security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  14  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  15  *
  16  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  17  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  18  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  19  */
  20
  21 #include <linux/config.h>
  22 #include <linux/module.h>
  23 #include <linux/init.h>
  24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  26 #include <linux/errno.h>
  27 #include <linux/sched.h>
  28 #include <linux/security.h>
  29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  30 #include <linux/capability.h>
  31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  32 #include <linux/mm.h>
  33 #include <linux/mman.h>
  34 #include <linux/slab.h>
  35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  36 #include <linux/swap.h>
  37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
  38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  40 #include <linux/file.h>
  41 #include <linux/namei.h>
  42 #include <linux/mount.h>
  43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
  44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  45 #include <linux/kd.h>
  46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  48 #include <linux/tty.h>
  49 #include <net/icmp.h>
  50 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
  51 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
  53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
  54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  57 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  60 #include <linux/udp.h>
  61 #include <linux/quota.h>
  62 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  63 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  64 #include <linux/parser.h>
  65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  66 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  68 #include <linux/personality.h>
  69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  70 #include <linux/audit.h>
  71
  72 #include "avc.h"
  73 #include "objsec.h"
  74 #include "netif.h"
  75
  76 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  77 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  78
  79 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  80 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  81
  82 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
  83 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
  84
  85 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
  86 {
  87         selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
  88         return 1;
  89 }
  90 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
  91 #endif
  92
  93 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
  94 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
  95
  96 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
  97 {
  98         selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
  99         return 1;
 100 }
 101 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 102 #endif
 103
 104 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
 105 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
 106
 107 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 108    just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
 109    The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
 110    module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
 111 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
 112
 113 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 114    before the policy was loaded. */
 115 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 116 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 117
 118 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 119
 120 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 121 {
 122         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 123
 124         tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 125         if (!tsec)
 126                 return -ENOMEM;
 127
 128         memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
 129         tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 130         tsec->task = task;
 131         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 132         task->security = tsec;
 133
 134         return 0;
 135 }
 136
 137 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 138 {
 139         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 140
 141         if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
 142                 return;
 143
 144         task->security = NULL;
 145         kfree(tsec);
 146 }
 147
 148 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 149 {
 150         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 151         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 152
 153         isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 154         if (!isec)
 155                 return -ENOMEM;
 156
 157         memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
 158         init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
 159         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 160         isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 161         isec->inode = inode;
 162         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 163         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 164         if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
 165                 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 166         else
 167                 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 168         inode->i_security = isec;
 169
 170         return 0;
 171 }
 172
 173 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 174 {
 175         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 176         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 177
 178         if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
 179                 return;
 180
 181         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 182         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 183                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 184         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 185
 186         inode->i_security = NULL;
 187         kfree(isec);
 188 }
 189
 190 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 191 {
 192         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 193         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 194
 195         fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
 196         if (!fsec)
 197                 return -ENOMEM;
 198
 199         memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
 200         fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 201         fsec->file = file;
 202         if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
 203                 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 204                 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 205         } else {
 206                 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 207                 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 208         }
 209         file->f_security = fsec;
 210
 211         return 0;
 212 }
 213
 214 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 215 {
 216         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 217
 218         if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
 219                 return;
 220
 221         file->f_security = NULL;
 222         kfree(fsec);
 223 }
 224
 225 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 226 {
 227         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 228
 229         sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 230         if (!sbsec)
 231                 return -ENOMEM;
 232
 233         memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
 234         init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
 235         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 236         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 237         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 238         sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 239         sbsec->sb = sb;
 240         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 241         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 242         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 243
 244         return 0;
 245 }
 246
 247 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 248 {
 249         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 250
 251         if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
 252                 return;
 253
 254         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 255         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 256                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 257         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 258
 259         sb->s_security = NULL;
 260         kfree(sbsec);
 261 }
 262
 263 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 264 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
 265 {
 266         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 267
 268         if (family != PF_UNIX)
 269                 return 0;
 270
 271         ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 272         if (!ssec)
 273                 return -ENOMEM;
 274
 275         memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
 276         ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
 277         ssec->sk = sk;
 278         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 279         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 280
 281         return 0;
 282 }
 283
 284 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 285 {
 286         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 287
 288         if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
 289                 return;
 290
 291         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 292         kfree(ssec);
 293 }
 294 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 295
 296 /* The security server must be initialized before
 297    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 298 extern int ss_initialized;
 299
 300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 301
 302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 303         "uses xattr",
 304         "uses transition SIDs",
 305         "uses task SIDs",
 306         "uses genfs_contexts",
 307         "not configured for labeling",
 308         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 309 };
 310
 311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 312
 313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 314 {
 315         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 316 }
 317
 318 enum {
 319         Opt_context = 1,
 320         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 321         Opt_defcontext = 4,
 322 };
 323
 324 static match_table_t tokens = {
 325         {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
 326         {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
 327         {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
 328 };
 329
 330 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 331
 332 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 333 {
 334         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 335         const char *name;
 336         u32 sid;
 337         int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
 338         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 339         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 340
 341         if (!data)
 342                 goto out;
 343
 344         name = sb->s_type->name;
 345
 346         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
 347
 348                 /* NFS we understand. */
 349                 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
 350                         struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
 351
 352                         if (d->version <  NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
 353                                 goto out;
 354
 355                         if (d->context[0]) {
 356                                 context = d->context;
 357                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 358                         }
 359                 } else
 360                         goto out;
 361
 362         } else {
 363                 /* Standard string-based options. */
 364                 char *p, *options = data;
 365
 366                 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
 367                         int token;
 368                         substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 369
 370                         if (!*p)
 371                                 continue;
 372
 373                         token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 374
 375                         switch (token) {
 376                         case Opt_context:
 377                                 if (seen) {
 378                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 379                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 380                                         goto out_free;
 381                                 }
 382                                 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 383                                 if (!context) {
 384                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 385                                         goto out_free;
 386                                 }
 387                                 if (!alloc)
 388                                         alloc = 1;
 389                                 seen |= Opt_context;
 390                                 break;
 391
 392                         case Opt_fscontext:
 393                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
 394                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 395                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 396                                         goto out_free;
 397                                 }
 398                                 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 399                                 if (!context) {
 400                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 401                                         goto out_free;
 402                                 }
 403                                 if (!alloc)
 404                                         alloc = 1;
 405                                 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
 406                                 break;
 407
 408                         case Opt_defcontext:
 409                                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 410                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 411                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  "
 412                                                "defcontext option is invalid "
 413                                                "for this filesystem type\n");
 414                                         goto out_free;
 415                                 }
 416                                 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
 417                                         rc = -EINVAL;
 418                                         printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 419                                         goto out_free;
 420                                 }
 421                                 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 422                                 if (!defcontext) {
 423                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 424                                         goto out_free;
 425                                 }
 426                                 if (!alloc)
 427                                         alloc = 1;
 428                                 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
 429                                 break;
 430
 431                         default:
 432                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 433                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount "
 434                                        "option\n");
 435                                 goto out_free;
 436
 437                         }
 438                 }
 439         }
 440
 441         if (!seen)
 442                 goto out;
 443
 444         if (context) {
 445                 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
 446                 if (rc) {
 447                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 448                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 449                                context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 450                         goto out_free;
 451                 }
 452
 453                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 454                                   FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 455                 if (rc)
 456                         goto out_free;
 457
 458                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 459                                   FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 460                 if (rc)
 461                         goto out_free;
 462
 463                 sbsec->sid = sid;
 464
 465                 if (seen & Opt_context)
 466                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 467         }
 468
 469         if (defcontext) {
 470                 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
 471                 if (rc) {
 472                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 473                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 474                                defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
 475                         goto out_free;
 476                 }
 477
 478                 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
 479                         goto out_free;
 480
 481                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 482                                   FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 483                 if (rc)
 484                         goto out_free;
 485
 486                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 487                                   FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 488                 if (rc)
 489                         goto out_free;
 490
 491                 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
 492         }
 493
 494 out_free:
 495         if (alloc) {
 496                 kfree(context);
 497                 kfree(defcontext);
 498         }
 499 out:
 500         return rc;
 501 }
 502
 503 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 504 {
 505         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 506         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 507         struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
 508         int rc = 0;
 509
 510         down(&sbsec->sem);
 511         if (sbsec->initialized)
 512                 goto out;
 513
 514         if (!ss_initialized) {
 515                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 516                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 517                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 518                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 519                 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 520                         list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 521                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 522                 goto out;
 523         }
 524
 525         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 526         rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 527         if (rc) {
 528                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 529                        __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 530                 goto out;
 531         }
 532
 533         rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
 534         if (rc)
 535                 goto out;
 536
 537         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 538                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 539                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 540                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 541                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 542                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 543                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 544                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 545                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 546                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 547                         goto out;
 548                 }
 549                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 550                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 551                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 552                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 553                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 554                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 555                         else
 556                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 557                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 558                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 559                         goto out;
 560                 }
 561         }
 562
 563         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 564                 sbsec->proc = 1;
 565
 566         sbsec->initialized = 1;
 567
 568         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
 569                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 570                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 571         }
 572         else {
 573                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 574                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 575                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 576         }
 577
 578         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 579         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
 580
 581         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 582            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 583            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 584            populates itself. */
 585         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 586 next_inode:
 587         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 588                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 589                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 590                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 591                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 592                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 593                 inode = igrab(inode);
 594                 if (inode) {
 595                         if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
 596                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 597                         iput(inode);
 598                 }
 599                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 600                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 601                 goto next_inode;
 602         }
 603         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 604 out:
 605         up(&sbsec->sem);
 606         return rc;
 607 }
 608
 609 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
 610 {
 611         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 612         case S_IFSOCK:
 613                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
 614         case S_IFLNK:
 615                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
 616         case S_IFREG:
 617                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
 618         case S_IFBLK:
 619                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
 620         case S_IFDIR:
 621                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
 622         case S_IFCHR:
 623                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
 624         case S_IFIFO:
 625                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
 626
 627         }
 628
 629         return SECCLASS_FILE;
 630 }
 631
 632 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 633 {
 634         switch (family) {
 635         case PF_UNIX:
 636                 switch (type) {
 637                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 638                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
 639                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
 640                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 641                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
 642                 }
 643                 break;
 644         case PF_INET:
 645         case PF_INET6:
 646                 switch (type) {
 647                 case SOCK_STREAM:
 648                         return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
 649                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
 650                         return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
 651                 case SOCK_RAW:
 652                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
 653                 }
 654                 break;
 655         case PF_NETLINK:
 656                 switch (protocol) {
 657                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
 658                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
 659                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
 660                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
 661                 case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
 662                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
 663                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
 664                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
 665                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
 666                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
 667                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
 668                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
 669                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
 670                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
 671                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
 672                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
 673                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
 674                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
 675                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
 676                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
 677                 default:
 678                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
 679                 }
 680         case PF_PACKET:
 681                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
 682         case PF_KEY:
 683                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
 684         }
 685
 686         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
 687 }
 688
 689 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
 690 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 691                                 u16 tclass,
 692                                 u32 *sid)
 693 {
 694         int buflen, rc;
 695         char *buffer, *path, *end;
 696
 697         buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 698         if (!buffer)
 699                 return -ENOMEM;
 700
 701         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
 702         end = buffer+buflen;
 703         *--end = '\0';
 704         buflen--;
 705         path = end-1;
 706         *path = '/';
 707         while (de && de != de->parent) {
 708                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
 709                 if (buflen < 0)
 710                         break;
 711                 end -= de->namelen;
 712                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
 713                 *--end = '/';
 714                 path = end;
 715                 de = de->parent;
 716         }
 717         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
 718         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 719         return rc;
 720 }
 721 #else
 722 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
 723                                 u16 tclass,
 724                                 u32 *sid)
 725 {
 726         return -EINVAL;
 727 }
 728 #endif
 729
 730 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
 731 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
 732 {
 733         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
 734         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 735         u32 sid;
 736         struct dentry *dentry;
 737 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
 738         char *context = NULL;
 739         unsigned len = 0;
 740         int rc = 0;
 741         int hold_sem = 0;
 742
 743         if (isec->initialized)
 744                 goto out;
 745
 746         down(&isec->sem);
 747         hold_sem = 1;
 748         if (isec->initialized)
 749                 goto out;
 750
 751         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 752         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
 753                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 754                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 755                    server is ready to handle calls. */
 756                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 757                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
 758                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
 759                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 760                 goto out;
 761         }
 762
 763         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 764         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 765                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 766                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 767                         break;
 768                 }
 769
 770                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
 771                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
 772                 if (opt_dentry) {
 773                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
 774                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
 775                 } else {
 776                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
 777                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
 778                 }
 779                 if (!dentry) {
 780                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
 781                                "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
 782                                inode->i_ino);
 783                         goto out;
 784                 }
 785
 786                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
 787                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 788                 if (!context) {
 789                         rc = -ENOMEM;
 790                         dput(dentry);
 791                         goto out;
 792                 }
 793                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 794                                            context, len);
 795                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
 796                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
 797                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 798                                                    NULL, 0);
 799                         if (rc < 0) {
 800                                 dput(dentry);
 801                                 goto out;
 802                         }
 803                         kfree(context);
 804                         len = rc;
 805                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
 806                         if (!context) {
 807                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 808                                 dput(dentry);
 809                                 goto out;
 810                         }
 811                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
 812                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
 813                                                    context, len);
 814                 }
 815                 dput(dentry);
 816                 if (rc < 0) {
 817                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
 818                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  getxattr returned "
 819                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
 820                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 821                                 kfree(context);
 822                                 goto out;
 823                         }
 824                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
 825                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 826                         rc = 0;
 827                 } else {
 828                         rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
 829                         if (rc) {
 830                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
 831                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
 832                                        __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
 833                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
 834                                 kfree(context);
 835                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 836                                 rc = 0;
 837                                 break;
 838                         }
 839                 }
 840                 kfree(context);
 841                 isec->sid = sid;
 842                 break;
 843         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 844                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
 845                 break;
 846         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 847                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
 848                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 849
 850                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
 851                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 852                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
 853                                              sbsec->sid,
 854                                              isec->sclass,
 855                                              &sid);
 856                 if (rc)
 857                         goto out;
 858                 isec->sid = sid;
 859                 break;
 860         default:
 861                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
 862                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
 863
 864                 if (sbsec->proc) {
 865                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
 866                         if (proci->pde) {
 867                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 868                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
 869                                                           isec->sclass,
 870                                                           &sid);
 871                                 if (rc)
 872                                         goto out;
 873                                 isec->sid = sid;
 874                         }
 875                 }
 876                 break;
 877         }
 878
 879         isec->initialized = 1;
 880
 881 out:
 882         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
 883                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 884
 885         if (hold_sem)
 886                 up(&isec->sem);
 887         return rc;
 888 }
 889
 890 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
 891 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 892 {
 893         u32 perm = 0;
 894
 895         switch (sig) {
 896         case SIGCHLD:
 897                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
 898                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
 899                 break;
 900         case SIGKILL:
 901                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
 902                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
 903                 break;
 904         case SIGSTOP:
 905                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
 906                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
 907                 break;
 908         default:
 909                 /* All other signals. */
 910                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
 911                 break;
 912         }
 913
 914         return perm;
 915 }
 916
 917 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
 918    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
 919 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
 920                          struct task_struct *tsk2,
 921                          u32 perms)
 922 {
 923         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
 924
 925         tsec1 = tsk1->security;
 926         tsec2 = tsk2->security;
 927         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
 928                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
 929 }
 930
 931 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
 932 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 933                                int cap)
 934 {
 935         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 936         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 937
 938         tsec = tsk->security;
 939
 940         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
 941         ad.tsk = tsk;
 942         ad.u.cap = cap;
 943
 944         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
 945                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
 946 }
 947
 948 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
 949 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 950                            u32 perms)
 951 {
 952         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 953
 954         tsec = tsk->security;
 955
 956         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 957                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
 958 }
 959
 960 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
 961    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
 962    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
 963 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
 964                           struct inode *inode,
 965                           u32 perms,
 966                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
 967 {
 968         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 969         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 970         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 971
 972         tsec = tsk->security;
 973         isec = inode->i_security;
 974
 975         if (!adp) {
 976                 adp = &ad;
 977                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 978                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 979         }
 980
 981         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
 982 }
 983
 984 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
 985    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
 986    pathname if needed. */
 987 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
 988                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
 989                                   struct dentry *dentry,
 990                                   u32 av)
 991 {
 992         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 993         struct avc_audit_data ad;
 994         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
 995         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
 996         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
 997         return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
 998 }
 999
1000 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1001    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1002    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1003    check a particular permission to the file.
1004    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1005    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1006    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1007    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1008 static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1009                                 struct file *file,
1010                                 u32 av)
1011 {
1012         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1013         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1014         struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1015         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1016         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1017         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1018         int rc;
1019
1020         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1021         ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1022         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1023
1024         if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1025                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1026                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1027                                   FD__USE,
1028                                   &ad);
1029                 if (rc)
1030                         return rc;
1031         }
1032
1033         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1034         if (av)
1035                 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1036
1037         return 0;
1038 }
1039
1040 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1041 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1042                       struct dentry *dentry,
1043                       u16 tclass)
1044 {
1045         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1046         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1047         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1048         u32 newsid;
1049         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1050         int rc;
1051
1052         tsec = current->security;
1053         dsec = dir->i_security;
1054         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1055
1056         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1057         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1058
1059         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1060                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1061                           &ad);
1062         if (rc)
1063                 return rc;
1064
1065         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1066                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1067         } else {
1068                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1069                                              &newsid);
1070                 if (rc)
1071                         return rc;
1072         }
1073
1074         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1075         if (rc)
1076                 return rc;
1077
1078         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1079                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1080                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1081 }
1082
1083 #define MAY_LINK   0
1084 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1085 #define MAY_RMDIR  2
1086
1087 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1088 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1089                     struct dentry *dentry,
1090                     int kind)
1091
1092 {
1093         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1094         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1095         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1096         u32 av;
1097         int rc;
1098
1099         tsec = current->security;
1100         dsec = dir->i_security;
1101         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1102
1103         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1104         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1105
1106         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1107         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1108         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1109         if (rc)
1110                 return rc;
1111
1112         switch (kind) {
1113         case MAY_LINK:
1114                 av = FILE__LINK;
1115                 break;
1116         case MAY_UNLINK:
1117                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1118                 break;
1119         case MAY_RMDIR:
1120                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1121                 break;
1122         default:
1123                 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link:  unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1124                 return 0;
1125         }
1126
1127         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1128         return rc;
1129 }
1130
1131 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1132                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1133                              struct inode *new_dir,
1134                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1135 {
1136         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1137         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1138         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1139         u32 av;
1140         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1141         int rc;
1142
1143         tsec = current->security;
1144         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1145         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1146         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1147         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1148
1149         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1150
1151         ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1152         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1153                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1154         if (rc)
1155                 return rc;
1156         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1157                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1158         if (rc)
1159                 return rc;
1160         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1161                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1162                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1163                 if (rc)
1164                         return rc;
1165         }
1166
1167         ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1168         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1169         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1170                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1171         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1172         if (rc)
1173                 return rc;
1174         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1175                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1176                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1177                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1178                                   new_isec->sclass,
1179                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1180                 if (rc)
1181                         return rc;
1182         }
1183
1184         return 0;
1185 }
1186
1187 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1188 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1189                                struct super_block *sb,
1190                                u32 perms,
1191                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1192 {
1193         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1195
1196         tsec = tsk->security;
1197         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1198         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1199                             perms, ad);
1200 }
1201
1202 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1203 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1204 {
1205         u32 av = 0;
1206
1207         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1208                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1209                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1210                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1211                         av |= FILE__READ;
1212
1213                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1214                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1215                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1216                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1217
1218         } else {
1219                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1220                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1221                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1222                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1223                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1224                         av |= DIR__READ;
1225         }
1226
1227         return av;
1228 }
1229
1230 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1231 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1232 {
1233         u32 av = 0;
1234
1235         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1236                 av |= FILE__READ;
1237         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1238                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1239                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1240                 else
1241                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1242         }
1243
1244         return av;
1245 }
1246
1247 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1248 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1249 {
1250         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1251         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1252
1253         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1254                 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1255                 return 0;
1256         }
1257
1258         down(&isec->sem);
1259         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1260         isec->sid = sid;
1261         isec->initialized = 1;
1262         up(&isec->sem);
1263         return 0;
1264 }
1265
1266 /* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
1267 static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
1268                        struct dentry *dentry)
1269 {
1270
1271         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1272         struct inode *inode;
1273         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1274         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1275         u32 newsid;
1276         char *context;
1277         unsigned int len;
1278         int rc;
1279
1280         tsec = current->security;
1281         dsec = dir->i_security;
1282         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1283
1284         inode = dentry->d_inode;
1285         if (!inode) {
1286                 /* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
1287                    a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
1288                    so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
1289                 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
1290                        "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
1291                 return 0;
1292         }
1293
1294         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1295                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1296         } else {
1297                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1298                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1299                                              &newsid);
1300                 if (rc) {
1301                         printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  "
1302                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1303                                "ino=%ld)\n",
1304                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1305                         return rc;
1306                 }
1307         }
1308
1309         rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1310         if (rc) {
1311                 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  inode_security_set_sid "
1312                        "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1313                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1314                 return rc;
1315         }
1316
1317         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
1318             inode->i_op->setxattr) {
1319                 /* Use extended attributes. */
1320                 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
1321                 if (rc) {
1322                         printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  sid_to_context "
1323                                "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1324                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1325                         return rc;
1326                 }
1327                 down(&inode->i_sem);
1328                 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
1329                                            XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1330                                            context, len, 0);
1331                 up(&inode->i_sem);
1332                 kfree(context);
1333                 if (rc < 0) {
1334                         printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create:  setxattr failed, "
1335                                "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1336                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1337                         return rc;
1338                 }
1339         }
1340
1341         return 0;
1342 }
1343
1344
1345 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1346
1347 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1348 {
1349         struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1350         struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1351         int rc;
1352
1353         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1354         if (rc)
1355                 return rc;
1356
1357         rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1358         /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1359         if (!rc)
1360                 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1361         return rc;
1362 }
1363
1364 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1365                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1366 {
1367         int error;
1368
1369         error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1370         if (error)
1371                 return error;
1372
1373         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1374 }
1375
1376 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1377                                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1378 {
1379         int error;
1380
1381         error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1382         if (error)
1383                 return error;
1384
1385         return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1386 }
1387
1388 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1389                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1390 {
1391         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1392 }
1393
1394 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1395 {
1396         int rc;
1397
1398         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1399         if (rc)
1400                 return rc;
1401
1402         return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1403 }
1404
1405 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1406 {
1407         int error = 0;
1408         u32 av;
1409         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1410         u32 tsid;
1411         int rc;
1412
1413         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1414         if (rc)
1415                 return rc;
1416
1417         tsec = current->security;
1418
1419         rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1420                                   SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1421         if (rc) {
1422                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1423                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1424         }
1425
1426         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1427          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1428         if(op == 001) {
1429                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1430                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1431         } else {
1432                 av = 0;
1433                 if (op & 004)
1434                         av |= FILE__READ;
1435                 if (op & 002)
1436                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1437                 if (av)
1438                         error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1439                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1440         }
1441
1442         return error;
1443 }
1444
1445 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1446 {
1447         int rc = 0;
1448
1449         if (!sb)
1450                 return 0;
1451
1452         switch (cmds) {
1453                 case Q_SYNC:
1454                 case Q_QUOTAON:
1455                 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1456                 case Q_SETINFO:
1457                 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1458                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1459                                                  sb,
1460                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1461                         break;
1462                 case Q_GETFMT:
1463                 case Q_GETINFO:
1464                 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1465                         rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1466                                                  sb,
1467                                                  FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1468                         break;
1469                 default:
1470                         rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1471                         break;
1472         }
1473         return rc;
1474 }
1475
1476 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1477 {
1478         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1479 }
1480
1481 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1482 {
1483         int rc;
1484
1485         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1486         if (rc)
1487                 return rc;
1488
1489         switch (type) {
1490                 case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
1491                 case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
1492                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1493                         break;
1494                 case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
1495                 case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
1496                 case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1497                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1498                         break;
1499                 case 0:         /* Close log */
1500                 case 1:         /* Open log */
1501                 case 2:         /* Read from log */
1502                 case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1503                 case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
1504                 default:
1505                         rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1506                         break;
1507         }
1508         return rc;
1509 }
1510
1511 /*
1512  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1513  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1514  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1515  *
1516  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1517  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1518  * the capability is granted.
1519  *
1520  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1521  * processes that allocate mappings.
1522  */
1523 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1524 {
1525         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1526         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1527
1528         rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1529         if (rc == 0)
1530                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1531                                         SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1532                                         CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1533                                         NULL);
1534
1535         if (rc == 0)
1536                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1537
1538         return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1539 }
1540
1541 /* binprm security operations */
1542
1543 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1544 {
1545         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1546
1547         bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1548         if (!bsec)
1549                 return -ENOMEM;
1550
1551         memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
1552         bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1553         bsec->bprm = bprm;
1554         bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1555         bsec->set = 0;
1556
1557         bprm->security = bsec;
1558         return 0;
1559 }
1560
1561 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1562 {
1563         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1564         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1565         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1566         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1567         u32 newsid;
1568         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1569         int rc;
1570
1571         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1572         if (rc)
1573                 return rc;
1574
1575         bsec = bprm->security;
1576
1577         if (bsec->set)
1578                 return 0;
1579
1580         tsec = current->security;
1581         isec = inode->i_security;
1582
1583         /* Default to the current task SID. */
1584         bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1585
1586         /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1587         tsec->create_sid = 0;
1588
1589         if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1590                 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1591                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1592                 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1593         } else {
1594                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1595                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1596                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1597                 if (rc)
1598                         return rc;
1599         }
1600
1601         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1602         ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1603         ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1604
1605         if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1606                 newsid = tsec->sid;
1607
1608         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1609                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1610                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1611                 if (rc)
1612                         return rc;
1613         } else {
1614                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1615                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1616                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1617                 if (rc)
1618                         return rc;
1619
1620                 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1621                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1622                 if (rc)
1623                         return rc;
1624
1625                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1626                 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1627
1628                 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1629                 bsec->sid = newsid;
1630         }
1631
1632         bsec->set = 1;
1633         return 0;
1634 }
1635
1636 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1637 {
1638         return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1639 }
1640
1641
1642 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1643 {
1644         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1645         int atsecure = 0;
1646
1647         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1648                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1649                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
1650                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1651                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1652                                          SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1653                                          PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1654         }
1655
1656         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1657 }
1658
1659 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1660 {
1661         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec = bprm->security;
1662         bprm->security = NULL;
1663         kfree(bsec);
1664 }
1665
1666 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1667 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1668
1669 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1670 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1671 {
1672         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1673         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1674         struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1675         long j = -1;
1676
1677         if (tty) {
1678                 file_list_lock();
1679                 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
1680                 if (file) {
1681                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1682                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1683                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1684                            file may belong to another process and we are only
1685                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
1686                         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1687                         if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1688                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1689                                 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1690                                 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1691                                 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1692                         }
1693                 }
1694                 file_list_unlock();
1695         }
1696
1697         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1698
1699         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1700
1701         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1702         for (;;) {
1703                 unsigned long set, i;
1704                 int fd;
1705
1706                 j++;
1707                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1708                 if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
1709                         break;
1710                 set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1711                 if (!set)
1712                         continue;
1713                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1714                 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1715                         if (set & 1) {
1716                                 file = fget(i);
1717                                 if (!file)
1718                                         continue;
1719                                 if (file_has_perm(current,
1720                                                   file,
1721                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
1722                                         sys_close(i);
1723                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
1724                                         if (fd != i) {
1725                                                 if (fd >= 0)
1726                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1727                                                 fput(file);
1728                                                 continue;
1729                                         }
1730                                         if (devnull) {
1731                                                 atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1732                                         } else {
1733                                                 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1734                                                 if (!devnull) {
1735                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
1736                                                         fput(file);
1737                                                         continue;
1738                                                 }
1739                                         }
1740                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
1741                                 }
1742                                 fput(file);
1743                         }
1744                 }
1745                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1746
1747         }
1748         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1749 }
1750
1751 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1752 {
1753         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1754         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1755         u32 sid;
1756         int rc;
1757
1758         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1759
1760         tsec = current->security;
1761
1762         bsec = bprm->security;
1763         sid = bsec->sid;
1764
1765         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1766         bsec->unsafe = 0;
1767         if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1768                 /* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
1769                    unchanged and kill. */
1770                 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1771                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1772                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1773                         if (rc) {
1774                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1775                                 return;
1776                         }
1777                 }
1778
1779                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1780                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1781                 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1782                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1783                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1784                                           NULL);
1785                         if (rc) {
1786                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1787                                 return;
1788                         }
1789                 }
1790                 tsec->sid = sid;
1791         }
1792 }
1793
1794 /*
1795  * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1796  */
1797 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1798 {
1799         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1800         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1801         struct itimerval itimer;
1802         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1803         int rc, i;
1804
1805         tsec = current->security;
1806         bsec = bprm->security;
1807
1808         if (bsec->unsafe) {
1809                 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1810                 return;
1811         }
1812         if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1813                 return;
1814
1815         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1816         flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1817
1818         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1819            from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
1820            subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1821            signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1822           been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1823           will be checked against the new SID. */
1824         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1825                           PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1826         if (rc) {
1827                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1828                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1829                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1830                 flush_signals(current);
1831                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1832                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1833                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1834                 recalc_sigpending();
1835                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1836         }
1837
1838         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1839            from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
1840            the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1841            task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
1842            (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1843            check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1844            the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1845            than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1846            is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1847            RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1848         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1849                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1850         if (rc) {
1851                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1852                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1853                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1854                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1855                 }
1856                 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1857                         /*
1858                          * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1859                          * to be refigured.
1860                          */
1861                         current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1862                 }
1863         }
1864
1865         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1866            recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1867         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1868 }
1869
1870 /* superblock security operations */
1871
1872 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1873 {
1874         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1875 }
1876
1877 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1878 {
1879         superblock_free_security(sb);
1880 }
1881
1882 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1883 {
1884         if (plen > olen)
1885                 return 0;
1886
1887         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1888 }
1889
1890 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1891 {
1892         return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1893                 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1894                 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1895 }
1896
1897 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1898 {
1899         if (!*first) {
1900                 **to = ',';
1901                 *to += 1;
1902         }
1903         else
1904                 *first = 0;
1905         memcpy(*to, from, len);
1906         *to += len;
1907 }
1908
1909 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1910 {
1911         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1912         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1913         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1914
1915         in_curr = orig;
1916         sec_curr = copy;
1917
1918         /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1919         if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1920                 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1921                 goto out;
1922         }
1923
1924         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1925         if (!nosec) {
1926                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1927                 goto out;
1928         }
1929
1930         nosec_save = nosec;
1931         fnosec = fsec = 1;
1932         in_save = in_end = orig;
1933
1934         do {
1935                 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1936                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
1937
1938                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1939                                 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1940                         else
1941                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1942
1943                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
1944                 }
1945         } while (*in_end++);
1946
1947         copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
1948         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1949 out:
1950         return rc;
1951 }
1952
1953 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1954 {
1955         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1956         int rc;
1957
1958         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1959         if (rc)
1960                 return rc;
1961
1962         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1963         ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1964         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1965 }
1966
1967 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1968 {
1969         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1970
1971         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1972         ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1973         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1974 }
1975
1976 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1977                          struct nameidata *nd,
1978                          char * type,
1979                          unsigned long flags,
1980                          void * data)
1981 {
1982         int rc;
1983
1984         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1985         if (rc)
1986                 return rc;
1987
1988         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1989                 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1990                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1991         else
1992                 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1993                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
1994 }
1995
1996 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1997 {
1998         int rc;
1999
2000         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2001         if (rc)
2002                 return rc;
2003
2004         return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2005                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2006 }
2007
2008 /* inode security operations */
2009
2010 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2011 {
2012         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2013 }
2014
2015 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2016 {
2017         inode_free_security(inode);
2018 }
2019
2020 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2021 {
2022         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2023 }
2024
2025 static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2026 {
2027         post_create(dir, dentry);
2028 }
2029
2030 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2031 {
2032         int rc;
2033
2034         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2035         if (rc)
2036                 return rc;
2037         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2038 }
2039
2040 static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2041 {
2042         return;
2043 }
2044
2045 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2046 {
2047         int rc;
2048
2049         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2050         if (rc)
2051                 return rc;
2052         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2053 }
2054
2055 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2056 {
2057         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2058 }
2059
2060 static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2061 {
2062         post_create(dir, dentry);
2063 }
2064
2065 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2066 {
2067         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2068 }
2069
2070 static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2071 {
2072         post_create(dir, dentry);
2073 }
2074
2075 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2076 {
2077         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2078 }
2079
2080 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2081 {
2082         int rc;
2083
2084         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2085         if (rc)
2086                 return rc;
2087
2088         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2089 }
2090
2091 static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2092 {
2093         post_create(dir, dentry);
2094 }
2095
2096 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2097                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2098 {
2099         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2100 }
2101
2102 static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2103                                       struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2104 {
2105         return;
2106 }
2107
2108 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2109 {
2110         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2111 }
2112
2113 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2114 {
2115         int rc;
2116
2117         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2118         if (rc)
2119                 return rc;
2120         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2121 }
2122
2123 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2124                                     struct nameidata *nd)
2125 {
2126         int rc;
2127
2128         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2129         if (rc)
2130                 return rc;
2131
2132         if (!mask) {
2133                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2134                 return 0;
2135         }
2136
2137         return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2138                                file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2139 }
2140
2141 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2142 {
2143         int rc;
2144
2145         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2146         if (rc)
2147                 return rc;
2148
2149         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2150                 return 0;
2151
2152         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2153                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2154                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2155
2156         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2157 }
2158
2159 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2160 {
2161         return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2162 }
2163
2164 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2165 {
2166         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2167         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2168         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2169         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2170         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2171         u32 newsid;
2172         int rc = 0;
2173
2174         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2175                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2176                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2177                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2178                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2179                            Restrict to administrator. */
2180                         return -EPERM;
2181                 }
2182
2183                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2184                    ordinary setattr permission. */
2185                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2186         }
2187
2188         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2189         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2190                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2191
2192         if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2193                 return -EPERM;
2194
2195         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2196         ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2197
2198         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2199                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2200         if (rc)
2201                 return rc;
2202
2203         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2204         if (rc)
2205                 return rc;
2206
2207         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2208                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2209         if (rc)
2210                 return rc;
2211
2212         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2213                                           isec->sclass);
2214         if (rc)
2215                 return rc;
2216
2217         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2218                             sbsec->sid,
2219                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2220                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2221                             &ad);
2222 }
2223
2224 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2225                                         void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2226 {
2227         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2228         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2229         u32 newsid;
2230         int rc;
2231
2232         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2233                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2234                 return;
2235         }
2236
2237         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2238         if (rc) {
2239                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  unable to obtain SID for context "
2240                        "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2241                 return;
2242         }
2243
2244         isec->sid = newsid;
2245         return;
2246 }
2247
2248 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2249 {
2250         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2251         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2252
2253         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2254                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2255
2256         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2257 }
2258
2259 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2260 {
2261         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2262 }
2263
2264 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2265 {
2266         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2267                 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2268                              sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2269                     !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2270                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2271                            Restrict to administrator. */
2272                         return -EPERM;
2273                 }
2274
2275                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2276                    ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2277                    permission for removexattr. */
2278                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2279         }
2280
2281         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2282            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2283         return -EACCES;
2284 }
2285
2286 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
2287 {
2288         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2289         char *context;
2290         unsigned len;
2291         int rc;
2292
2293         /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
2294
2295         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2296                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2297
2298         rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2299         if (rc)
2300                 return rc;
2301
2302         if (!buffer || !size) {
2303                 kfree(context);
2304                 return len;
2305         }
2306         if (size < len) {
2307                 kfree(context);
2308                 return -ERANGE;
2309         }
2310         memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2311         kfree(context);
2312         return len;
2313 }
2314
2315 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2316                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2317 {
2318         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2319         u32 newsid;
2320         int rc;
2321
2322         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2323                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2324
2325         if (!value || !size)
2326                 return -EACCES;
2327
2328         rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2329         if (rc)
2330                 return rc;
2331
2332         isec->sid = newsid;
2333         return 0;
2334 }
2335
2336 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2337 {
2338         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2339         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2340                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2341         return len;
2342 }
2343
2344 /* file security operations */
2345
2346 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2347 {
2348         struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2349
2350         if (!mask) {
2351                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2352                 return 0;
2353         }
2354
2355         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2356         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2357                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2358
2359         return file_has_perm(current, file,
2360                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2361 }
2362
2363 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2364 {
2365         return file_alloc_security(file);
2366 }
2367
2368 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2369 {
2370         file_free_security(file);
2371 }
2372
2373 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2374                               unsigned long arg)
2375 {
2376         int error = 0;
2377
2378         switch (cmd) {
2379                 case FIONREAD:
2380                 /* fall through */
2381                 case FIBMAP:
2382                 /* fall through */
2383                 case FIGETBSZ:
2384                 /* fall through */
2385                 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2386                 /* fall through */
2387                 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2388                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2389                         break;
2390
2391                 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2392                 /* fall through */
2393                 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2394                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2395                         break;
2396
2397                 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2398                 case FIONBIO:
2399                 /* fall through */
2400                 case FIOASYNC:
2401                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2402                         break;
2403
2404                 case KDSKBENT:
2405                 case KDSKBSENT:
2406                         error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2407                         break;
2408
2409                 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2410                  * to the file's ioctl() function.
2411                  */
2412                 default:
2413                         error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2414
2415         }
2416         return error;
2417 }
2418
2419 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2420 {
2421 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2422         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2423                 /*
2424                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2425                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2426                  * This has an additional check.
2427                  */
2428                 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2429                 if (rc)
2430                         return rc;
2431         }
2432 #endif
2433
2434         if (file) {
2435                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2436                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2437
2438                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2439                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2440                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2441
2442                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2443                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2444
2445                 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2446         }
2447         return 0;
2448 }
2449
2450 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2451                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2452 {
2453         int rc;
2454
2455         rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2456         if (rc)
2457                 return rc;
2458
2459         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2460                 prot = reqprot;
2461
2462         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2463                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2464 }
2465
2466 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2467                                  unsigned long reqprot,
2468                                  unsigned long prot)
2469 {
2470         int rc;
2471
2472         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2473         if (rc)
2474                 return rc;
2475
2476         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2477                 prot = reqprot;
2478
2479 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2480         if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
2481                 /*
2482                  * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2483                  * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
2484                  * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
2485                  * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
2486                  */
2487                 int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
2488                 if (rc)
2489                         return rc;
2490         }
2491 #endif
2492
2493         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2494 }
2495
2496 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2497 {
2498         return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2499 }
2500
2501 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2502                               unsigned long arg)
2503 {
2504         int err = 0;
2505
2506         switch (cmd) {
2507                 case F_SETFL:
2508                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2509                                 err = -EINVAL;
2510                                 break;
2511                         }
2512
2513                         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2514                                 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2515                                 break;
2516                         }
2517                         /* fall through */
2518                 case F_SETOWN:
2519                 case F_SETSIG:
2520                 case F_GETFL:
2521                 case F_GETOWN:
2522                 case F_GETSIG:
2523                         /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2524                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2525                         break;
2526                 case F_GETLK:
2527                 case F_SETLK:
2528                 case F_SETLKW:
2529 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2530                 case F_GETLK64:
2531                 case F_SETLK64:
2532                 case F_SETLKW64:
2533 #endif
2534                         if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2535                                 err = -EINVAL;
2536                                 break;
2537                         }
2538                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2539                         break;
2540         }
2541
2542         return err;
2543 }
2544
2545 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2546 {
2547         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2548         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2549
2550         tsec = current->security;
2551         fsec = file->f_security;
2552         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2553
2554         return 0;
2555 }
2556
2557 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2558                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2559 {
2560         struct file *file;
2561         u32 perm;
2562         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2563         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2564
2565         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2566         file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2567
2568         tsec = tsk->security;
2569         fsec = file->f_security;
2570
2571         if (!signum)
2572                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2573         else
2574                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2575
2576         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2577                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2578 }
2579
2580 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2581 {
2582         return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2583 }
2584
2585 /* task security operations */
2586
2587 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2588 {
2589         int rc;
2590
2591         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2592         if (rc)
2593                 return rc;
2594
2595         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2596 }
2597
2598 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2599 {
2600         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2601         int rc;
2602
2603         tsec1 = current->security;
2604
2605         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2606         if (rc)
2607                 return rc;
2608         tsec2 = tsk->security;
2609
2610         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2611         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2612
2613         /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2614         tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2615         tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2616
2617         /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2618            This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2619            subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2620         tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2621
2622         return 0;
2623 }
2624
2625 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2626 {
2627         task_free_security(tsk);
2628 }
2629
2630 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2631 {
2632         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2633            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2634            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2635            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
2636            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2637            capable hook. */
2638         return 0;
2639 }
2640
2641 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2642 {
2643         return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2644 }
2645
2646 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2647 {
2648         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2649         return 0;
2650 }
2651
2652 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2653 {
2654         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2655 }
2656
2657 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2658 {
2659         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2660 }
2661
2662 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2663 {
2664         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2665 }
2666
2667 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2668 {
2669         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2670         return 0;
2671 }
2672
2673 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2674 {
2675         int rc;
2676
2677         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2678         if (rc)
2679                 return rc;
2680
2681         return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2682 }
2683
2684 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2685 {
2686         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2687         int rc;
2688
2689         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2690         if (rc)
2691                 return rc;
2692
2693         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2694            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2695            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2696            upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2697         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2698                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2699
2700         return 0;
2701 }
2702
2703 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2704 {
2705         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2706 }
2707
2708 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2709 {
2710         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2711 }
2712
2713 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2714 {
2715         u32 perm;
2716         int rc;
2717
2718         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2719         if (rc)
2720                 return rc;
2721
2722         if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
2723                      (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2724                 return 0;
2725
2726         if (!sig)
2727                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2728         else
2729                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2730
2731         return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2732 }
2733
2734 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2735                               unsigned long arg2,
2736                               unsigned long arg3,
2737                               unsigned long arg4,
2738                               unsigned long arg5)
2739 {
2740         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2741            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2742            the state of the current process. */
2743         return 0;
2744 }
2745
2746 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2747 {
2748         u32 perm;
2749
2750         perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2751
2752         return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2753 }
2754
2755 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2756 {
2757         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2758
2759         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2760
2761         tsec = p->security;
2762         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2763         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2764         return;
2765 }
2766
2767 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2768                                   struct inode *inode)
2769 {
2770         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2771         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2772
2773         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2774         isec->initialized = 1;
2775         return;
2776 }
2777
2778 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2779
2780 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2781 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2782 {
2783         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2784         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2785
2786         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2787         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2788         if (ih == NULL)
2789                 goto out;
2790
2791         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2792         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2793                 goto out;
2794
2795         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2796         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2797         ret = 0;
2798
2799         switch (ih->protocol) {
2800         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2801                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2802
2803                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2804                         break;
2805
2806                 offset += ihlen;
2807                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2808                 if (th == NULL)
2809                         break;
2810
2811                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2812                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2813                 break;
2814         }
2815
2816         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2817                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2818
2819                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2820                         break;
2821
2822                 offset += ihlen;
2823                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2824                 if (uh == NULL)
2825                         break;
2826
2827                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2828                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2829                 break;
2830         }
2831
2832         default:
2833                 break;
2834         }
2835 out:
2836         return ret;
2837 }
2838
2839 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2840
2841 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2842 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2843 {
2844         u8 nexthdr;
2845         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2846         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2847
2848         offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2849         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2850         if (ip6 == NULL)
2851                 goto out;
2852
2853         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2854         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2855         ret = 0;
2856
2857         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2858         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2859         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2860         if (offset < 0)
2861                 goto out;
2862
2863         switch (nexthdr) {
2864         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
2865                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2866
2867                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2868                 if (th == NULL)
2869                         break;
2870
2871                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2872                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2873                 break;
2874         }
2875
2876         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
2877                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2878
2879                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2880                 if (uh == NULL)
2881                         break;
2882
2883                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2884                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2885                 break;
2886         }
2887
2888         /* includes fragments */
2889         default:
2890                 break;
2891         }
2892 out:
2893         return ret;
2894 }
2895
2896 #endif /* IPV6 */
2897
2898 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2899                              char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2900 {
2901         int ret = 0;
2902
2903         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2904         case PF_INET:
2905                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2906                 if (ret || !addrp)
2907                         break;
2908                 *len = 4;
2909                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2910                                         &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2911                 break;
2912
2913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2914         case PF_INET6:
2915                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2916                 if (ret || !addrp)
2917                         break;
2918                 *len = 16;
2919                 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2920                                         &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2921                 break;
2922 #endif  /* IPV6 */
2923         default:
2924                 break;
2925         }
2926
2927         return ret;
2928 }
2929
2930 /* socket security operations */
2931 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2932                            u32 perms)
2933 {
2934         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2935         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2936         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2937         int err = 0;
2938
2939         tsec = task->security;
2940         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2941
2942         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2943                 goto out;
2944
2945         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2946         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2947         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2948
2949 out:
2950         return err;
2951 }
2952
2953 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2954                                  int protocol, int kern)
2955 {
2956         int err = 0;
2957         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2958
2959         if (kern)
2960                 goto out;
2961
2962         tsec = current->security;
2963         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2964                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2965                            protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2966
2967 out:
2968         return err;
2969 }
2970
2971 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2972                                        int type, int protocol, int kern)
2973 {
2974         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2975         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2976
2977         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2978
2979         tsec = current->security;
2980         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2981         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2982         isec->initialized = 1;
2983
2984         return;
2985 }
2986
2987 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2988    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2989    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2990 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2991 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2992
2993 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2994 {
2995         u16 family;
2996         int err;
2997
2998         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2999         if (err)
3000                 goto out;
3001
3002         /*
3003          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3004          */
3005         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3006         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3007                 char *addrp;
3008                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3009                 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3010                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3011                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3012                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3013                 unsigned short snum;
3014                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3015                 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3016
3017                 tsec = current->security;
3018                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3019
3020                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3021                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3022                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3023                         addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3024                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3025                 } else {
3026                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3027                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3028                         addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3029                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3030                 }
3031
3032                 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3033                            snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3034                         err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3035                                                 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3036                         if (err)
3037                                 goto out;
3038                         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3039                         ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3040                         ad.u.net.family = family;
3041                         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3042                                            isec->sclass,
3043                                            SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3044                         if (err)
3045                                 goto out;
3046                 }
3047
3048                 switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
3049                 case IPPROTO_TCP:
3050                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3051                         break;
3052
3053                 case IPPROTO_UDP:
3054                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3055                         break;
3056
3057                 default:
3058                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3059                         break;
3060                 }
3061
3062                 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3063                 if (err)
3064                         goto out;
3065
3066                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3067                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3068                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3069
3070                 if (family == PF_INET)
3071                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3072                 else
3073                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3074
3075                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3076                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3077                 if (err)
3078                         goto out;
3079         }
3080 out:
3081         return err;
3082 }
3083
3084 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3085 {
3086         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3087         int err;
3088
3089         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3090         if (err)
3091                 return err;
3092
3093         /*
3094          * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3095          */
3096         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3097         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3098                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3099                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3100                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3101                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3102                 unsigned short snum;
3103                 u32 sid;
3104
3105                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3106                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3107                         if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3108                                 return -EINVAL;
3109                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3110                 } else {
3111                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3112                         if (addrlen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
3113                                 return -EINVAL;
3114                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3115                 }
3116
3117                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3118                                         sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3119                 if (err)
3120                         goto out;
3121
3122                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3123                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3124                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3125                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3126                                    TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3127                 if (err)
3128                         goto out;
3129         }
3130
3131 out:
3132         return err;
3133 }
3134
3135 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3136 {
3137         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3138 }
3139
3140 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3141 {
3142         int err;
3143         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3144         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3145
3146         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3147         if (err)
3148                 return err;
3149
3150         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3151
3152         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3153         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3154         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3155         newisec->initialized = 1;
3156
3157         return 0;
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3161                                   int size)
3162 {
3163         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3164 }
3165
3166 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3167                                   int size, int flags)
3168 {
3169         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3170 }
3171
3172 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3173 {
3174         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3175 }
3176
3177 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3178 {
3179         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3180 }
3181
3182 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3183 {
3184         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3185 }
3186
3187 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3188                                      int optname)
3189 {
3190         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3191 }
3192
3193 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3194 {
3195         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3196 }
3197
3198 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3199                                               struct socket *other,
3200                                               struct sock *newsk)
3201 {
3202         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3203         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3204         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3205         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3206         int err;
3207
3208         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3209         if (err)
3210                 return err;
3211
3212         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3213         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3214
3215         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3216         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3217
3218         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3219                            isec->sclass,
3220                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3221         if (err)
3222                 return err;
3223
3224         /* connecting socket */
3225         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3226         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3227
3228         /* server child socket */
3229         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3230         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3231
3232         return 0;
3233 }
3234
3235 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3236                                         struct socket *other)
3237 {
3238         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3239         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3240         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3241         int err;
3242
3243         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3244         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3245
3246         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3247         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3248
3249         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3250                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3251         if (err)
3252                 return err;
3253
3254         return 0;
3255 }
3256
3257 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3258 {
3259         u16 family;
3260         char *addrp;
3261         int len, err = 0;
3262         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3263         u32 sock_sid = 0;
3264         u16 sock_class = 0;
3265         struct socket *sock;
3266         struct net_device *dev;
3267         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3268
3269         family = sk->sk_family;
3270         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3271                 goto out;
3272
3273         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3274         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3275                 family = PF_INET;
3276
3277         read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3278         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3279         if (sock) {
3280                 struct inode *inode;
3281                 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3282                 if (inode) {
3283                         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3284                         isec = inode->i_security;
3285                         sock_sid = isec->sid;
3286                         sock_class = isec->sclass;
3287                 }
3288         }
3289         read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3290         if (!sock_sid)
3291                 goto out;
3292
3293         dev = skb->dev;
3294         if (!dev)
3295                 goto out;
3296
3297         err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3298         if (err)
3299                 goto out;
3300
3301         switch (sock_class) {
3302         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3303                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3304                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3305                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3306                 break;
3307
3308         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3309                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3310                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3311                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3312                 break;
3313
3314         default:
3315                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3316                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3317                 break;
3318         }
3319
3320         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3321         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3322         ad.u.net.family = family;
3323
3324         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3325         if (err)
3326                 goto out;
3327
3328         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3329         if (err)
3330                 goto out;
3331
3332         /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3333         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3334         if (err)
3335                 goto out;
3336
3337         err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3338         if (err)
3339                 goto out;
3340
3341         if (recv_perm) {
3342                 u32 port_sid;
3343
3344                 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3345                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3346                                         sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3347                                         &port_sid);
3348                 if (err)
3349                         goto out;
3350
3351                 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3352                                    sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3353         }
3354 out:
3355         return err;
3356 }
3357
3358 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3359                                      int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3360 {
3361         int err = 0;
3362         char *scontext;
3363         u32 scontext_len;
3364         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3365         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3366
3367         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3368         if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3369                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
3370                 goto out;
3371         }
3372
3373         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3374
3375         err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3376         if (err)
3377                 goto out;
3378
3379         if (scontext_len > len) {
3380                 err = -ERANGE;
3381                 goto out_len;
3382         }
3383
3384         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3385                 err = -EFAULT;
3386
3387 out_len:
3388         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3389                 err = -EFAULT;
3390
3391         kfree(scontext);
3392 out:
3393         return err;
3394 }
3395
3396 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
3397 {
3398         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3399 }
3400
3401 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3402 {
3403         sk_free_security(sk);
3404 }
3405
3406 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3407 {
3408         int err = 0;
3409         u32 perm;
3410         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3411         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3412         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3413
3414         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3415                 err = -EINVAL;
3416                 goto out;
3417         }
3418         nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3419
3420         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3421         if (err) {
3422                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3423                         audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3424                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
3425                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3426                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3427                         if (!selinux_enforcing)
3428                                 err = 0;
3429                 }
3430
3431                 /* Ignore */
3432                 if (err == -ENOENT)
3433                         err = 0;
3434                 goto out;
3435         }
3436
3437         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3438 out:
3439         return err;
3440 }
3441
3442 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3443
3444 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3445                                               struct sk_buff **pskb,
3446                                               const struct net_device *in,
3447                                               const struct net_device *out,
3448                                               int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3449                                               u16 family)
3450 {
3451         char *addrp;
3452         int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3453         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3454         struct sock *sk;
3455         struct socket *sock;
3456         struct inode *inode;
3457         struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3458         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3459         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3460         struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3461
3462         sk = skb->sk;
3463         if (!sk)
3464                 goto out;
3465
3466         sock = sk->sk_socket;
3467         if (!sock)
3468                 goto out;
3469
3470         inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3471         if (!inode)
3472                 goto out;
3473
3474         err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3475         if (err)
3476                 goto out;
3477
3478         isec = inode->i_security;
3479
3480         switch (isec->sclass) {
3481         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3482                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3483                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3484                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3485                 break;
3486
3487         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3488                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3489                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3490                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3491                 break;
3492
3493         default:
3494                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3495                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3496                 break;
3497         }
3498
3499
3500         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3501         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3502         ad.u.net.family = family;
3503
3504         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3505                                 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3506         if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3507                 goto out;
3508
3509         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3510                            netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3511         if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3512                 goto out;
3513
3514         /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3515         err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3516                                 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3517         if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3518                 goto out;
3519
3520         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3521                            node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3522         if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3523                 goto out;
3524
3525         if (send_perm) {
3526                 u32 port_sid;
3527
3528                 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3529                 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3530                                         sk->sk_type,
3531                                         sk->sk_protocol,
3532                                         ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3533                                         &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3534                 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3535                         goto out;
3536
3537                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3538                                    send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3539         }
3540
3541 out:
3542         return err;
3543 }
3544
3545 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3546                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3547                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3548                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3549                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3550 {
3551         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3552 }
3553
3554 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3555
3556 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3557                                                 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3558                                                 const struct net_device *in,
3559                                                 const struct net_device *out,
3560                                                 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3561 {
3562         return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3563 }
3564
3565 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3566
3567 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3568
3569 #else
3570
3571 static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3572 {
3573         return 0;
3574 }
3575
3576 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
3577
3578 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3579 {
3580         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3581         struct av_decision avd;
3582         int err;
3583
3584         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3585         if (err)
3586                 return err;
3587
3588         tsec = current->security;
3589
3590         avd.allowed = 0;
3591         avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3592                                 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3593         cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3594
3595         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3596                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3597
3598         return err;
3599 }
3600
3601 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3602 {
3603         if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3604                 return -EPERM;
3605         return 0;
3606 }
3607
3608 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3609                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3610                               u16 sclass)
3611 {
3612         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3613         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3614
3615         isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3616         if (!isec)
3617                 return -ENOMEM;
3618
3619         memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
3620         isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3621         isec->sclass = sclass;
3622         isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3623         if (tsec) {
3624                 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3625         } else {
3626                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3627         }
3628         perm->security = isec;
3629
3630         return 0;
3631 }
3632
3633 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3634 {
3635         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3636         if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3637                 return;
3638
3639         perm->security = NULL;
3640         kfree(isec);
3641 }
3642
3643 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3644 {
3645         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3646
3647         msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3648         if (!msec)
3649                 return -ENOMEM;
3650
3651         memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
3652         msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3653         msec->msg = msg;
3654         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3655         msg->security = msec;
3656
3657         return 0;
3658 }
3659
3660 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3661 {
3662         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3663         if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3664                 return;
3665
3666         msg->security = NULL;
3667         kfree(msec);
3668 }
3669
3670 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3671                         u32 perms)
3672 {
3673         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3674         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3675         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3676
3677         tsec = current->security;
3678         isec = ipc_perms->security;
3679
3680         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3681         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3682
3683         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3684 }
3685
3686 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3687 {
3688         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3689 }
3690
3691 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3692 {
3693         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3694 }
3695
3696 /* message queue security operations */
3697 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3698 {
3699         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3700         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3701         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3702         int rc;
3703
3704         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3705         if (rc)
3706                 return rc;
3707
3708         tsec = current->security;
3709         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3710
3711         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3712         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3713
3714         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3715                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
3716         if (rc) {
3717                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3718                 return rc;
3719         }
3720         return 0;
3721 }
3722
3723 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3724 {
3725         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3726 }
3727
3728 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3729 {
3730         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3731         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3732         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3733
3734         tsec = current->security;
3735         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3736
3737         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3738         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3739
3740         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3741                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3742 }
3743
3744 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3745 {
3746         int err;
3747         int perms;
3748
3749         switch(cmd) {
3750         case IPC_INFO:
3751         case MSG_INFO:
3752                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3753                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3754         case IPC_STAT:
3755         case MSG_STAT:
3756                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3757                 break;
3758         case IPC_SET:
3759                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3760                 break;
3761         case IPC_RMID:
3762                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3763                 break;
3764         default:
3765                 return 0;
3766         }
3767
3768         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3769         return err;
3770 }
3771
3772 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3773 {
3774         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3775         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3776         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3777         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3778         int rc;
3779
3780         tsec = current->security;
3781         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3782         msec = msg->security;
3783
3784         /*
3785          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3786          */
3787         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3788                 /*
3789                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
3790                  * message queue this message will be stored in
3791                  */
3792                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3793                                              isec->sid,
3794                                              SECCLASS_MSG,
3795                                              &msec->sid);
3796                 if (rc)
3797                         return rc;
3798         }
3799
3800         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3801         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3802
3803         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3804         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3805                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
3806         if (!rc)
3807                 /* Can this process send the message */
3808                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3809                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3810         if (!rc)
3811                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3812                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3813                                   SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3814
3815         return rc;
3816 }
3817
3818 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3819                                     struct task_struct *target,
3820                                     long type, int mode)
3821 {
3822         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3823         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3824         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3825         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3826         int rc;
3827
3828         tsec = target->security;
3829         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3830         msec = msg->security;
3831
3832         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3833         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3834
3835         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3836                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3837         if (!rc)
3838                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3839                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3840         return rc;
3841 }
3842
3843 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3844 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3845 {
3846         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3847         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3848         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3849         int rc;
3850
3851         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3852         if (rc)
3853                 return rc;
3854
3855         tsec = current->security;
3856         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3857
3858         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3859         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3860
3861         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3862                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
3863         if (rc) {
3864                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3865                 return rc;
3866         }
3867         return 0;
3868 }
3869
3870 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3871 {
3872         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3873 }
3874
3875 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3876 {
3877         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3878         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3879         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3880
3881         tsec = current->security;
3882         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3883
3884         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3885         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3886
3887         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3888                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3889 }
3890
3891 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3892 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3893 {
3894         int perms;
3895         int err;
3896
3897         switch(cmd) {
3898         case IPC_INFO:
3899         case SHM_INFO:
3900                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3901                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3902         case IPC_STAT:
3903         case SHM_STAT:
3904                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3905                 break;
3906         case IPC_SET:
3907                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3908                 break;
3909         case SHM_LOCK:
3910         case SHM_UNLOCK:
3911                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
3912                 break;
3913         case IPC_RMID:
3914                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3915                 break;
3916         default:
3917                 return 0;
3918         }
3919
3920         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3921         return err;
3922 }
3923
3924 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3925                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3926 {
3927         u32 perms;
3928         int rc;
3929
3930         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3931         if (rc)
3932                 return rc;
3933
3934         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3935                 perms = SHM__READ;
3936         else
3937                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3938
3939         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3940 }
3941
3942 /* Semaphore security operations */
3943 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3944 {
3945         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3946         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3947         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3948         int rc;
3949
3950         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3951         if (rc)
3952                 return rc;
3953
3954         tsec = current->security;
3955         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3956
3957         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3958         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3959
3960         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3961                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
3962         if (rc) {
3963                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3964                 return rc;
3965         }
3966         return 0;
3967 }
3968
3969 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3970 {
3971         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3972 }
3973
3974 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3975 {
3976         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3977         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3978         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3979
3980         tsec = current->security;
3981         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3982
3983         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3984         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3985
3986         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3987                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3988 }
3989
3990 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3991 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3992 {
3993         int err;
3994         u32 perms;
3995
3996         switch(cmd) {
3997         case IPC_INFO:
3998         case SEM_INFO:
3999                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4000                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4001         case GETPID:
4002         case GETNCNT:
4003         case GETZCNT:
4004                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4005                 break;
4006         case GETVAL:
4007         case GETALL:
4008                 perms = SEM__READ;
4009                 break;
4010         case SETVAL:
4011         case SETALL:
4012                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
4013                 break;
4014         case IPC_RMID:
4015                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4016                 break;
4017         case IPC_SET:
4018                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4019                 break;
4020         case IPC_STAT:
4021         case SEM_STAT:
4022                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4023                 break;
4024         default:
4025                 return 0;
4026         }
4027
4028         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4029         return err;
4030 }
4031
4032 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4033                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4034 {
4035         u32 perms;
4036
4037         if (alter)
4038                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4039         else
4040                 perms = SEM__READ;
4041
4042         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4043 }
4044
4045 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4046 {
4047         u32 av = 0;
4048
4049         av = 0;
4050         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
4051                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4052         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
4053                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4054
4055         if (av == 0)
4056                 return 0;
4057
4058         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4059 }
4060
4061 /* module stacking operations */
4062 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4063 {
4064         if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4065                 printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  There is already a secondary security "
4066                        "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4067                 return -EINVAL;
4068         }
4069
4070         secondary_ops = ops;
4071
4072         printk(KERN_INFO "%s:  Registering secondary module %s\n",
4073                __FUNCTION__,
4074                name);
4075
4076         return 0;
4077 }
4078
4079 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4080 {
4081         if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4082                 printk (KERN_INFO "%s:  trying to unregister a security module "
4083                         "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4084                 return -EINVAL;
4085         }
4086
4087         secondary_ops = original_ops;
4088
4089         return 0;
4090 }
4091
4092 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4093 {
4094         if (inode)
4095                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4096 }
4097
4098 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4099                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4100 {
4101         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4102         u32 sid, len;
4103         char *context;
4104         int error;
4105
4106         if (current != p) {
4107                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4108                 if (error)
4109                         return error;
4110         }
4111
4112         if (!size)
4113                 return -ERANGE;
4114
4115         tsec = p->security;
4116
4117         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4118                 sid = tsec->sid;
4119         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4120                 sid = tsec->osid;
4121         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4122                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4123         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4124                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4125         else
4126                 return -EINVAL;
4127
4128         if (!sid)
4129                 return 0;
4130
4131         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
4132         if (error)
4133                 return error;
4134         if (len > size) {
4135                 kfree(context);
4136                 return -ERANGE;
4137         }
4138         memcpy(value, context, len);
4139         kfree(context);
4140         return len;
4141 }
4142
4143 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4144                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4145 {
4146         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4147         u32 sid = 0;
4148         int error;
4149         char *str = value;
4150
4151         if (current != p) {
4152                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4153                    security attributes. */
4154                 return -EACCES;
4155         }
4156
4157         /*
4158          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4159          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4160          * above restriction is ever removed.
4161          */
4162         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4163                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4164         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4165                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4166         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4167                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4168         else
4169                 error = -EINVAL;
4170         if (error)
4171                 return error;
4172
4173         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4174         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4175                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4176                         str[size-1] = 0;
4177                         size--;
4178                 }
4179                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4180                 if (error)
4181                         return error;
4182         }
4183
4184         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4185            performed during the actual operation (execve,
4186            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4187            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4188            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4189            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4190         tsec = p->security;
4191         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4192                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4193         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4194                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4195         else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4196                 struct av_decision avd;
4197
4198                 if (sid == 0)
4199                         return -EINVAL;
4200
4201                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4202                 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4203                         struct task_struct *g, *t;
4204                         struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4205                         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4206                         do_each_thread(g, t)
4207                                 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4208                                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4209                                         return -EPERM;
4210                                 }
4211                         while_each_thread(g, t);
4212                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4213                 }
4214
4215                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4216                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4217                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4218                 if (error)
4219                         return error;
4220
4221                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4222                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4223                 task_lock(p);
4224                 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4225                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4226                                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4227                                                      PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4228                         if (!error)
4229                                 tsec->sid = sid;
4230                         task_unlock(p);
4231                         avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4232                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4233                         if (error)
4234                                 return error;
4235                 } else {
4236                         tsec->sid = sid;
4237                         task_unlock(p);
4238                 }
4239         }
4240         else
4241                 return -EINVAL;
4242
4243         return size;
4244 }
4245
4246 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4247         .ptrace =                       selinux_ptrace,
4248         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
4249         .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
4250         .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
4251         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
4252         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
4253         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
4254         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
4255         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
4256         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4257
4258         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
4259         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
4260
4261         .bprm_alloc_security =          selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4262         .bprm_free_security =           selinux_bprm_free_security,
4263         .bprm_apply_creds =             selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4264         .bprm_post_apply_creds =        selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4265         .bprm_set_security =            selinux_bprm_set_security,
4266         .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
4267         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4268
4269         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4270         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
4271         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
4272         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4273         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
4274         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
4275         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
4276
4277         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4278         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
4279         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
4280         .inode_post_create =            selinux_inode_post_create,
4281         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
4282         .inode_post_link =              selinux_inode_post_link,
4283         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
4284         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
4285         .inode_post_symlink =           selinux_inode_post_symlink,
4286         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
4287         .inode_post_mkdir =             selinux_inode_post_mkdir,
4288         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
4289         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
4290         .inode_post_mknod =             selinux_inode_post_mknod,
4291         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
4292         .inode_post_rename =            selinux_inode_post_rename,
4293         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
4294         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
4295         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
4296         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
4297         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
4298         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
4299         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4300         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
4301         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
4302         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
4303         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4304         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4305         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4306
4307         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
4308         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
4309         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
4310         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
4311         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
4312         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
4313         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
4314         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
4315         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
4316         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4317         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
4318
4319         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
4320         .task_alloc_security =          selinux_task_alloc_security,
4321         .task_free_security =           selinux_task_free_security,
4322         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
4323         .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
4324         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
4325         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
4326         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
4327         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
4328         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
4329         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
4330         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
4331         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
4332         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
4333         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
4334         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
4335         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
4336         .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4337         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
4338
4339         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
4340
4341         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4342         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4343
4344         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4345         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4346         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4347         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4348         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4349         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4350
4351         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4352         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
4353         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
4354         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
4355         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
4356
4357         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4358         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
4359         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
4360         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
4361         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
4362
4363         .register_security =            selinux_register_security,
4364         .unregister_security =          selinux_unregister_security,
4365
4366         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
4367
4368         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
4369         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
4370
4371 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
4372         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4373         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4374
4375         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
4376         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
4377         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
4378         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
4379         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
4380         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
4381         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4382         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4383         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
4384         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
4385         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4386         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4387         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
4388         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4389         .socket_getpeersec =            selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4390         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4391         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
4392 #endif
4393 };
4394
4395 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4396 {
4397         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4398
4399         if (!selinux_enabled) {
4400                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
4401                 return 0;
4402         }
4403
4404         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
4405
4406         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4407         if (task_alloc_security(current))
4408                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4409         tsec = current->security;
4410         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4411
4412         avc_init();
4413
4414         original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4415         if (!secondary_ops)
4416                 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4417         if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4418                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4419
4420         if (selinux_enforcing) {
4421                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4422         } else {
4423                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
4424         }
4425         return 0;
4426 }
4427
4428 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4429 {
4430         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
4431
4432         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4433         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4434         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4435 next_sb:
4436         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4437                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4438                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4439                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
4440                                            list);
4441                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4442                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4443                 sb->s_count++;
4444                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4445                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4446                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4447                 if (sb->s_root)
4448                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4449                 drop_super(sb);
4450                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4451                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4452                 goto next_sb;
4453         }
4454         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4455 }
4456
4457 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4458    all processes and objects when they are created. */
4459 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4460
4461 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4462
4463 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4464         .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4465         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4466         .pf =           PF_INET,
4467         .hooknum =      NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4468         .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4469 };
4470
4471 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4472
4473 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4474         .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4475         .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
4476         .pf =           PF_INET6,
4477         .hooknum =      NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4478         .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4479 };
4480
4481 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4482
4483 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4484 {
4485         int err = 0;
4486
4487         if (!selinux_enabled)
4488                 goto out;
4489
4490         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4491
4492         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4493         if (err)
4494                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4495
4496 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4497
4498         err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4499         if (err)
4500                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4501
4502 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4503 out:
4504         return err;
4505 }
4506
4507 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4508
4509 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4510 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4511 {
4512         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4513
4514         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4515 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4516         nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4517 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4518 }
4519 #endif
4520
4521 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4522
4523 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4524 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4525 #endif
4526
4527 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4528
4529 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4530 int selinux_disable(void)
4531 {
4532         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4533         static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4534
4535         if (ss_initialized) {
4536                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4537                 return -EINVAL;
4538         }
4539
4540         if (selinux_disabled) {
4541                 /* Only do this once. */
4542                 return -EINVAL;
4543         }
4544
4545         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
4546
4547         selinux_disabled = 1;
4548
4549         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4550         security_ops = secondary_ops;
4551
4552         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4553         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4554
4555         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
4556         exit_sel_fs();
4557
4558         return 0;
4559 }
4560 #endif
4561
4562