security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  14  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  15  *  Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  16  *                     Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
  17  *
  18  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  19  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  20  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  21  */
  22
  23 #include <linux/module.h>
  24 #include <linux/init.h>
  25 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  26 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  27 #include <linux/errno.h>
  28 #include <linux/sched.h>
  29 #include <linux/security.h>
  30 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  31 #include <linux/capability.h>
  32 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  33 #include <linux/mm.h>
  34 #include <linux/mman.h>
  35 #include <linux/slab.h>
  36 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  37 #include <linux/swap.h>
  38 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
  39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  41 #include <linux/file.h>
  42 #include <linux/namei.h>
  43 #include <linux/mount.h>
  44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
  45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  46 #include <linux/kd.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  57 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  60 #include <linux/udp.h>
  61 #include <linux/quota.h>
  62 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  63 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  64 #include <linux/parser.h>
  65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  68 #include <linux/personality.h>
  69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  70 #include <linux/audit.h>
  71 #include <linux/string.h>
  72 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  73 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  74
  75 #include "avc.h"
  76 #include "objsec.h"
  77 #include "netif.h"
  78 #include "xfrm.h"
  79 #include "selinux_netlabel.h"
  80
  81 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  82 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  83
  84 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  85 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  86 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  87
  88 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
  89 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
  90
  91 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
  92 {
  93         selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
  94         return 1;
  95 }
  96 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
  97 #endif
  98
  99 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 100 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 101
 102 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 103 {
 104         selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
 105         return 1;
 106 }
 107 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 108 #else
 109 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 110 #endif
 111
 112 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
 113 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
 114
 115 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 116    just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
 117    The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
 118    module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
 119 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 120
 121 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 122    before the policy was loaded. */
 123 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 124 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 125
 126 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
 127
 128 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
 129    length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
 130 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
 131 {
 132         char *context;
 133         unsigned len;
 134         int rc;
 135
 136         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
 137         if (rc)
 138                 return rc;
 139
 140         if (!buffer || !size)
 141                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 142
 143         if (size < len) {
 144                 len = -ERANGE;
 145                 goto getsecurity_exit;
 146         }
 147         memcpy(buffer, context, len);
 148
 149 getsecurity_exit:
 150         kfree(context);
 151         return len;
 152 }
 153
 154 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 155
 156 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 157 {
 158         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 159
 160         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 161         if (!tsec)
 162                 return -ENOMEM;
 163
 164         tsec->task = task;
 165         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 166         task->security = tsec;
 167
 168         return 0;
 169 }
 170
 171 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 172 {
 173         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 174         task->security = NULL;
 175         kfree(tsec);
 176 }
 177
 178 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 179 {
 180         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 181         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 182
 183         isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
 184         if (!isec)
 185                 return -ENOMEM;
 186
 187         memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
 188         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 189         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 190         isec->inode = inode;
 191         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 192         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 193         isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 194         inode->i_security = isec;
 195
 196         return 0;
 197 }
 198
 199 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 200 {
 201         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 202         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 203
 204         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 205         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 206                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 207         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 208
 209         inode->i_security = NULL;
 210         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 211 }
 212
 213 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 214 {
 215         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 216         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 217
 218         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 219         if (!fsec)
 220                 return -ENOMEM;
 221
 222         fsec->file = file;
 223         fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 224         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 225         file->f_security = fsec;
 226
 227         return 0;
 228 }
 229
 230 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 231 {
 232         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 233         file->f_security = NULL;
 234         kfree(fsec);
 235 }
 236
 237 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 238 {
 239         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 240
 241         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 242         if (!sbsec)
 243                 return -ENOMEM;
 244
 245         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 246         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 247         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 248         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 249         sbsec->sb = sb;
 250         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 251         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 252         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 253         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 254
 255         return 0;
 256 }
 257
 258 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 259 {
 260         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 261
 262         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 263         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 264                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 265         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 266
 267         sb->s_security = NULL;
 268         kfree(sbsec);
 269 }
 270
 271 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 272 {
 273         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 274
 275         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 276         if (!ssec)
 277                 return -ENOMEM;
 278
 279         ssec->sk = sk;
 280         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 281         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 283
 284         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 290 {
 291         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 292
 293         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 294         kfree(ssec);
 295 }
 296
 297 /* The security server must be initialized before
 298    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 299 extern int ss_initialized;
 300
 301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 302
 303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 304         "uses xattr",
 305         "uses transition SIDs",
 306         "uses task SIDs",
 307         "uses genfs_contexts",
 308         "not configured for labeling",
 309         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 310 };
 311
 312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 313
 314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 315 {
 316         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 317 }
 318
 319 enum {
 320         Opt_context = 1,
 321         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 322         Opt_defcontext = 4,
 323         Opt_rootcontext = 8,
 324 };
 325
 326 static match_table_t tokens = {
 327         {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
 328         {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
 329         {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
 330         {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
 331 };
 332
 333 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 334
 335 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 336                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 337                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 338 {
 339         int rc;
 340
 341         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 342                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 343         if (rc)
 344                 return rc;
 345
 346         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 347                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 348         return rc;
 349 }
 350
 351 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 352                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 353                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 354 {
 355         int rc;
 356         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 357                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 358         if (rc)
 359                 return rc;
 360
 361         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 362                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 363         return rc;
 364 }
 365
 366 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 367 {
 368         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 369         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 370         const char *name;
 371         u32 sid;
 372         int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
 373         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 374         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 375
 376         if (!data)
 377                 goto out;
 378
 379         name = sb->s_type->name;
 380
 381         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
 382
 383                 /* NFS we understand. */
 384                 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
 385                         struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
 386
 387                         if (d->version <  NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
 388                                 goto out;
 389
 390                         if (d->context[0]) {
 391                                 context = d->context;
 392                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 393                         }
 394                 } else
 395                         goto out;
 396
 397         } else {
 398                 /* Standard string-based options. */
 399                 char *p, *options = data;
 400
 401                 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 402                         int token;
 403                         substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 404
 405                         if (!*p)
 406                                 continue;
 407
 408                         token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 409
 410                         switch (token) {
 411                         case Opt_context:
 412                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 413                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 414                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 415                                         goto out_free;
 416                                 }
 417                                 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 418                                 if (!context) {
 419                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 420                                         goto out_free;
 421                                 }
 422                                 if (!alloc)
 423                                         alloc = 1;
 424                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 425                                 break;
 426
 427                         case Opt_fscontext:
 428                                 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
 429                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 430                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 431                                         goto out_free;
 432                                 }
 433                                 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 434                                 if (!fscontext) {
 435                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 436                                         goto out_free;
 437                                 }
 438                                 if (!alloc)
 439                                         alloc = 1;
 440                                 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
 441                                 break;
 442
 443                         case Opt_rootcontext:
 444                                 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
 445                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 446                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 447                                         goto out_free;
 448                                 }
 449                                 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 450                                 if (!rootcontext) {
 451                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 452                                         goto out_free;
 453                                 }
 454                                 if (!alloc)
 455                                         alloc = 1;
 456                                 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
 457                                 break;
 458
 459                         case Opt_defcontext:
 460                                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 461                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 462                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  "
 463                                                "defcontext option is invalid "
 464                                                "for this filesystem type\n");
 465                                         goto out_free;
 466                                 }
 467                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 468                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 469                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 470                                         goto out_free;
 471                                 }
 472                                 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 473                                 if (!defcontext) {
 474                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 475                                         goto out_free;
 476                                 }
 477                                 if (!alloc)
 478                                         alloc = 1;
 479                                 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
 480                                 break;
 481
 482                         default:
 483                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 484                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount "
 485                                        "option\n");
 486                                 goto out_free;
 487
 488                         }
 489                 }
 490         }
 491
 492         if (!seen)
 493                 goto out;
 494
 495         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 496         if (fscontext) {
 497                 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
 498                 if (rc) {
 499                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 500                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 501                                fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 502                         goto out_free;
 503                 }
 504
 505                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 506                 if (rc)
 507                         goto out_free;
 508
 509                 sbsec->sid = sid;
 510         }
 511
 512         /*
 513          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 514          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 515          * the superblock context if not already set.
 516          */
 517         if (context) {
 518                 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
 519                 if (rc) {
 520                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 521                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 522                                context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 523                         goto out_free;
 524                 }
 525
 526                 if (!fscontext) {
 527                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 528                         if (rc)
 529                                 goto out_free;
 530                         sbsec->sid = sid;
 531                 } else {
 532                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 533                         if (rc)
 534                                 goto out_free;
 535                 }
 536                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 537
 538                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 539         }
 540
 541         if (rootcontext) {
 542                 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
 543                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 544                 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
 545                 if (rc) {
 546                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 547                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 548                                rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 549                         goto out_free;
 550                 }
 551
 552                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 553                 if (rc)
 554                         goto out_free;
 555
 556                 isec->sid = sid;
 557                 isec->initialized = 1;
 558         }
 559
 560         if (defcontext) {
 561                 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
 562                 if (rc) {
 563                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 564                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 565                                defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 566                         goto out_free;
 567                 }
 568
 569                 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
 570                         goto out_free;
 571
 572                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
 573                 if (rc)
 574                         goto out_free;
 575
 576                 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
 577         }
 578
 579 out_free:
 580         if (alloc) {
 581                 kfree(context);
 582                 kfree(defcontext);
 583                 kfree(fscontext);
 584                 kfree(rootcontext);
 585         }
 586 out:
 587         return rc;
 588 }
 589
 590 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 591 {
 592         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 593         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 594         struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
 595         int rc = 0;
 596
 597         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 598         if (sbsec->initialized)
 599                 goto out;
 600
 601         if (!ss_initialized) {
 602                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 603                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 604                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 605                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 606                 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 607                         list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 608                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 609                 goto out;
 610         }
 611
 612         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 613         rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 614         if (rc) {
 615                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 616                        __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 617                 goto out;
 618         }
 619
 620         rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
 621         if (rc)
 622                 goto out;
 623
 624         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 625                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 626                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 627                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 628                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 629                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 630                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 631                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 632                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 633                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 634                         goto out;
 635                 }
 636                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 637                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 638                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 639                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 640                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 641                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 642                         else
 643                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 644                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 645                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 646                         goto out;
 647                 }
 648         }
 649
 650         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 651                 sbsec->proc = 1;
 652
 653         sbsec->initialized = 1;
 654
 655         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
 656                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 657                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 658         }
 659         else {
 660                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 661                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 662                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 663         }
 664
 665         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 666         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
 667
 668         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 669            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 670            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 671            populates itself. */
 672         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 673 next_inode:
 674         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 675                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 676                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 677                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 678                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 679                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 680                 inode = igrab(inode);
 681                 if (inode) {
 682                         if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
 683                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 684                         iput(inode);
 685                 }
 686                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 687                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 688                 goto next_inode;
 689         }
 690         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 691 out:
 692         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 693         return rc;
 694 }
 695
 696 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 697 {
 698         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 699         case S_IFSOCK:
 700                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
 701         case S_IFLNK:
 702                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
 703         case S_IFREG:
 704                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
 705         case S_IFBLK:
 706                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
 707         case S_IFDIR:
 708                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
 709         case S_IFCHR:
 710                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
 711         case S_IFIFO:
 712                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
 713
 714         }
 715
 716         return SECCLASS_FILE;
 717 }
 718
 719 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
 720 {
 721         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
 722 }
 723
 724 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 725 {
 726         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
 727 }
 728
 729 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 730 {
 731         switch (family) {
 732         case PF_UNIX:
 733                 switch (type) {
 734                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 735                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
 736                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
 737                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 738                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
 739                 }
 740                 break;
 741         case PF_INET:
 742         case PF_INET6:
 743                 switch (type) {
 744                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 745                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
 746                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
 747                         else
 748                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 749                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 750                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
 751                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
 752                         else
 753                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 754                 default:
 755                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 756                 }
 757                 break;
 758         case PF_NETLINK:
 759                 switch (protocol) {
 760                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
 761                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
 762                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
 763                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
 764                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
 765                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 766                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
 767                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
 768                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
 769                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
 770                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
 771                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
 772                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
 773                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
 774                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
 775                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
 776                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 777                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
 778                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
 779                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
 780                 default:
 781                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 782                 }
 783         case PF_PACKET:
 784                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 785         case PF_KEY:
 786                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
 787         case PF_APPLETALK:
 788                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
 789         }
 790
 791         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 792 }
 793
 794 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 795 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 796                                 u16 tclass,
 797                                 u32 *sid)
 798 {
 799         int buflen, rc;
 800         char *buffer, *path, *end;
 801
 802         buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 803         if (!buffer)
 804                 return -ENOMEM;
 805
 806         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
 807         end = buffer+buflen;
 808         *--end = '\0';
 809         buflen--;
 810         path = end-1;
 811         *path = '/';
 812         while (de && de != de->parent) {
 813                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
 814                 if (buflen < 0)
 815                         break;
 816                 end -= de->namelen;
 817                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
 818                 *--end = '/';
 819                 path = end;
 820                 de = de->parent;
 821         }
 822         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 823         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 824         return rc;
 825 }
 826 #else
 827 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 828                                 u16 tclass,
 829                                 u32 *sid)
 830 {
 831         return -EINVAL;
 832 }
 833 #endif
 834
 835 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 836 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
 837 {
 838         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
 839         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 840         u32 sid;
 841         struct dentry *dentry;
 842 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
 843         char *context = NULL;
 844         unsigned len = 0;
 845         int rc = 0;
 846
 847         if (isec->initialized)
 848                 goto out;
 849
 850         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
 851         if (isec->initialized)
 852                 goto out_unlock;
 853
 854         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 855         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
 856                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 857                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 858                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 859                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 860                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
 861                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
 862                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 863                 goto out_unlock;
 864         }
 865
 866         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 867         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 868                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 869                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 870                         break;
 871                 }
 872
 873                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
 874                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
 875                 if (opt_dentry) {
 876                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
 877                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
 878                 } else {
 879                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
 880                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
 881                 }
 882                 if (!dentry) {
 883                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
 884                                "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
 885                                inode->i_ino);
 886                         goto out_unlock;
 887                 }
 888
 889                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
 890                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 891                 if (!context) {
 892                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 893                         dput(dentry);
 894                         goto out_unlock;
 895                 }
 896                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 897                                            context, len);
 898                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
 899                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
 900                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 901                                                    NULL, 0);
 902                         if (rc < 0) {
 903                                 dput(dentry);
 904                                 goto out_unlock;
 905                         }
 906                         kfree(context);
 907                         len = rc;
 908                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 909                         if (!context) {
 910                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 911                                 dput(dentry);
 912                                 goto out_unlock;
 913                         }
 914                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
 915                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 916                                                    context, len);
 917                 }
 918                 dput(dentry);
 919                 if (rc < 0) {
 920                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
 921                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
 922                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
 923                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 924                                 kfree(context);
 925                                 goto out_unlock;
 926                         }
 927                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
 928                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 929                         rc = 0;
 930                 } else {
 931                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
 932                                                              sbsec->def_sid);
 933                         if (rc) {
 934                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 935                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
 936                                        __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
 937                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 938                                 kfree(context);
 939                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 940                                 rc = 0;
 941                                 break;
 942                         }
 943                 }
 944                 kfree(context);
 945                 isec->sid = sid;
 946                 break;
 947         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 948                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
 949                 break;
 950         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 951                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
 952                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 953
 954                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 955                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 956                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
 957                                              sbsec->sid,
 958                                              isec->sclass,
 959                                              &sid);
 960                 if (rc)
 961                         goto out_unlock;
 962                 isec->sid = sid;
 963                 break;
 964         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
 965                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 966                 break;
 967         default:
 968                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
 969                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 970
 971                 if (sbsec->proc) {
 972                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
 973                         if (proci->pde) {
 974                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 975                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
 976                                                           isec->sclass,
 977                                                           &sid);
 978                                 if (rc)
 979                                         goto out_unlock;
 980                                 isec->sid = sid;
 981                         }
 982                 }
 983                 break;
 984         }
 985
 986         isec->initialized = 1;
 987
 988 out_unlock:
 989         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
 990 out:
 991         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 992                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 993         return rc;
 994 }
 995
 996 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
 997 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 998 {
 999         u32 perm = 0;
1000
1001         switch (sig) {
1002         case SIGCHLD:
1003                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1004                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1005                 break;
1006         case SIGKILL:
1007                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1008                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1009                 break;
1010         case SIGSTOP:
1011                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1012                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1013                 break;
1014         default:
1015                 /* All other signals. */
1016                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1017                 break;
1018         }
1019
1020         return perm;
1021 }
1022
1023 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1024    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1025 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1026                          struct task_struct *tsk2,
1027                          u32 perms)
1028 {
1029         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1030
1031         tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1032         tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1033         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1034                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1035 }
1036
1037 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1038 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1039                                int cap)
1040 {
1041         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1042         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1043
1044         tsec = tsk->security;
1045
1046         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1047         ad.tsk = tsk;
1048         ad.u.cap = cap;
1049
1050         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1051                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1052 }
1053
1054 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1055 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1056                            u32 perms)
1057 {
1058         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1059
1060         tsec = tsk->security;
1061
1062         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1063                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1064 }
1065
1066 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1067    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1068    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1069 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1070                           struct inode *inode,
1071                           u32 perms,
1072                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1073 {
1074         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1075         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1076         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1077
1078         tsec = tsk->security;
1079         isec = inode->i_security;
1080
1081         if (!adp) {
1082                 adp = &ad;
1083                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1084                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1085         }
1086
1087         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1088 }
1089
1090 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1091    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1092    pathname if needed. */
1093 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1094                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1095                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1096                                   u32 av)
1097 {
1098         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1099         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1100         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1101         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1102         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1103         return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1104 }
1105
1106 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1107    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1108    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1109    check a particular permission to the file.
1110    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1111    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1112    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1113    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1114 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1115                                 struct file *file,
1116                                 u32 av)
1117 {
1118         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1119         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1120         struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1121         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1122         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1123         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1124         int rc;
1125
1126         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1127         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1128         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1129
1130         if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1131                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1132                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1133                                   FD__USE,
1134                                   &ad);
1135                 if (rc)
1136                         return rc;
1137         }
1138
1139         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1140         if (av)
1141                 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1142
1143         return 0;
1144 }
1145
1146 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1147 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1148                       struct dentry *dentry,
1149                       u16 tclass)
1150 {
1151         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1152         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1153         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1154         u32 newsid;
1155         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1156         int rc;
1157
1158         tsec = current->security;
1159         dsec = dir->i_security;
1160         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1161
1162         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1163         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1164
1165         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1166                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1167                           &ad);
1168         if (rc)
1169                 return rc;
1170
1171         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1172                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1173         } else {
1174                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1175                                              &newsid);
1176                 if (rc)
1177                         return rc;
1178         }
1179
1180         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1181         if (rc)
1182                 return rc;
1183
1184         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1185                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1186                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1187 }
1188
1189 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1190 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1191                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1192 {
1193         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194
1195         tsec = ctx->security;
1196
1197         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1198 }
1199
1200 #define MAY_LINK   0
1201 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1202 #define MAY_RMDIR  2
1203
1204 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1205 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1206                     struct dentry *dentry,
1207                     int kind)
1208
1209 {
1210         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1211         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1212         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1213         u32 av;
1214         int rc;
1215
1216         tsec = current->security;
1217         dsec = dir->i_security;
1218         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1219
1220         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1221         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1222
1223         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1224         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1225         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1226         if (rc)
1227                 return rc;
1228
1229         switch (kind) {
1230         case MAY_LINK:
1231                 av = FILE__LINK;
1232                 break;
1233         case MAY_UNLINK:
1234                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1235                 break;
1236         case MAY_RMDIR:
1237                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1238                 break;
1239         default:
1240                 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link:  unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1241                 return 0;
1242         }
1243
1244         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1245         return rc;
1246 }
1247
1248 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1249                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1250                              struct inode *new_dir,
1251                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1252 {
1253         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1254         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1255         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1256         u32 av;
1257         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1258         int rc;
1259
1260         tsec = current->security;
1261         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1262         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1263         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1264         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1265
1266         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1267
1268         ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1269         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1270                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1271         if (rc)
1272                 return rc;
1273         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1274                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1275         if (rc)
1276                 return rc;
1277         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1278                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1279                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1280                 if (rc)
1281                         return rc;
1282         }
1283
1284         ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1285         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1286         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1287                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1288         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1289         if (rc)
1290                 return rc;
1291         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1292                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1293                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1294                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1295                                   new_isec->sclass,
1296                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1297                 if (rc)
1298                         return rc;
1299         }
1300
1301         return 0;
1302 }
1303
1304 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1305 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1306                                struct super_block *sb,
1307                                u32 perms,
1308                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1309 {
1310         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1311         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1312
1313         tsec = tsk->security;
1314         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1315         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1316                             perms, ad);
1317 }
1318
1319 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1321 {
1322         u32 av = 0;
1323
1324         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1325                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1326                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1327                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1328                         av |= FILE__READ;
1329
1330                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1331                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1332                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1333                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1334
1335         } else {
1336                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1337                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1338                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1339                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1340                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1341                         av |= DIR__READ;
1342         }
1343
1344         return av;
1345 }
1346
1347 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1348 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1349 {
1350         u32 av = 0;
1351
1352         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1353                 av |= FILE__READ;
1354         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1355                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1356                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1357                 else
1358                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1359         }
1360
1361         return av;
1362 }
1363
1364 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1365
1366 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1367 {
1368         struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1369         struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1370         int rc;
1371
1372         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1373         if (rc)
1374                 return rc;
1375
1376         rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1377         /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1378         if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1379                 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1380         return rc;
1381 }
1382
1383 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1384                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1385 {
1386         int error;
1387
1388         error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1389         if (error)
1390                 return error;
1391
1392         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1393 }
1394
1395 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1396                                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1397 {
1398         int error;
1399
1400         error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1401         if (error)
1402                 return error;
1403
1404         return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1405 }
1406
1407 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1408                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1409 {
1410         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1411 }
1412
1413 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1414 {
1415         int rc;
1416
1417         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1418         if (rc)
1419                 return rc;
1420
1421         return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1422 }
1423
1424 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1425 {
1426         int error = 0;
1427         u32 av;
1428         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1429         u32 tsid;
1430         int rc;
1431
1432         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1433         if (rc)
1434                 return rc;
1435
1436         tsec = current->security;
1437
1438         rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1439                                   SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1440         if (rc) {
1441                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1442                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1443         }
1444
1445         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1446          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1447         if(op == 001) {
1448                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1449                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1450         } else {
1451                 av = 0;
1452                 if (op & 004)
1453                         av |= FILE__READ;
1454                 if (op & 002)
1455                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1456                 if (av)
1457                         error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1458                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1459         }
1460
1461         return error;
1462 }
1463
1464 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1465 {
1466         int rc = 0;
1467
1468         if (!sb)
1469                 return 0;
1470
1471         switch (cmds) {
1472                 case Q_SYNC:
1473                 case Q_QUOTAON:
1474                 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1475                 case Q_SETINFO:
1476                 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1477                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1478                                                  sb,
1479                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1480                         break;
1481                 case Q_GETFMT:
1482                 case Q_GETINFO:
1483                 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1484                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1485                                                  sb,
1486                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1487                         break;
1488                 default:
1489                         rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1490                         break;
1491         }
1492         return rc;
1493 }
1494
1495 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1496 {
1497         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1498 }
1499
1500 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1501 {
1502         int rc;
1503
1504         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1505         if (rc)
1506                 return rc;
1507
1508         switch (type) {
1509                 case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
1510                 case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
1511                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1512                         break;
1513                 case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
1514                 case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
1515                 case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1516                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1517                         break;
1518                 case 0:         /* Close log */
1519                 case 1:         /* Open log */
1520                 case 2:         /* Read from log */
1521                 case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1522                 case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
1523                 default:
1524                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1525                         break;
1526         }
1527         return rc;
1528 }
1529
1530 /*
1531  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1532  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1533  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1534  *
1535  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1536  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1537  * the capability is granted.
1538  *
1539  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1540  * processes that allocate mappings.
1541  */
1542 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1543 {
1544         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1545         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1546
1547         rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1548         if (rc == 0)
1549                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1550                                         SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1551                                         CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1552                                         NULL);
1553
1554         if (rc == 0)
1555                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1556
1557         return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1558 }
1559
1560 /* binprm security operations */
1561
1562 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1563 {
1564         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1565
1566         bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1567         if (!bsec)
1568                 return -ENOMEM;
1569
1570         bsec->bprm = bprm;
1571         bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1572         bsec->set = 0;
1573
1574         bprm->security = bsec;
1575         return 0;
1576 }
1577
1578 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1579 {
1580         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1581         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1582         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1583         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1584         u32 newsid;
1585         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1586         int rc;
1587
1588         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1589         if (rc)
1590                 return rc;
1591
1592         bsec = bprm->security;
1593
1594         if (bsec->set)
1595                 return 0;
1596
1597         tsec = current->security;
1598         isec = inode->i_security;
1599
1600         /* Default to the current task SID. */
1601         bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1602
1603         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1604         tsec->create_sid = 0;
1605         tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1606         tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1607
1608         if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1609                 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1610                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1611                 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1612         } else {
1613                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1614                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1615                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1616                 if (rc)
1617                         return rc;
1618         }
1619
1620         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1621         ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1622         ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1623
1624         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1625                 newsid = tsec->sid;
1626
1627         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1628                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1629                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1630                 if (rc)
1631                         return rc;
1632         } else {
1633                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1634                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1635                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1636                 if (rc)
1637                         return rc;
1638
1639                 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1640                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1641                 if (rc)
1642                         return rc;
1643
1644                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1645                 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1646
1647                 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1648                 bsec->sid = newsid;
1649         }
1650
1651         bsec->set = 1;
1652         return 0;
1653 }
1654
1655 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1656 {
1657         return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1658 }
1659
1660
1661 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1662 {
1663         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1664         int atsecure = 0;
1665
1666         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1667                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1668                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
1669                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1670                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1671                                          SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1672                                          PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1673         }
1674
1675         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1676 }
1677
1678 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1679 {
1680         kfree(bprm->security);
1681         bprm->security = NULL;
1682 }
1683
1684 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1685 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1686
1687 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1688 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1689 {
1690         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1691         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1692         struct tty_struct *tty;
1693         struct fdtable *fdt;
1694         long j = -1;
1695
1696         mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1697         tty = current->signal->tty;
1698         if (tty) {
1699                 file_list_lock();
1700                 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1701                 if (file) {
1702                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1703                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1704                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1705                            file may belong to another process and we are only
1706                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
1707                         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1708                         if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1709                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1710                                 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1711                                 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1712                                 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1713                         }
1714                 }
1715                 file_list_unlock();
1716         }
1717         mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1718
1719         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1720
1721         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1722
1723         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1724         for (;;) {
1725                 unsigned long set, i;
1726                 int fd;
1727
1728                 j++;
1729                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1730                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1731                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1732                         break;
1733                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1734                 if (!set)
1735                         continue;
1736                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1737                 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1738                         if (set & 1) {
1739                                 file = fget(i);
1740                                 if (!file)
1741                                         continue;
1742                                 if (file_has_perm(current,
1743                                                   file,
1744                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
1745                                         sys_close(i);
1746                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
1747                                         if (fd != i) {
1748                                                 if (fd >= 0)
1749                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1750                                                 fput(file);
1751                                                 continue;
1752                                         }
1753                                         if (devnull) {
1754                                                 get_file(devnull);
1755                                         } else {
1756                                                 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1757                                                 if (!devnull) {
1758                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1759                                                         fput(file);
1760                                                         continue;
1761                                                 }
1762                                         }
1763                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
1764                                 }
1765                                 fput(file);
1766                         }
1767                 }
1768                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1769
1770         }
1771         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1772 }
1773
1774 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1775 {
1776         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1777         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1778         u32 sid;
1779         int rc;
1780
1781         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1782
1783         tsec = current->security;
1784
1785         bsec = bprm->security;
1786         sid = bsec->sid;
1787
1788         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1789         bsec->unsafe = 0;
1790         if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1791                 /* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
1792                    unchanged and kill. */
1793                 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1794                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1795                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1796                         if (rc) {
1797                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1798                                 return;
1799                         }
1800                 }
1801
1802                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1803                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1804                 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1805                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1806                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1807                                           NULL);
1808                         if (rc) {
1809                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1810                                 return;
1811                         }
1812                 }
1813                 tsec->sid = sid;
1814         }
1815 }
1816
1817 /*
1818  * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1819  */
1820 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1821 {
1822         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1823         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1824         struct itimerval itimer;
1825         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1826         int rc, i;
1827
1828         tsec = current->security;
1829         bsec = bprm->security;
1830
1831         if (bsec->unsafe) {
1832                 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1833                 return;
1834         }
1835         if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1836                 return;
1837
1838         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1839         flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1840
1841         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1842            from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
1843            subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1844            signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1845           been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1846           will be checked against the new SID. */
1847         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1848                           PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1849         if (rc) {
1850                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1851                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1852                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1853                 flush_signals(current);
1854                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1855                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1856                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1857                 recalc_sigpending();
1858                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1859         }
1860
1861         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1862            from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
1863            the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1864            task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
1865            (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1866            check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1867            the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1868            than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1869            is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1870            RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1871         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1872                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1873         if (rc) {
1874                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1875                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1876                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1877                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1878                 }
1879                 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1880                         /*
1881                          * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1882                          * to be refigured.
1883                          */
1884                         current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1885                 }
1886         }
1887
1888         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1889            recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1890         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1891 }
1892
1893 /* superblock security operations */
1894
1895 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1896 {
1897         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1898 }
1899
1900 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1901 {
1902         superblock_free_security(sb);
1903 }
1904
1905 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1906 {
1907         if (plen > olen)
1908                 return 0;
1909
1910         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1911 }
1912
1913 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1914 {
1915         return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1916                 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1917                 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1918                 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1919 }
1920
1921 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1922 {
1923         if (!*first) {
1924                 **to = ',';
1925                 *to += 1;
1926         } else
1927                 *first = 0;
1928         memcpy(*to, from, len);
1929         *to += len;
1930 }
1931
1932 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1933                                        int len)
1934 {
1935         int current_size = 0;
1936
1937         if (!*first) {
1938                 **to = '|';
1939                 *to += 1;
1940         }
1941         else
1942                 *first = 0;
1943
1944         while (current_size < len) {
1945                 if (*from != '"') {
1946                         **to = *from;
1947                         *to += 1;
1948                 }
1949                 from += 1;
1950                 current_size += 1;
1951         }
1952 }
1953
1954 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1955 {
1956         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1957         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1958         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1959         int open_quote = 0;
1960
1961         in_curr = orig;
1962         sec_curr = copy;
1963
1964         /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1965         if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1966                 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1967                 goto out;
1968         }
1969
1970         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1971         if (!nosec) {
1972                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1973                 goto out;
1974         }
1975
1976         nosec_save = nosec;
1977         fnosec = fsec = 1;
1978         in_save = in_end = orig;
1979
1980         do {
1981                 if (*in_end == '"')
1982                         open_quote = !open_quote;
1983                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
1984                                 *in_end == '\0') {
1985                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
1986
1987                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1988                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1989                         else
1990                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1991
1992                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
1993                 }
1994         } while (*in_end++);
1995
1996         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1997         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1998 out:
1999         return rc;
2000 }
2001
2002 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2003 {
2004         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2005         int rc;
2006
2007         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2008         if (rc)
2009                 return rc;
2010
2011         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2012         ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2013         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2014 }
2015
2016 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 {
2018         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2019
2020         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2021         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2022         return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2023 }
2024
2025 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2026                          struct nameidata *nd,
2027                          char * type,
2028                          unsigned long flags,
2029                          void * data)
2030 {
2031         int rc;
2032
2033         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2034         if (rc)
2035                 return rc;
2036
2037         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2038                 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2039                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2040         else
2041                 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2042                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2043 }
2044
2045 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2046 {
2047         int rc;
2048
2049         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2050         if (rc)
2051                 return rc;
2052
2053         return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2054                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2055 }
2056
2057 /* inode security operations */
2058
2059 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2060 {
2061         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2062 }
2063
2064 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2065 {
2066         inode_free_security(inode);
2067 }
2068
2069 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2070                                        char **name, void **value,
2071                                        size_t *len)
2072 {
2073         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2074         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2075         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2076         u32 newsid, clen;
2077         int rc;
2078         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2079
2080         tsec = current->security;
2081         dsec = dir->i_security;
2082         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2083
2084         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2085                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2086         } else {
2087                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2088                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2089                                              &newsid);
2090                 if (rc) {
2091                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2092                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2093                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2094                                __FUNCTION__,
2095                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2096                         return rc;
2097                 }
2098         }
2099
2100         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2101         if (sbsec->initialized) {
2102                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2103                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2104                 isec->sid = newsid;
2105                 isec->initialized = 1;
2106         }
2107
2108         if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2109                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2110
2111         if (name) {
2112                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2113                 if (!namep)
2114                         return -ENOMEM;
2115                 *name = namep;
2116         }
2117
2118         if (value && len) {
2119                 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2120                 if (rc) {
2121                         kfree(namep);
2122                         return rc;
2123                 }
2124                 *value = context;
2125                 *len = clen;
2126         }
2127
2128         return 0;
2129 }
2130
2131 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2132 {
2133         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2134 }
2135
2136 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2137 {
2138         int rc;
2139
2140         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2141         if (rc)
2142                 return rc;
2143         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2144 }
2145
2146 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2147 {
2148         int rc;
2149
2150         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2151         if (rc)
2152                 return rc;
2153         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2154 }
2155
2156 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2157 {
2158         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2159 }
2160
2161 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2162 {
2163         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2164 }
2165
2166 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2167 {
2168         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2169 }
2170
2171 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2172 {
2173         int rc;
2174
2175         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2176         if (rc)
2177                 return rc;
2178
2179         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2180 }
2181
2182 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2183                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2184 {
2185         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2186 }
2187
2188 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2189 {
2190         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2191 }
2192
2193 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2194 {
2195         int rc;
2196
2197         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2198         if (rc)
2199                 return rc;
2200         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2201 }
2202
2203 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2204                                     struct nameidata *nd)
2205 {
2206         int rc;
2207
2208         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2209         if (rc)
2210                 return rc;
2211
2212         if (!mask) {
2213                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2214                 return 0;
2215         }
2216
2217         return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2218                                file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2219 }
2220
2221 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2222 {
2223         int rc;
2224
2225         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2226         if (rc)
2227                 return rc;
2228
2229         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2230                 return 0;
2231
2232         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2233                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2234                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2235
2236         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2237 }
2238
2239 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2240 {
2241         return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2242 }
2243
2244 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2245 {
2246         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2247         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2248         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2249         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2250         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2251         u32 newsid;
2252         int rc = 0;
2253
2254         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2255                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2256                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2257                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2258                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2259                            Restrict to administrator. */
2260                         return -EPERM;
2261                 }
2262
2263                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2264                    ordinary setattr permission. */
2265                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2266         }
2267
2268         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2269         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2270                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2271
2272         if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2273                 return -EPERM;
2274
2275         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2276         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2277
2278         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2279                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2280         if (rc)
2281                 return rc;
2282
2283         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2284         if (rc)
2285                 return rc;
2286
2287         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2288                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2289         if (rc)
2290                 return rc;
2291
2292         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2293                                           isec->sclass);
2294         if (rc)
2295                 return rc;
2296
2297         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2298                             sbsec->sid,
2299                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2300                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2301                             &ad);
2302 }
2303
2304 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2305                                         void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2306 {
2307         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2308         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2309         u32 newsid;
2310         int rc;
2311
2312         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2313                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2314                 return;
2315         }
2316
2317         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2318         if (rc) {
2319                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
2320                        "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2321                 return;
2322         }
2323
2324         isec->sid = newsid;
2325         return;
2326 }
2327
2328 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2329 {
2330         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2331 }
2332
2333 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2334 {
2335         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2336 }
2337
2338 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2339 {
2340         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2341                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2342                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2343                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2344                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2345                            Restrict to administrator. */
2346                         return -EPERM;
2347                 }
2348
2349                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2350                    ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2351                    permission for removexattr. */
2352                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2353         }
2354
2355         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2356            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2357         return -EACCES;
2358 }
2359
2360 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2361 {
2362       return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2363 }
2364
2365 /*
2366  * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user.  If the
2367  * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2368  * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2369  *
2370  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2371  */
2372 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2373 {
2374         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2375
2376         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2377                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2378
2379         return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2380 }
2381
2382 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2383                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2384 {
2385         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2386         u32 newsid;
2387         int rc;
2388
2389         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2390                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2391
2392         if (!value || !size)
2393                 return -EACCES;
2394
2395         rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2396         if (rc)
2397                 return rc;
2398
2399         isec->sid = newsid;
2400         return 0;
2401 }
2402
2403 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2404 {
2405         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2406         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2407                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2408         return len;
2409 }
2410
2411 /* file security operations */
2412
2413 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2414 {
2415         int rc;
2416         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2417
2418         if (!mask) {
2419                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2420                 return 0;
2421         }
2422
2423         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2424         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2425                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2426
2427         rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2428                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2429         if (rc)
2430                 return rc;
2431
2432         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2433 }
2434
2435 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2436 {
2437         return file_alloc_security(file);
2438 }
2439
2440 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2441 {
2442         file_free_security(file);
2443 }
2444
2445 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2446                               unsigned long arg)
2447 {
2448         int error = 0;
2449
2450         switch (cmd) {
2451                 case FIONREAD:
2452                 /* fall through */
2453                 case FIBMAP:
2454                 /* fall through */
2455                 case FIGETBSZ:
2456                 /* fall through */
2457                 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2458                 /* fall through */
2459                 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2460                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2461                         break;
2462
2463                 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2464                 /* fall through */
2465                 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2466                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2467                         break;
2468
2469                 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2470                 case FIONBIO:
2471                 /* fall through */
2472                 case FIOASYNC:
2473                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2474                         break;
2475
2476                 case KDSKBENT:
2477                 case KDSKBSENT:
2478                         error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2479                         break;
2480
2481                 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2482                  * to the file's ioctl() function.
2483                  */
2484                 default:
2485                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2486
2487         }
2488         return error;
2489 }
2490
2491 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2492 {
2493 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2494         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2495                 /*
2496                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2497                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2498                  * This has an additional check.
2499                  */
2500                 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2501                 if (rc)
2502                         return rc;
2503         }
2504 #endif
2505
2506         if (file) {
2507                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2508                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2509
2510                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2511                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2512                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2513
2514                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2515                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2516
2517                 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2518         }
2519         return 0;
2520 }
2521
2522 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2523                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2524 {
2525         int rc;
2526
2527         rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2528         if (rc)
2529                 return rc;
2530
2531         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2532                 prot = reqprot;
2533
2534         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2535                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2536 }
2537
2538 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2539                                  unsigned long reqprot,
2540                                  unsigned long prot)
2541 {
2542         int rc;
2543
2544         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2545         if (rc)
2546                 return rc;
2547
2548         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2549                 prot = reqprot;
2550
2551 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2552         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2553                 rc = 0;
2554                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2555                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2556                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2557                                            PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2558                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2559                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2560                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2561                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2562                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2563                         /*
2564                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2565                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2566                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2567                          * modified content.  This typically should only
2568                          * occur for text relocations.
2569                          */
2570                         rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2571                                            FILE__EXECMOD);
2572                 }
2573                 if (rc)
2574                         return rc;
2575         }
2576 #endif
2577
2578         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2579 }
2580
2581 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2582 {
2583         return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2584 }
2585
2586 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2587                               unsigned long arg)
2588 {
2589         int err = 0;
2590
2591         switch (cmd) {
2592                 case F_SETFL:
2593                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2594                                 err = -EINVAL;
2595                                 break;
2596                         }
2597
2598                         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2599                                 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2600                                 break;
2601                         }
2602                         /* fall through */
2603                 case F_SETOWN:
2604                 case F_SETSIG:
2605                 case F_GETFL:
2606                 case F_GETOWN:
2607                 case F_GETSIG:
2608                         /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2609                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2610                         break;
2611                 case F_GETLK:
2612                 case F_SETLK:
2613                 case F_SETLKW:
2614 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2615                 case F_GETLK64:
2616                 case F_SETLK64:
2617                 case F_SETLKW64:
2618 #endif
2619                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2620                                 err = -EINVAL;
2621                                 break;
2622                         }
2623                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2624                         break;
2625         }
2626
2627         return err;
2628 }
2629
2630 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2631 {
2632         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2633         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2634
2635         tsec = current->security;
2636         fsec = file->f_security;
2637         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2638
2639         return 0;
2640 }
2641
2642 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2643                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2644 {
2645         struct file *file;
2646         u32 perm;
2647         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2648         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2649
2650         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2651         file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2652
2653         tsec = tsk->security;
2654         fsec = file->f_security;
2655
2656         if (!signum)
2657                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2658         else
2659                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2660
2661         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2662                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2663 }
2664
2665 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2666 {
2667         return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2668 }
2669
2670 /* task security operations */
2671
2672 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2673 {
2674         int rc;
2675
2676         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2677         if (rc)
2678                 return rc;
2679
2680         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2681 }
2682
2683 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2684 {
2685         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2686         int rc;
2687
2688         tsec1 = current->security;
2689
2690         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2691         if (rc)
2692                 return rc;
2693         tsec2 = tsk->security;
2694
2695         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2696         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2697
2698         /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2699         tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2700         tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2701         tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2702         tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2703
2704         /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2705            This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2706            subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2707         tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2708
2709         return 0;
2710 }
2711
2712 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2713 {
2714         task_free_security(tsk);
2715 }
2716
2717 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2718 {
2719         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2720            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2721            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2722            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
2723            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2724            capable hook. */
2725         return 0;
2726 }
2727
2728 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2729 {
2730         return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2731 }
2732
2733 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2734 {
2735         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2736         return 0;
2737 }
2738
2739 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2740 {
2741         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2742 }
2743
2744 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2745 {
2746         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2747 }
2748
2749 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2750 {
2751         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2752 }
2753
2754 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2755 {
2756         selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2757 }
2758
2759 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2760 {
2761         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2762         return 0;
2763 }
2764
2765 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2766 {
2767         int rc;
2768
2769         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2770         if (rc)
2771                 return rc;
2772
2773         return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2774 }
2775
2776 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2777 {
2778         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2779 }
2780
2781 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2782 {
2783         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2784 }
2785
2786 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2787 {
2788         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2789         int rc;
2790
2791         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2792         if (rc)
2793                 return rc;
2794
2795         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2796            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2797            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2798            upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2799         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2800                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2801
2802         return 0;
2803 }
2804
2805 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2806 {
2807         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2808 }
2809
2810 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2811 {
2812         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2813 }
2814
2815 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2816 {
2817         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2818 }
2819
2820 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2821                                 int sig, u32 secid)
2822 {
2823         u32 perm;
2824         int rc;
2825         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2826
2827         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2828         if (rc)
2829                 return rc;
2830
2831         if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2832                 return 0;
2833
2834         if (!sig)
2835                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2836         else
2837                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2838         tsec = p->security;
2839         if (secid)
2840                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2841         else
2842                 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2843         return rc;
2844 }
2845
2846 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2847                               unsigned long arg2,
2848                               unsigned long arg3,
2849                               unsigned long arg4,
2850                               unsigned long arg5)
2851 {
2852         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2853            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2854            the state of the current process. */
2855         return 0;
2856 }
2857
2858 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2859 {
2860         u32 perm;
2861
2862         perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2863
2864         return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2865 }
2866
2867 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2868 {
2869         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2870
2871         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2872
2873         tsec = p->security;
2874         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2875         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2876         return;
2877 }
2878
2879 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2880                                   struct inode *inode)
2881 {
2882         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2883         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2884
2885         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2886         isec->initialized = 1;
2887         return;
2888 }
2889
2890 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2891 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2892 {
2893         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2894         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2895
2896         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2897         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2898         if (ih == NULL)
2899                 goto out;
2900
2901         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2902         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2903                 goto out;
2904
2905         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2906         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2907         ret = 0;
2908
2909         switch (ih->protocol) {
2910         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2911                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2912
2913                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2914                         break;
2915
2916                 offset += ihlen;
2917                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2918                 if (th == NULL)
2919                         break;
2920
2921                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2922                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2923                 break;
2924         }
2925
2926         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2927                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2928
2929                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2930                         break;
2931
2932                 offset += ihlen;
2933                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2934                 if (uh == NULL)
2935                         break;
2936
2937                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2938                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2939                 break;
2940         }
2941
2942         default:
2943                 break;
2944         }
2945 out:
2946         return ret;
2947 }
2948
2949 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2950
2951 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2952 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2953 {
2954         u8 nexthdr;
2955         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2956         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2957
2958         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2959         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2960         if (ip6 == NULL)
2961                 goto out;
2962
2963         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2964         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2965         ret = 0;
2966
2967         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2968         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2969         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2970         if (offset < 0)
2971                 goto out;
2972
2973         switch (nexthdr) {
2974         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2975                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2976
2977                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2978                 if (th == NULL)
2979                         break;
2980
2981                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2982                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2983                 break;
2984         }
2985
2986         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2987                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2988
2989                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2990                 if (uh == NULL)
2991                         break;
2992
2993                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2994                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2995                 break;
2996         }
2997
2998         /* includes fragments */
2999         default:
3000                 break;
3001         }
3002 out:
3003         return ret;
3004 }
3005
3006 #endif /* IPV6 */
3007
3008 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3009                              char **addrp, int *len, int src)
3010 {
3011         int ret = 0;
3012
3013         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3014         case PF_INET:
3015                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
3016                 if (ret || !addrp)
3017                         break;
3018                 *len = 4;
3019                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3020                                         &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3021                 break;
3022
3023 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3024         case PF_INET6:
3025                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
3026                 if (ret || !addrp)
3027                         break;
3028                 *len = 16;
3029                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3030                                         &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3031                 break;
3032 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3033         default:
3034                 break;
3035         }
3036
3037         return ret;
3038 }
3039
3040 /* socket security operations */
3041 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3042                            u32 perms)
3043 {
3044         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3045         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3046         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3047         int err = 0;
3048
3049         tsec = task->security;
3050         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3051
3052         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3053                 goto out;
3054
3055         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3056         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3057         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3058
3059 out:
3060         return err;
3061 }
3062
3063 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3064                                  int protocol, int kern)
3065 {
3066         int err = 0;
3067         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3068         u32 newsid;
3069
3070         if (kern)
3071                 goto out;
3072
3073         tsec = current->security;
3074         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3075         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3076                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3077                            protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3078
3079 out:
3080         return err;
3081 }
3082
3083 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3084                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3085 {
3086         int err = 0;
3087         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3088         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3089         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3090         u32 newsid;
3091
3092         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3093
3094         tsec = current->security;
3095         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3096         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3097         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3098         isec->initialized = 1;
3099
3100         if (sock->sk) {
3101                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3102                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3103                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock,
3104                                                         family,
3105                                                         isec->sid);
3106         }
3107
3108         return err;
3109 }
3110
3111 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3112    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3113    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3114 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
3115 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
3116
3117 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3118 {
3119         u16 family;
3120         int err;
3121
3122         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3123         if (err)
3124                 goto out;
3125
3126         /*
3127          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3128          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3129          * check the first address now.
3130          */
3131         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3132         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3133                 char *addrp;
3134                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3135                 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3136                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3137                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3138                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3139                 unsigned short snum;
3140                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3141                 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3142
3143                 tsec = current->security;
3144                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3145
3146                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3147                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3148                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3149                         addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3150                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3151                 } else {
3152                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3153                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3154                         addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3155                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3156                 }
3157
3158                 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3159                            snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3160                         err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3161                                                 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3162                         if (err)
3163                                 goto out;
3164                         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3165                         ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3166                         ad.u.net.family = family;
3167                         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3168                                            isec->sclass,
3169                                            SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3170                         if (err)
3171                                 goto out;
3172                 }
3173
3174                 switch(isec->sclass) {
3175                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3176                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3177                         break;
3178
3179                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3180                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3181                         break;
3182
3183                 default:
3184                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3185                         break;
3186                 }
3187
3188                 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3189                 if (err)
3190                         goto out;
3191
3192                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3193                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3194                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3195
3196                 if (family == PF_INET)
3197                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3198                 else
3199                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3200
3201                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3202                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3203                 if (err)
3204                         goto out;
3205         }
3206 out:
3207         return err;
3208 }
3209
3210 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3211 {
3212         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3213         int err;
3214
3215         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3216         if (err)
3217                 return err;
3218
3219         /*
3220          * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3221          */
3222         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3223         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3224                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3225                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3226                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3227                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3228                 unsigned short snum;
3229                 u32 sid;
3230
3231                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3232                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3233                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3234                                 return -EINVAL;
3235                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3236                 } else {
3237                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3238                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3239                                 return -EINVAL;
3240                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3241                 }
3242
3243                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3244                                         sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3245                 if (err)
3246                         goto out;
3247
3248                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3249                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3250                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3251                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3252                                    TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3253                 if (err)
3254                         goto out;
3255         }
3256
3257 out:
3258         return err;
3259 }
3260
3261 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3262 {
3263         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3264 }
3265
3266 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3267 {
3268         int err;
3269         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3270         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3271
3272         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3273         if (err)
3274                 return err;
3275
3276         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3277
3278         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3279         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3280         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3281         newisec->initialized = 1;
3282
3283         return 0;
3284 }
3285
3286 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3287                                   int size)
3288 {
3289         int rc;
3290
3291         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3292         if (rc)
3293                 return rc;
3294
3295         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3296 }
3297
3298 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3299                                   int size, int flags)
3300 {
3301         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3302 }
3303
3304 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3305 {
3306         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3307 }
3308
3309 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3310 {
3311         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3312 }
3313
3314 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3315 {
3316         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3317 }
3318
3319 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3320                                      int optname)
3321 {
3322         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3323 }
3324
3325 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3326 {
3327         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3328 }
3329
3330 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3331                                               struct socket *other,
3332                                               struct sock *newsk)
3333 {
3334         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3335         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3336         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3337         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3338         int err;
3339
3340         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3341         if (err)
3342                 return err;
3343
3344         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3345         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3346
3347         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3348         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3349
3350         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3351                            isec->sclass,
3352                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3353         if (err)
3354                 return err;
3355
3356         /* connecting socket */
3357         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3358         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3359
3360         /* server child socket */
3361         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3362         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3363         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3364
3365         return err;
3366 }
3367
3368 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3369                                         struct socket *other)
3370 {
3371         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3372         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3373         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3374         int err;
3375
3376         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3377         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3378
3379         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3380         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3381
3382         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3383                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3384         if (err)
3385                 return err;
3386
3387         return 0;
3388 }
3389
3390 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3391                 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3392 {
3393         int err = 0;
3394         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3395         struct socket *sock;
3396         u16 sock_class = 0;
3397         u32 sock_sid = 0;
3398
3399         read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3400         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3401         if (sock) {
3402                 struct inode *inode;
3403                 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3404                 if (inode) {
3405                         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3406                         isec = inode->i_security;
3407                         sock_sid = isec->sid;
3408                         sock_class = isec->sclass;
3409                 }
3410         }
3411         read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3412         if (!sock_sid)
3413                 goto out;
3414
3415         if (!skb->dev)
3416                 goto out;
3417
3418         err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3419         if (err)
3420                 goto out;
3421
3422         switch (sock_class) {
3423         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3424                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3425                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3426                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3427                 break;
3428
3429         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3430                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3431                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3432                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3433                 break;
3434
3435         default:
3436                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3437                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3438                 break;
3439         }
3440
3441         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3442         if (err)
3443                 goto out;
3444
3445         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3446         if (err)
3447                 goto out;
3448
3449         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3450         if (err)
3451                 goto out;
3452
3453         if (recv_perm) {
3454                 u32 port_sid;
3455
3456                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3457                                         sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3458                                         &port_sid);
3459                 if (err)
3460                         goto out;
3461
3462                 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3463                                    sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3464         }
3465
3466 out:
3467         return err;
3468 }
3469
3470 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3471 {
3472         u16 family;
3473         char *addrp;
3474         int len, err = 0;
3475         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3476         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3477
3478         family = sk->sk_family;
3479         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3480                 goto out;
3481
3482         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3483         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3484                 family = PF_INET;
3485
3486         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3487         ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3488         ad.u.net.family = family;
3489
3490         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3491         if (err)
3492                 goto out;
3493
3494         if (selinux_compat_net)
3495                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3496                                                   addrp, len);
3497         else
3498                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3499                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
3500         if (err)
3501                 goto out;
3502
3503         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3504         if (err)
3505                 goto out;
3506
3507         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3508 out:
3509         return err;
3510 }
3511
3512 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3513                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3514 {
3515         int err = 0;
3516         char *scontext;
3517         u32 scontext_len;
3518         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3519         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3520         u32 peer_sid = 0;
3521
3522         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3523
3524         /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3525         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3526                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3527                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3528         }
3529         else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3530                 peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
3531                 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3532                         peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3533                 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3534                         err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3535                         goto out;
3536                 }
3537         }
3538         else {
3539                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3540                 goto out;
3541         }
3542
3543         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3544
3545         if (err)
3546                 goto out;
3547
3548         if (scontext_len > len) {
3549                 err = -ERANGE;
3550                 goto out_len;
3551         }
3552
3553         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3554                 err = -EFAULT;
3555
3556 out_len:
3557         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3558                 err = -EFAULT;
3559
3560         kfree(scontext);
3561 out:
3562         return err;
3563 }
3564
3565 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3566 {
3567         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3568         int err = 0;
3569
3570         if (sock && (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX))
3571                 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3572         else if (skb) {
3573                 peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
3574                 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3575                         peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3576         }
3577
3578         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3579                 err = -EINVAL;
3580         *secid = peer_secid;
3581
3582         return err;
3583 }
3584
3585 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3586 {
3587         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3588 }
3589
3590 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3591 {
3592         sk_free_security(sk);
3593 }
3594
3595 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3596 {
3597         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3598         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3599
3600         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3601         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3602
3603         selinux_netlbl_sk_clone_security(ssec, newssec);
3604 }
3605
3606 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3607 {
3608         if (!sk)
3609                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3610         else {
3611                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3612
3613                 *secid = sksec->sid;
3614         }
3615 }
3616
3617 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3618 {
3619         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3620         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3621
3622         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3623             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3624                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3625
3626         selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3627 }
3628
3629 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3630                                      struct request_sock *req)
3631 {
3632         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3633         int err;
3634         u32 newsid;
3635         u32 peersid;
3636
3637         newsid = selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(skb, sksec->sid);
3638         if (newsid != SECSID_NULL) {
3639                 req->secid = newsid;
3640                 return 0;
3641         }
3642
3643         err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
3644         BUG_ON(err);
3645
3646         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3647                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3648                 return 0;
3649         }
3650
3651         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3652         if (err)
3653                 return err;
3654
3655         req->secid = newsid;
3656         return 0;
3657 }
3658
3659 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3660                                    const struct request_sock *req)
3661 {
3662         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3663
3664         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3665         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3666            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3667            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3668            time it will have been created and available. */
3669
3670         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3671 }
3672
3673 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3674                                       struct flowi *fl)
3675 {
3676         fl->secid = req->secid;
3677 }
3678
3679 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3680 {
3681         int err = 0;
3682         u32 perm;
3683         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3684         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3685         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3686
3687         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3688                 err = -EINVAL;
3689                 goto out;
3690         }
3691         nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3692
3693         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3694         if (err) {
3695                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3696                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3697                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
3698                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3699                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3700                         if (!selinux_enforcing)
3701                                 err = 0;
3702                 }
3703
3704                 /* Ignore */
3705                 if (err == -ENOENT)
3706                         err = 0;
3707                 goto out;
3708         }
3709
3710         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3711 out:
3712         return err;
3713 }
3714
3715 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3716
3717 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3718                                             struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3719                                             u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3720 {
3721         int err = 0;
3722         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3723         struct socket *sock;
3724         struct inode *inode;
3725         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3726
3727         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3728         if (!sock)
3729                 goto out;
3730
3731         inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3732         if (!inode)
3733                 goto out;
3734
3735         isec = inode->i_security;
3736
3737         err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3738         if (err)
3739                 goto out;
3740
3741         switch (isec->sclass) {
3742         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3743                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3744                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3745                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3746                 break;
3747
3748         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3749                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3750                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3751                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3752                 break;
3753
3754         default:
3755                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3756                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3757                 break;
3758         }
3759
3760         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3761         if (err)
3762                 goto out;
3763
3764         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3765         if (err)
3766                 goto out;
3767
3768         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3769         if (err)
3770                 goto out;
3771
3772         if (send_perm) {
3773                 u32 port_sid;
3774
3775                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3776                                         sk->sk_type,
3777                                         sk->sk_protocol,
3778                                         ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3779                                         &port_sid);
3780                 if (err)
3781                         goto out;
3782
3783                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3784                                    send_perm, ad);
3785         }
3786 out:
3787         return err;
3788 }
3789
3790 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3791                                               struct sk_buff **pskb,
3792                                               const struct net_device *in,
3793                                               const struct net_device *out,
3794                                               int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3795                                               u16 family)
3796 {
3797         char *addrp;
3798         int len, err = 0;
3799         struct sock *sk;
3800         struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3801         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3802         struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3803         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3804
3805         sk = skb->sk;
3806         if (!sk)
3807                 goto out;
3808
3809         sksec = sk->sk_security;
3810
3811         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3812         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3813         ad.u.net.family = family;
3814
3815         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
3816         if (err)
3817                 goto out;
3818
3819         if (selinux_compat_net)
3820                 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
3821                                                        family, addrp, len);
3822         else
3823                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3824                                    PACKET__SEND, &ad);
3825
3826         if (err)
3827                 goto out;
3828
3829         err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3830 out:
3831         return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3832 }
3833
3834 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3835                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3836                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3837                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3838                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3839 {
3840         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3841 }
3842
3843 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3844
3845 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3846                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3847                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3848                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3849                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3850 {
3851         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3852 }
3853
3854 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3855
3856 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3857
3858 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3859 {
3860         int err;
3861
3862         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3863         if (err)
3864                 return err;
3865
3866         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3867                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3868
3869         return err;
3870 }
3871
3872 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
3873 {
3874         int err;
3875         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3876
3877         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
3878         if (err)
3879                 return err;
3880
3881         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
3882         ad.u.cap = capability;
3883
3884         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
3885                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
3886 }
3887
3888 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3889                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3890                               u16 sclass)
3891 {
3892         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3893         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3894
3895         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3896         if (!isec)
3897                 return -ENOMEM;
3898
3899         isec->sclass = sclass;
3900         isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3901         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3902         perm->security = isec;
3903
3904         return 0;
3905 }
3906
3907 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3908 {
3909         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3910         perm->security = NULL;
3911         kfree(isec);
3912 }
3913
3914 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3915 {
3916         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3917
3918         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3919         if (!msec)
3920                 return -ENOMEM;
3921
3922         msec->msg = msg;
3923         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3924         msg->security = msec;
3925
3926         return 0;
3927 }
3928
3929 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3930 {
3931         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3932
3933         msg->security = NULL;
3934         kfree(msec);
3935 }
3936
3937 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3938                         u32 perms)
3939 {
3940         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3941         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3942         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3943
3944         tsec = current->security;
3945         isec = ipc_perms->security;
3946
3947         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3948         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3949
3950         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3951 }
3952
3953 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3954 {
3955         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3956 }
3957
3958 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3959 {
3960         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3961 }
3962
3963 /* message queue security operations */
3964 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3965 {
3966         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3967         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3968         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3969         int rc;
3970
3971         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3972         if (rc)
3973                 return rc;
3974
3975         tsec = current->security;
3976         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3977
3978         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3979         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3980
3981         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3982                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3983         if (rc) {
3984                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3985                 return rc;
3986         }
3987         return 0;
3988 }
3989
3990 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3991 {
3992         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3993 }
3994
3995 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3996 {
3997         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3998         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3999         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4000
4001         tsec = current->security;
4002         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4003
4004         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4005         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4006
4007         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4008                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4009 }
4010
4011 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4012 {
4013         int err;
4014         int perms;
4015
4016         switch(cmd) {
4017         case IPC_INFO:
4018         case MSG_INFO:
4019                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4020                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4021         case IPC_STAT:
4022         case MSG_STAT:
4023                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4024                 break;
4025         case IPC_SET:
4026                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4027                 break;
4028         case IPC_RMID:
4029                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4030                 break;
4031         default:
4032                 return 0;
4033         }
4034
4035         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4036         return err;
4037 }
4038
4039 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4040 {
4041         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4042         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4043         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4044         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4045         int rc;
4046
4047         tsec = current->security;
4048         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4049         msec = msg->security;
4050
4051         /*
4052          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4053          */
4054         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4055                 /*
4056                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4057                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4058                  */
4059                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4060                                              isec->sid,
4061                                              SECCLASS_MSG,
4062                                              &msec->sid);
4063                 if (rc)
4064                         return rc;
4065         }
4066
4067         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4068         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4069
4070         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4071         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4072                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4073         if (!rc)
4074                 /* Can this process send the message */
4075                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4076                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4077         if (!rc)
4078                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4079                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4080                                   SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4081
4082         return rc;
4083 }
4084
4085 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4086                                     struct task_struct *target,
4087                                     long type, int mode)
4088 {
4089         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4090         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4091         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4092         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4093         int rc;
4094
4095         tsec = target->security;
4096         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4097         msec = msg->security;
4098
4099         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4100         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4101
4102         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4103                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4104         if (!rc)
4105                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4106                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4107         return rc;
4108 }
4109
4110 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4111 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4112 {
4113         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4114         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4115         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4116         int rc;
4117
4118         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4119         if (rc)
4120                 return rc;
4121
4122         tsec = current->security;
4123         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4124
4125         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4126         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4127
4128         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4129                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4130         if (rc) {
4131                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4132                 return rc;
4133         }
4134         return 0;
4135 }
4136
4137 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4138 {
4139         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4140 }
4141
4142 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4143 {
4144         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4145         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4146         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4147
4148         tsec = current->security;
4149         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4150
4151         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4152         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4153
4154         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4155                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4156 }
4157
4158 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4159 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4160 {
4161         int perms;
4162         int err;
4163
4164         switch(cmd) {
4165         case IPC_INFO:
4166         case SHM_INFO:
4167                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4168                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4169         case IPC_STAT:
4170         case SHM_STAT:
4171                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4172                 break;
4173         case IPC_SET:
4174                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4175                 break;
4176         case SHM_LOCK:
4177         case SHM_UNLOCK:
4178                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4179                 break;
4180         case IPC_RMID:
4181                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4182                 break;
4183         default:
4184                 return 0;
4185         }
4186
4187         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4188         return err;
4189 }
4190
4191 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4192                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4193 {
4194         u32 perms;
4195         int rc;
4196
4197         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4198         if (rc)
4199                 return rc;
4200
4201         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4202                 perms = SHM__READ;
4203         else
4204                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4205
4206         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4207 }
4208
4209 /* Semaphore security operations */
4210 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4211 {
4212         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4213         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4214         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4215         int rc;
4216
4217         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4218         if (rc)
4219                 return rc;
4220
4221         tsec = current->security;
4222         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4223
4224         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4225         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4226
4227         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4228                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
4229         if (rc) {
4230                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4231                 return rc;
4232         }
4233         return 0;
4234 }
4235
4236 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4237 {
4238         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4239 }
4240
4241 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4242 {
4243         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4244         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4245         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4246
4247         tsec = current->security;
4248         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4249
4250         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4251         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4252
4253         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4254                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4255 }
4256
4257 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4258 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4259 {
4260         int err;
4261         u32 perms;
4262
4263         switch(cmd) {
4264         case IPC_INFO:
4265         case SEM_INFO:
4266                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4267                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4268         case GETPID:
4269         case GETNCNT:
4270         case GETZCNT:
4271                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4272                 break;
4273         case GETVAL:
4274         case GETALL:
4275                 perms = SEM__READ;
4276                 break;
4277         case SETVAL:
4278         case SETALL:
4279                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4280                 break;
4281         case IPC_RMID:
4282                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4283                 break;
4284         case IPC_SET:
4285                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4286                 break;
4287         case IPC_STAT:
4288         case SEM_STAT:
4289                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4290                 break;
4291         default:
4292                 return 0;
4293         }
4294
4295         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4296         return err;
4297 }
4298
4299 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4300                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4301 {
4302         u32 perms;
4303
4304         if (alter)
4305                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4306         else
4307                 perms = SEM__READ;
4308
4309         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4310 }
4311
4312 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4313 {
4314         u32 av = 0;
4315
4316         av = 0;
4317         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4318                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4319         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4320                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4321
4322         if (av == 0)
4323                 return 0;
4324
4325         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4326 }
4327
4328 /* module stacking operations */
4329 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4330 {
4331         if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4332                 printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
4333                        "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4334                 return -EINVAL;
4335         }
4336
4337         secondary_ops = ops;
4338
4339         printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
4340                __FUNCTION__,
4341                name);
4342
4343         return 0;
4344 }
4345
4346 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4347 {
4348         if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4349                 printk (KERN_INFO "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
4350                         "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4351                 return -EINVAL;
4352         }
4353
4354         secondary_ops = original_ops;
4355
4356         return 0;
4357 }
4358
4359 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4360 {
4361         if (inode)
4362                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4363 }
4364
4365 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4366                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4367 {
4368         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4369         u32 sid;
4370         int error;
4371
4372         if (current != p) {
4373                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4374                 if (error)
4375                         return error;
4376         }
4377
4378         tsec = p->security;
4379
4380         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4381                 sid = tsec->sid;
4382         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4383                 sid = tsec->osid;
4384         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4385                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4386         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4387                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4388         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4389                 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4390         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4391                 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4392         else
4393                 return -EINVAL;
4394
4395         if (!sid)
4396                 return 0;
4397
4398         return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4399 }
4400
4401 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4402                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4403 {
4404         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4405         u32 sid = 0;
4406         int error;
4407         char *str = value;
4408
4409         if (current != p) {
4410                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4411                    security attributes. */
4412                 return -EACCES;
4413         }
4414
4415         /*
4416          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4417          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4418          * above restriction is ever removed.
4419          */
4420         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4421                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4422         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4423                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4424         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4425                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4426         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4427                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4428         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4429                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4430         else
4431                 error = -EINVAL;
4432         if (error)
4433                 return error;
4434
4435         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4436         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4437                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4438                         str[size-1] = 0;
4439                         size--;
4440                 }
4441                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4442                 if (error)
4443                         return error;
4444         }
4445
4446         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4447            performed during the actual operation (execve,
4448            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4449            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4450            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4451            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4452         tsec = p->security;
4453         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4454                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4455         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4456                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4457         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4458                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4459                 if (error)
4460                         return error;
4461                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4462         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4463                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4464         else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4465                 struct av_decision avd;
4466
4467                 if (sid == 0)
4468                         return -EINVAL;
4469
4470                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4471                 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4472                         struct task_struct *g, *t;
4473                         struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4474                         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4475                         do_each_thread(g, t)
4476                                 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4477                                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4478                                         return -EPERM;
4479                                 }
4480                         while_each_thread(g, t);
4481                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4482                 }
4483
4484                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4485                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4486                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4487                 if (error)
4488                         return error;
4489
4490                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4491                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4492                 task_lock(p);
4493                 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4494                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4495                                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4496                                                      PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4497                         if (!error)
4498                                 tsec->sid = sid;
4499                         task_unlock(p);
4500                         avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4501                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4502                         if (error)
4503                                 return error;
4504                 } else {
4505                         tsec->sid = sid;
4506                         task_unlock(p);
4507                 }
4508         }
4509         else
4510                 return -EINVAL;
4511
4512         return size;
4513 }
4514
4515 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4516 {
4517         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4518 }
4519
4520 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4521 {
4522         if (secdata)
4523                 kfree(secdata);
4524 }
4525
4526 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4527
4528 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4529                              unsigned long flags)
4530 {
4531         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4532         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4533
4534         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4535         if (!ksec)
4536                 return -ENOMEM;
4537
4538         ksec->obj = k;
4539         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4540                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4541         else
4542                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4543         k->security = ksec;
4544
4545         return 0;
4546 }
4547
4548 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4549 {
4550         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4551
4552         k->security = NULL;
4553         kfree(ksec);
4554 }
4555
4556 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4557                             struct task_struct *ctx,
4558                             key_perm_t perm)
4559 {
4560         struct key *key;
4561         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4562         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4563
4564         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4565
4566         tsec = ctx->security;
4567         ksec = key->security;
4568
4569         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4570            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4571            appear to be created. */
4572         if (perm == 0)
4573                 return 0;
4574
4575         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4576                             SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4577 }
4578
4579 #endif
4580
4581 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4582         .ptrace =                       selinux_ptrace,
4583         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
4584         .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
4585         .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
4586         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
4587         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
4588         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
4589         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
4590         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
4591         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4592
4593         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
4594         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
4595
4596         .bprm_alloc_security =          selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4597         .bprm_free_security =           selinux_bprm_free_security,
4598         .bprm_apply_creds =             selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4599         .bprm_post_apply_creds =        selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4600         .bprm_set_security =            selinux_bprm_set_security,
4601         .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
4602         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4603
4604         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4605         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
4606         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
4607         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4608         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
4609         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
4610         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
4611
4612         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4613         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
4614         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
4615         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
4616         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
4617         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
4618         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
4619         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
4620         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
4621         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
4622         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
4623         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
4624         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
4625         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
4626         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
4627         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
4628         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
4629         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4630         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
4631         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
4632         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
4633         .inode_xattr_getsuffix =        selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4634         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4635         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4636         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4637
4638         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
4639         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
4640         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
4641         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
4642         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
4643         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
4644         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
4645         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
4646         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
4647         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4648         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
4649
4650         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
4651         .task_alloc_security =          selinux_task_alloc_security,
4652         .task_free_security =           selinux_task_free_security,
4653         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
4654         .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
4655         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
4656         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
4657         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
4658         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
4659         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
4660         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
4661         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
4662         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
4663         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
4664         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
4665         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
4666         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
4667         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
4668         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
4669         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
4670         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
4671         .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4672         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
4673
4674         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
4675
4676         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4677         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4678
4679         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4680         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4681         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4682         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4683         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4684         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4685
4686         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4687         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
4688         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
4689         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
4690         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
4691
4692         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4693         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
4694         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
4695         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
4696         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
4697
4698         .register_security =            selinux_register_security,
4699         .unregister_security =          selinux_unregister_security,
4700
4701         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
4702
4703         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
4704         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
4705
4706         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4707         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
4708
4709         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4710         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4711
4712         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
4713         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
4714         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
4715         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
4716         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
4717         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
4718         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4719         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4720         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
4721         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
4722         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4723         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4724         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
4725         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4726         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4727         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4728         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4729         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
4730         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
4731         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
4732         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
4733         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
4734         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4735         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
4736
4737 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4738         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4739         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4740         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4741         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4742         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4743         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4744         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4745         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4746         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4747         .xfrm_flow_state_match =        selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
4748         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4749 #endif
4750
4751 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4752         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
4753         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
4754         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
4755 #endif
4756 };
4757
4758 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4759 {
4760         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4761
4762         if (!selinux_enabled) {
4763                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
4764                 return 0;
4765         }
4766
4767         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
4768
4769         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4770         if (task_alloc_security(current))
4771                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4772         tsec = current->security;
4773         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4774
4775         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4776                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4777                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4778         avc_init();
4779
4780         original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4781         if (!secondary_ops)
4782                 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4783         if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4784                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4785
4786         if (selinux_enforcing) {
4787                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4788         } else {
4789                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
4790         }
4791
4792 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
4793         /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
4794         selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
4795                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4796         selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
4797                           KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
4798 #endif
4799
4800         return 0;
4801 }
4802
4803 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4804 {
4805         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
4806
4807         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4808         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4809         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4810         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4811 next_sb:
4812         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4813                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4814                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4815                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
4816                                            list);
4817                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4818                 sb->s_count++;
4819                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4820                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4821                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4822                 if (sb->s_root)
4823                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4824                 drop_super(sb);
4825                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4826                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4827                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4828                 goto next_sb;
4829         }
4830         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4831         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4832 }
4833
4834 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4835    all processes and objects when they are created. */
4836 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4837
4838 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4839
4840 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4841         .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4842         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4843         .pf =           PF_INET,
4844         .hooknum =      NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4845         .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4846 };
4847
4848 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4849
4850 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4851         .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4852         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4853         .pf =           PF_INET6,
4854         .hooknum =      NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4855         .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4856 };
4857
4858 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4859
4860 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4861 {
4862         int err = 0;
4863
4864         if (!selinux_enabled)
4865                 goto out;
4866
4867         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4868
4869         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4870         if (err)
4871                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4872
4873 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4874
4875         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4876         if (err)
4877                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4878
4879 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4880
4881 out:
4882         return err;
4883 }
4884
4885 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4886
4887 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4888 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4889 {
4890         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4891
4892         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4893 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4894         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4895 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4896 }
4897 #endif
4898
4899 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4900
4901 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4902 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4903 #endif
4904
4905 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4906
4907 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4908 int selinux_disable(void)
4909 {
4910         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4911         static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4912
4913         if (ss_initialized) {
4914                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4915                 return -EINVAL;
4916         }
4917
4918         if (selinux_disabled) {
4919                 /* Only do this once. */
4920                 return -EINVAL;
4921         }
4922
4923         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
4924
4925         selinux_disabled = 1;
4926         selinux_enabled = 0;
4927
4928         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4929         security_ops = secondary_ops;
4930
4931         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4932         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4933
4934         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4935         exit_sel_fs();
4936
4937         return 0;
4938 }
4939 #endif
4940
4941