserved bits (63-22, 15, 5, 3, 1).
+ */
+#define FLAG_MASK 0x54dd5UL
/* set's the trap flag. */
#define TRAP_FLAG 0x100UL
return (*((unsigned long *)stack));
}
-static inline struct pt_regs *get_child_regs(struct task_struct *task)
-{
- struct pt_regs *regs = (void *)task->thread.rsp0;
- return regs - 1;
-}
-
/*
* this routine will put a word on the processes privileged stack.
* the offset is how far from the base addr as stored in the TSS.
static void set_singlestep(struct task_struct *child)
{
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_child_regs(child);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* Always set TIF_SINGLESTEP - this guarantees that
/* But touch TF only if it was set by us.. */
if (child->ptrace & PT_DTRACE) {
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_child_regs(child);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
regs->eflags &= ~TRAP_FLAG;
child->ptrace &= ~PT_DTRACE;
}
return -EIO;
value &= 0xffff;
break;
- case offsetof(struct user_regs_struct, rip):
- /* Check if the new RIP address is canonical */
- if (value >= TASK_SIZE_OF(child))
- return -EIO;
- break;
}
put_stack_long(child, regno - sizeof(struct pt_regs), value);
return 0;
case offsetof(struct user, u_debugreg[7]):
/* See arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c for an explanation of
* this awkward check.*/
- data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
- for(i=0; i<4; i++)
- if ((0x5454 >> ((data >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf)) & 1)
+ data &= ~DR_CONTROL_RESERVED;
+ for(i=0; i<4; i++)
+ if ((0x5554 >> ((data >> (16 + 4*i)) & 0xf)) & 1)
break;
if (i == 4) {
child->thread.debugreg7 = data;
if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rbx, regs->rcx,
regs->rdx, regs->rsi);
} else {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
regs->rdx, regs->r10);
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
|| test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))