2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32 #include <linux/sched.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <linux/xattr.h>
35 #include <linux/capability.h>
36 #include <linux/unistd.h>
38 #include <linux/mman.h>
39 #include <linux/slab.h>
40 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
41 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42 #include <linux/swap.h>
43 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
44 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
45 #include <linux/dcache.h>
46 #include <linux/file.h>
47 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
48 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/mount.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <linux/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/quota.h>
70 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <linux/parser.h>
73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76 #include <linux/personality.h>
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/string.h>
79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84 #include <linux/export.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
224 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
225 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
228 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
230 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
231 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
233 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
234 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
235 list_del_init(&isec->list);
236 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
239 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
240 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
241 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
242 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
243 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
244 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
245 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
247 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
250 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
253 u32 sid = current_sid();
255 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
260 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
261 file->f_security = fsec;
266 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
268 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
269 file->f_security = NULL;
273 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
275 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
277 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
281 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
282 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
283 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
285 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
286 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
287 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
288 sb->s_security = sbsec;
293 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
295 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
296 sb->s_security = NULL;
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
324 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
327 static const match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 const struct cred *cred)
342 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
355 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
357 const struct cred *cred)
359 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
361 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
362 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
366 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
367 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
371 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
373 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
374 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
375 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
378 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
379 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
380 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
381 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
382 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
383 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
384 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
385 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
386 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
390 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
391 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
392 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
393 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
394 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
397 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
398 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
399 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
404 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
406 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
407 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
410 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
411 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
412 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
414 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
415 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
416 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
417 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
418 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
420 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
421 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
422 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
424 /* Initialize the root inode. */
425 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
427 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
428 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
429 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
434 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
435 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
436 struct inode_security_struct, list);
437 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
438 list_del_init(&isec->list);
439 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
440 inode = igrab(inode);
442 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
446 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
449 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
455 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
456 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
457 * mount options, or whatever.
459 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
460 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
463 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
464 char *context = NULL;
468 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
470 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
476 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
477 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
478 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
480 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
483 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
484 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
485 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
487 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
488 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
494 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
500 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
507 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
514 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
515 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
521 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
522 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
523 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
525 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
528 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
529 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
531 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
536 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
541 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
545 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
546 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
548 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
550 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
551 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
552 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
553 (old_sid != new_sid))
556 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
557 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
559 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
560 if (mnt_flags & flag)
566 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
567 * labeling information.
569 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
570 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
572 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
574 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
575 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
576 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
577 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
578 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
579 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
580 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
581 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
582 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
584 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
586 if (!ss_initialized) {
588 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
589 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
590 server is ready to handle calls. */
594 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
595 "before the security server is initialized\n");
600 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
601 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
602 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
603 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
605 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
606 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
607 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
608 * will be used for both mounts)
610 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
615 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
616 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
617 * than once with different security options.
619 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
622 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
624 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
625 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
627 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
628 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
629 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
636 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
638 goto out_double_mount;
640 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
645 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
647 goto out_double_mount;
649 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
651 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
652 rootcontext_sid = sid;
654 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
656 goto out_double_mount;
658 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
662 defcontext_sid = sid;
664 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
666 goto out_double_mount;
668 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
678 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
679 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
680 goto out_double_mount;
685 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
686 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
688 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
689 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
691 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
692 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
696 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
702 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
706 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
707 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
708 * the superblock context if not already set.
711 if (!fscontext_sid) {
712 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
716 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
718 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
723 if (!rootcontext_sid)
724 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
726 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
727 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
730 if (rootcontext_sid) {
731 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
736 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
737 root_isec->initialized = 1;
740 if (defcontext_sid) {
741 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
743 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
744 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
748 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
755 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
758 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
760 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
764 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
765 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
769 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
770 struct super_block *newsb)
772 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
773 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
775 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
776 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
777 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
780 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
781 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
786 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
787 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
789 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
790 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
793 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
795 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
797 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
798 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
799 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
802 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
806 if (!set_rootcontext) {
807 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
808 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
811 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
813 if (set_rootcontext) {
814 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
815 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
816 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
817 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
819 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
822 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
823 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
826 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
827 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
830 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
831 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
832 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
834 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
836 /* Standard string-based options. */
837 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
839 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
844 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
848 if (context || defcontext) {
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
853 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
866 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
873 case Opt_rootcontext:
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
879 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
887 if (context || defcontext) {
889 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
892 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
898 case Opt_labelsupport:
902 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
909 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
914 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
923 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
926 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
927 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
930 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
931 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
934 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
938 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
946 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
948 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
951 char *options = data;
952 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
954 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
959 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
961 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
966 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
969 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
973 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
974 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
979 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
982 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
983 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
987 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
989 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
992 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
994 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
995 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
998 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1000 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1002 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1008 /* we need a comma before each option */
1010 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1013 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1019 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1021 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1024 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1026 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1032 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1034 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1039 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1041 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1043 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1045 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1047 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1049 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1051 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1053 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1055 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1059 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1062 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1064 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1067 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1069 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1072 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1078 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1079 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1088 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1089 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1093 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1094 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1096 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1100 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1107 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1109 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1115 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1116 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1119 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1120 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1121 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1122 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1123 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1124 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1126 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1131 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1133 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1139 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1140 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1145 char *buffer, *path;
1147 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1151 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1155 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1156 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1157 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1158 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1162 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1164 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1168 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1176 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1177 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1179 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1180 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1182 struct dentry *dentry;
1183 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1184 char *context = NULL;
1188 if (isec->initialized)
1191 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1192 if (isec->initialized)
1195 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1196 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1197 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1198 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1199 server is ready to handle calls. */
1200 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1201 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1202 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1203 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1207 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1208 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1209 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1210 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1214 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1215 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1217 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1218 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1220 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1221 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1225 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1226 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1227 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1228 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1229 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1230 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1231 * be used again by userspace.
1236 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1237 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1243 context[len] = '\0';
1244 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1246 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1249 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1250 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1257 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1263 context[len] = '\0';
1264 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1270 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1271 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1272 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1273 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1277 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1278 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1281 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1285 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1286 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1288 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1289 if (printk_ratelimit())
1290 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1291 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1292 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1294 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1295 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1296 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1299 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1308 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1310 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1311 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1316 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1317 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1322 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1323 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1326 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1327 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1329 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1330 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1333 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1334 * d_splice_alias. */
1335 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1337 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1339 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1341 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1342 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1343 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1344 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1345 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1346 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1347 * could be used again by userspace.
1351 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1352 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1361 isec->initialized = 1;
1364 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1366 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1367 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1371 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1372 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1378 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1379 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1382 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1383 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1386 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1387 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1390 /* All other signals. */
1391 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1399 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1402 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1403 const struct cred *target,
1406 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1408 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1412 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1413 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1414 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1415 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1417 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1418 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1421 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1425 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1426 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1428 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1432 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1433 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1434 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1435 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1437 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1442 sid = current_sid();
1443 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1444 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1447 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1448 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1451 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1452 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1453 const struct cred *cred,
1456 struct common_audit_data ad;
1457 struct av_decision avd;
1459 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1460 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1463 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1467 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1469 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1472 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1476 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1481 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1482 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1483 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1490 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1491 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1494 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1496 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1497 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1500 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1501 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1502 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1503 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1504 struct inode *inode,
1506 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1509 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1512 validate_creds(cred);
1514 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1517 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1518 isec = inode->i_security;
1520 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1523 static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1524 struct inode *inode,
1528 struct common_audit_data ad;
1530 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1532 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1535 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1536 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1537 pathname if needed. */
1538 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1539 struct dentry *dentry,
1542 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1543 struct common_audit_data ad;
1545 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1546 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1547 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1550 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1551 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1552 pathname if needed. */
1553 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1557 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1558 struct common_audit_data ad;
1560 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1562 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1565 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1566 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1567 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1568 check a particular permission to the file.
1569 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1570 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1571 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1572 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1573 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1578 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1580 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1584 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1586 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1587 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1595 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1598 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1604 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1605 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1606 struct dentry *dentry,
1609 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1610 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1611 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1613 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 dsec = dir->i_security;
1617 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1620 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1622 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1623 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1625 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1626 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1631 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1632 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1633 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1638 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1642 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1643 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1644 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1647 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1648 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1649 struct task_struct *ctx)
1651 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1653 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1657 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1660 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1661 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1662 struct dentry *dentry,
1666 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1667 struct common_audit_data ad;
1668 u32 sid = current_sid();
1672 dsec = dir->i_security;
1673 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1675 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1676 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1679 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1680 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1695 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1704 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1705 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1706 struct inode *new_dir,
1707 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1709 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad;
1711 u32 sid = current_sid();
1713 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1716 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1717 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1718 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1719 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1721 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1723 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1724 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1725 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1732 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1734 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1739 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1740 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1742 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1743 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1746 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1747 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1748 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1751 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1759 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1760 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1761 struct super_block *sb,
1763 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1768 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1769 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1772 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1773 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1777 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1778 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1779 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1780 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1783 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1785 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1789 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1791 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1793 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1800 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1801 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1805 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1807 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1808 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1815 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1824 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1827 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1829 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1831 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1848 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1896 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1897 * which was removed).
1899 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1900 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1901 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1902 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1905 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1906 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
1910 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
1914 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1917 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1919 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1931 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1936 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1939 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1945 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1947 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1949 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1952 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1957 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1958 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1959 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1961 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1962 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1963 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1964 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1965 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1967 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1968 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1969 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1970 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1971 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1973 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1980 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1981 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1982 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1984 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1985 * processes that allocate mappings.
1987 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1989 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1991 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
1992 &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1993 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1997 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2000 /* binprm security operations */
2002 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2004 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2005 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2006 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2007 struct common_audit_data ad;
2008 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2011 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2015 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2016 * the script interpreter */
2017 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2020 old_tsec = current_security();
2021 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2022 isec = inode->i_security;
2024 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2025 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2026 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2028 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2029 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2030 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2031 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2033 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2034 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2035 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2036 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2038 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2039 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2040 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2046 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2047 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2049 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2050 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2052 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2053 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2054 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2058 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2059 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2060 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2065 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2069 /* Check for shared state */
2070 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2071 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2072 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2078 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2079 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2081 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2082 struct task_struct *tracer;
2083 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2087 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2088 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2089 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2095 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2097 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2103 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2104 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2110 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2112 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2120 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2121 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2122 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2123 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2125 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2128 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2131 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2132 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2133 struct files_struct *files)
2135 struct common_audit_data ad;
2136 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2137 struct tty_struct *tty;
2138 struct fdtable *fdt;
2142 tty = get_current_tty();
2144 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2145 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2146 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2147 struct inode *inode;
2149 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2150 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2151 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2152 file may belong to another process and we are only
2153 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2154 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2155 struct tty_file_private, list);
2156 file = file_priv->file;
2157 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2158 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2159 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2163 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2166 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2170 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2172 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2174 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2176 unsigned long set, i;
2181 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2182 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2184 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2187 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2188 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2193 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2195 file_to_av(file))) {
2197 fd = get_unused_fd();
2207 devnull = dentry_open(
2209 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2211 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2218 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2223 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2226 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2230 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2232 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2234 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2235 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2238 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2239 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2242 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2243 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2245 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2246 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2248 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2249 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2250 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2252 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2253 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2254 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2255 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2256 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2258 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2259 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2261 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2263 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2264 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2265 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2266 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2268 task_unlock(current);
2269 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2274 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2277 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2279 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2280 struct itimerval itimer;
2290 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2291 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2292 * flush and unblock signals.
2294 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2295 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2297 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2299 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2300 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2301 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2302 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2303 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2304 __flush_signals(current);
2305 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2306 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2308 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2311 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2312 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2313 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2314 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2315 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2318 /* superblock security operations */
2320 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2322 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2325 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2327 superblock_free_security(sb);
2330 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2335 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2338 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2340 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2341 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2342 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2343 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2344 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2347 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2354 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2358 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2361 int current_size = 0;
2369 while (current_size < len) {
2379 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2381 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2382 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2383 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2389 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2397 in_save = in_end = orig;
2401 open_quote = !open_quote;
2402 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2404 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2406 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2407 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2409 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2411 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2413 } while (*in_end++);
2415 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2416 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2421 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2424 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2425 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2426 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2428 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2434 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2437 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2438 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2441 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2443 goto out_free_secdata;
2445 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2447 goto out_free_secdata;
2449 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2450 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2452 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2456 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2458 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2459 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2461 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2462 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2463 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2469 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2470 goto out_bad_option;
2473 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2474 goto out_bad_option;
2476 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2477 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2478 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2480 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2481 goto out_bad_option;
2484 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2485 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2486 goto out_bad_option;
2495 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2497 free_secdata(secdata);
2500 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2501 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2506 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2508 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2509 struct common_audit_data ad;
2512 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2516 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2517 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2520 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2521 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2522 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2525 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2527 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2528 struct common_audit_data ad;
2530 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2531 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2532 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2535 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2538 unsigned long flags,
2541 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2543 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2544 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2545 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2547 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2550 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2552 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2554 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2555 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2558 /* inode security operations */
2560 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2562 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2565 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2567 inode_free_security(inode);
2570 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2571 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2572 void **value, size_t *len)
2574 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2575 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2576 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2577 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2579 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2581 dsec = dir->i_security;
2582 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2585 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2587 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2588 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2589 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2590 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2591 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2592 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2595 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2596 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2599 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2604 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2605 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2606 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2607 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2609 isec->initialized = 1;
2612 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2616 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2623 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2635 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2637 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2640 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2642 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2645 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2647 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2650 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2652 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2655 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2657 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2660 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2662 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2665 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2667 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2670 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2671 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2673 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2676 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2678 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2680 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2683 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2690 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2693 struct common_audit_data ad;
2696 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2698 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2699 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2701 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2705 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2709 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2711 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2713 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2716 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2718 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2721 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2722 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2723 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2729 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2730 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2733 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2736 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2738 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2741 path.dentry = dentry;
2744 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2747 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2749 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2751 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2752 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2753 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2754 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2756 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2757 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2758 Restrict to administrator. */
2763 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2764 ordinary setattr permission. */
2765 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2768 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2769 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2771 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2772 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2773 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2774 struct common_audit_data ad;
2775 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2778 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2779 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2781 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2782 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2785 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2788 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2789 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2791 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2792 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2796 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2797 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2798 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2800 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2805 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2806 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2810 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2815 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2817 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2818 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2822 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2823 const void *value, size_t size,
2826 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2827 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2831 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2832 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2836 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2838 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2839 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2840 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2848 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2850 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2852 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2855 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2857 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2859 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2862 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2864 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2865 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2867 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2868 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2873 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2875 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2877 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2881 char *context = NULL;
2882 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2884 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2888 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2889 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2890 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2891 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2892 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2893 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2894 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2896 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
2897 &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2898 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2900 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2903 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2916 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2917 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2919 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2923 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2926 if (!value || !size)
2929 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2934 isec->initialized = 1;
2938 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2940 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2941 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2942 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2946 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2948 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2952 /* file security operations */
2954 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2956 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2957 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2959 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2960 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2963 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2964 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2967 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2969 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2970 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2971 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2972 u32 sid = current_sid();
2975 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2978 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2979 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2980 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2983 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2986 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2988 return file_alloc_security(file);
2991 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2993 file_free_security(file);
2996 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2999 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3009 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3011 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
3012 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3015 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3017 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
3018 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3021 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3025 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3030 error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3031 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3034 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3035 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3038 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3043 static int default_noexec;
3045 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3047 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3050 if (default_noexec &&
3051 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3053 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3054 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3055 * This has an additional check.
3057 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3063 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3064 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3066 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3067 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3070 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3071 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3073 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3080 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3081 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3082 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3085 u32 sid = current_sid();
3088 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3089 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3090 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3091 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3093 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3094 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3095 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3100 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3101 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3102 if (rc || addr_only)
3105 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3108 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3109 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3112 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3113 unsigned long reqprot,
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3118 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3121 if (default_noexec &&
3122 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3124 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3125 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3126 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3127 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3128 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3129 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3130 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3131 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3133 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3134 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3135 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3136 * modified content. This typically should only
3137 * occur for text relocations.
3139 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3145 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3148 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3150 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3152 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3155 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3158 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3163 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3168 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3169 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3178 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3179 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3184 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3189 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3193 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3200 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3202 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3204 fsec = file->f_security;
3205 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3210 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3211 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3214 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3216 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3218 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3219 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3221 fsec = file->f_security;
3224 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3226 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3228 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3229 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3232 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3234 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3236 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3239 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3241 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3242 struct inode *inode;
3243 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3245 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3246 fsec = file->f_security;
3247 isec = inode->i_security;
3249 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3250 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3251 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3252 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3253 * struct as its SID.
3255 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3256 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3258 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3259 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3260 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3261 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3262 * new inode label or new policy.
3263 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3265 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3268 /* task security operations */
3270 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3272 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3276 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3278 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3280 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3282 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3286 cred->security = tsec;
3291 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3293 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3295 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3298 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3299 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3301 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3302 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3307 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3309 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3312 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3313 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3315 old_tsec = old->security;
3317 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3321 new->security = tsec;
3326 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3328 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3330 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3331 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3337 * set the security data for a kernel service
3338 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3340 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3342 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3343 u32 sid = current_sid();
3346 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3347 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3348 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3352 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3353 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3354 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3360 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3361 * objective context of the specified inode
3363 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3365 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3366 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3367 u32 sid = current_sid();
3370 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3371 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3372 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3376 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3380 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3383 struct common_audit_data ad;
3385 sid = task_sid(current);
3387 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3388 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3390 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3391 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3394 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3396 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3399 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3401 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3404 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3406 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3409 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3411 *secid = task_sid(p);
3414 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3418 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3422 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3425 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3429 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3433 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3436 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3438 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3441 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3442 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3444 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3446 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3447 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3448 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3449 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3450 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3451 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3456 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3460 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3464 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3467 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3469 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3472 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3474 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3477 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3484 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3486 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3488 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3489 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3491 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3495 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3497 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3500 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3501 struct inode *inode)
3503 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3504 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3507 isec->initialized = 1;
3510 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3511 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3512 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3514 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3515 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3517 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3518 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3522 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3523 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3526 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3527 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3531 *proto = ih->protocol;
3533 switch (ih->protocol) {
3535 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3537 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3541 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3545 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3546 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3551 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3553 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3557 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3561 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3562 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3566 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3567 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3569 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3573 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3577 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3578 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3589 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3591 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3592 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3593 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3596 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3597 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3599 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3600 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3604 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3605 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3608 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3609 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3610 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3619 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3621 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3625 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3626 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3631 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3633 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3637 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3638 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3642 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3643 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3645 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3649 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3650 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3654 /* includes fragments */
3664 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3665 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3670 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3672 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3675 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3676 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3679 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3681 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3684 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3685 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3695 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3696 " unable to parse packet\n");
3706 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3708 * @family: protocol family
3709 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3712 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3713 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3714 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3715 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3716 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3720 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3727 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3728 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3730 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3731 if (unlikely(err)) {
3733 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3734 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3742 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3743 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3744 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3745 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3747 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3748 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3749 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3750 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3753 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3757 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3758 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3765 /* socket security operations */
3767 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3768 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3770 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3771 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3775 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3779 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3781 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3782 struct common_audit_data ad;
3783 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3785 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3788 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3791 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3794 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3795 int protocol, int kern)
3797 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3805 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3806 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3810 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3813 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3814 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3816 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3817 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3818 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3821 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3824 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3826 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3831 isec->initialized = 1;
3834 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3835 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3836 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3837 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3843 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3844 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3845 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3847 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3849 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3853 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3858 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3859 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3860 * check the first address now.
3862 family = sk->sk_family;
3863 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3865 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3866 struct common_audit_data ad;
3867 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3868 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3869 unsigned short snum;
3872 if (family == PF_INET) {
3873 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3874 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3875 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3877 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3878 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3879 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3885 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3887 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3888 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3892 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3893 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3894 ad.u.net.family = family;
3895 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3897 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3903 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3904 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3905 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3908 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3909 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3912 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3913 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3917 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3921 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3925 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3926 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3927 ad.u.net.family = family;
3929 if (family == PF_INET)
3930 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3932 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3934 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3935 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3943 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3945 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3946 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3949 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3954 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3956 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3957 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3958 struct common_audit_data ad;
3959 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3960 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3961 unsigned short snum;
3964 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3965 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3966 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3968 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3970 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3971 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3973 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3976 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3980 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3981 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3983 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3984 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3985 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3986 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3991 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3997 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3999 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4002 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4005 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4006 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4008 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4012 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4014 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4015 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4016 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4017 newisec->initialized = 1;
4022 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4025 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4028 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4029 int size, int flags)
4031 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4034 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4036 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4039 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4041 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4044 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4048 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4052 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4055 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4058 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4061 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4063 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4066 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4070 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4071 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4072 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4073 struct common_audit_data ad;
4076 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4077 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4079 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4080 sksec_other->sclass,
4081 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4085 /* server child socket */
4086 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4087 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4092 /* connecting socket */
4093 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4098 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4099 struct socket *other)
4101 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4102 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4103 struct common_audit_data ad;
4105 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4106 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4108 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4112 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4114 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4120 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4123 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4124 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4128 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4131 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4132 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4135 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4139 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4140 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4141 struct common_audit_data ad;
4144 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4145 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4146 ad.u.net.family = family;
4147 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4151 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4152 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4158 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4161 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4166 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4169 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4170 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4171 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4172 struct common_audit_data ad;
4177 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4180 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4181 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4184 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4185 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4186 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4187 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4188 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4189 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4191 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4192 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4193 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4196 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4197 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4198 ad.u.net.family = family;
4199 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4203 if (peerlbl_active) {
4206 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4209 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4212 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4215 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4218 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4223 if (secmark_active) {
4224 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4233 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4234 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4239 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4240 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4242 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4243 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4244 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4245 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4246 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4248 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4252 if (scontext_len > len) {
4257 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4261 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4267 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4269 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4272 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4274 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4277 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4281 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4282 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4284 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4287 *secid = peer_secid;
4288 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4293 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4295 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4297 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4301 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4302 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4303 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4304 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4309 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4311 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4313 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4318 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4320 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4323 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4324 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4325 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4327 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4330 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4333 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4335 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4337 *secid = sksec->sid;
4341 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4343 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4344 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4346 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4347 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4348 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4349 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4352 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4353 struct request_sock *req)
4355 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4357 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4361 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4362 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4365 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4368 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4371 req->secid = connsid;
4372 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4374 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4377 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4378 const struct request_sock *req)
4380 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4382 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4383 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4384 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4385 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4386 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4387 time it will have been created and available. */
4389 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4390 * thread with access to newsksec */
4391 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4394 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4396 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4397 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4399 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4400 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4403 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4406 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4408 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4411 __tsec = current_security();
4414 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4417 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4419 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4422 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4424 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4427 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4430 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4433 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4435 u32 sid = current_sid();
4437 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4438 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4439 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4440 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4441 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4442 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4444 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4448 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4450 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4452 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4453 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4454 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4455 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4456 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4457 * protocols were being used */
4459 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4460 * the sockcreate SID here */
4462 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4463 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4466 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4468 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4469 u32 sid = current_sid();
4472 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4473 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4476 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4477 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4486 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4490 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4491 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4493 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4497 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4499 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4501 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4502 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4503 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4504 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4505 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4506 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4516 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4521 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4523 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4529 struct common_audit_data ad;
4534 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4537 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4538 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4539 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4540 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4543 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4546 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4547 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4548 ad.u.net.family = family;
4549 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4552 if (peerlbl_active) {
4553 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4556 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4562 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4563 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4567 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4568 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4569 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4571 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4577 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4578 struct sk_buff *skb,
4579 const struct net_device *in,
4580 const struct net_device *out,
4581 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4583 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4586 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4587 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4588 struct sk_buff *skb,
4589 const struct net_device *in,
4590 const struct net_device *out,
4591 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4593 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4597 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4603 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4606 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4607 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4608 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4611 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4613 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4614 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4615 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4616 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4617 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4618 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4619 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4620 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4621 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4622 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4623 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4624 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4625 * best we can do. */
4628 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4629 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4632 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4633 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4639 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4640 struct sk_buff *skb,
4641 const struct net_device *in,
4642 const struct net_device *out,
4643 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4645 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4648 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4652 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4654 struct common_audit_data ad;
4660 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4662 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4663 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4664 ad.u.net.family = family;
4665 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4668 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4669 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4670 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4671 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4673 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4674 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4679 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4685 struct common_audit_data ad;
4690 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4691 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4692 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4693 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4694 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4695 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4697 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4698 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4699 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4705 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4706 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4707 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4708 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4709 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4710 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4711 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4712 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4713 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4714 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4716 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4717 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4722 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4723 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4724 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4725 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4727 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4728 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4731 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4732 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4734 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4735 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4736 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4737 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4738 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4739 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4740 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4741 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4742 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4743 * for similar problems. */
4745 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4746 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4748 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4749 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4750 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4751 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4752 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4753 * pass the packet. */
4754 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4757 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4761 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4764 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4767 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
4769 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4771 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
4772 * associated socket. */
4773 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4774 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4775 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4778 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4779 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4780 ad.u.net.family = family;
4781 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4785 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4786 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4787 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4789 if (peerlbl_active) {
4793 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4795 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4796 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4797 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4799 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4801 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4802 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4803 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4809 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4810 struct sk_buff *skb,
4811 const struct net_device *in,
4812 const struct net_device *out,
4813 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4815 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4818 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4819 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4820 struct sk_buff *skb,
4821 const struct net_device *in,
4822 const struct net_device *out,
4823 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4825 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4829 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4831 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4835 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4839 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4842 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4845 struct common_audit_data ad;
4848 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4852 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4853 ad.u.cap = capability;
4855 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
4856 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
4857 CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4860 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4861 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4864 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4867 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4871 sid = task_sid(task);
4872 isec->sclass = sclass;
4874 perm->security = isec;
4879 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4881 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4882 perm->security = NULL;
4886 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4888 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4890 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4894 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4895 msg->security = msec;
4900 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4902 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4904 msg->security = NULL;
4908 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4911 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4912 struct common_audit_data ad;
4913 u32 sid = current_sid();
4915 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4917 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4918 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4920 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4923 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4925 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4928 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4930 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4933 /* message queue security operations */
4934 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4936 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4937 struct common_audit_data ad;
4938 u32 sid = current_sid();
4941 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4945 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4947 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4953 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4959 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4961 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4964 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct common_audit_data ad;
4968 u32 sid = current_sid();
4970 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4972 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4975 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4976 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4979 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4987 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4988 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4991 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4994 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4997 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5003 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5007 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5009 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5010 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5011 struct common_audit_data ad;
5012 u32 sid = current_sid();
5015 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5016 msec = msg->security;
5019 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5021 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5023 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5024 * message queue this message will be stored in
5026 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5032 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5033 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5035 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5036 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5039 /* Can this process send the message */
5040 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5043 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5044 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5045 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5050 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5051 struct task_struct *target,
5052 long type, int mode)
5054 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5055 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5056 struct common_audit_data ad;
5057 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5060 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5061 msec = msg->security;
5063 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5064 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5066 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5067 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5069 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5070 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5074 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5075 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5077 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5078 struct common_audit_data ad;
5079 u32 sid = current_sid();
5082 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5086 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5088 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5089 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5091 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5094 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5100 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5102 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5105 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5107 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5108 struct common_audit_data ad;
5109 u32 sid = current_sid();
5111 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5113 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5114 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5116 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5117 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5120 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5121 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5129 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5130 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5133 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5136 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5143 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5149 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5153 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5154 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5158 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5161 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5163 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5166 /* Semaphore security operations */
5167 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5169 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5170 struct common_audit_data ad;
5171 u32 sid = current_sid();
5174 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5178 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5180 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5181 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5183 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5186 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5192 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5194 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5197 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5199 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5200 struct common_audit_data ad;
5201 u32 sid = current_sid();
5203 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5205 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5206 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5208 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5209 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5212 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5213 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5221 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5222 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5226 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5237 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5240 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5244 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5250 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5254 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5255 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5260 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5264 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5267 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5273 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5275 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5280 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5283 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5285 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5289 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5292 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5295 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5296 char *name, char **value)
5298 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5304 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5310 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5312 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5314 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5316 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5317 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5318 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5319 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5320 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5321 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5322 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5323 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5331 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5341 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5342 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5344 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5345 struct task_struct *tracer;
5352 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5353 security attributes. */
5358 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5359 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5360 * above restriction is ever removed.
5362 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5363 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5364 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5365 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5366 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5367 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5368 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5369 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5370 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5371 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5377 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5378 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5379 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5383 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5384 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5385 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5387 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5394 new = prepare_creds();
5398 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5399 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5400 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5401 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5402 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5403 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5404 tsec = new->security;
5405 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5406 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5407 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5408 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5409 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5410 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5413 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5414 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5415 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5416 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5421 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5423 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5424 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5429 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5430 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5431 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5435 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5436 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5439 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5441 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5445 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5446 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5465 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5467 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5470 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5472 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5475 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5481 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5483 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5485 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5489 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5491 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5493 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5496 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5499 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5508 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5509 unsigned long flags)
5511 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5512 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5514 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5518 tsec = cred->security;
5519 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5520 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5522 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5528 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5530 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5536 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5537 const struct cred *cred,
5541 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5544 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5545 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5546 appear to be created. */
5550 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5552 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5553 ksec = key->security;
5555 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5558 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5560 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5561 char *context = NULL;
5565 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5574 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5577 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5578 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5579 .capget = selinux_capget,
5580 .capset = selinux_capset,
5581 .capable = selinux_capable,
5582 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5583 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5584 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5585 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5587 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5588 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5590 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5591 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5592 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5593 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5595 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5596 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5597 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5598 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5599 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5600 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5601 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5602 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5603 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5604 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5605 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5606 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5609 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5610 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5611 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5612 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5613 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5614 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5615 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5616 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5617 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5618 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5619 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5620 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5621 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5622 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5623 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5624 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5625 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5626 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5627 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5628 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5629 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5630 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5631 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5632 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5633 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5635 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5636 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5637 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5638 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5639 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5640 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5641 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5642 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5643 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5644 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5645 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5647 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5649 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5650 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5651 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5652 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5653 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5654 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5655 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5656 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5657 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5658 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5659 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5660 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5661 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5662 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5663 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5664 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5665 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5666 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5667 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5668 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5669 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5670 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5672 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5673 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5675 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5676 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5678 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5679 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5680 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5681 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5682 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5683 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5685 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5686 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5687 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5688 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5689 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5691 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5692 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5693 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5694 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5695 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5697 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5699 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5700 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5702 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5703 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5704 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5705 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5706 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5707 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5709 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5710 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5712 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5713 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5714 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5715 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5716 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5717 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5718 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5719 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5720 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5721 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5722 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5723 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5724 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5725 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5726 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5727 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5728 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5729 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5730 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5731 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5732 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5733 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5734 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5735 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5736 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5737 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5738 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5739 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5740 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5741 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5742 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5744 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5745 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5746 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5747 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5748 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5749 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5750 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5751 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5752 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5753 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5754 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5758 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5759 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5760 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5761 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5765 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5766 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5767 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5768 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5772 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5774 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5775 selinux_enabled = 0;
5779 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5780 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5784 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5786 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5787 cred_init_security();
5789 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5791 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5792 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5793 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5796 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5797 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5799 if (selinux_enforcing)
5800 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5802 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5807 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5809 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5812 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5814 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5816 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5817 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5818 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5821 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5822 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5823 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5825 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5827 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5829 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5830 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5832 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5833 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5836 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5837 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5839 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5840 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5843 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5844 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5846 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5847 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5851 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5853 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5855 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5856 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5858 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5859 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5862 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5863 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5865 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5866 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5872 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5876 if (!selinux_enabled)
5879 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5881 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5883 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5885 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5886 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5888 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5895 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5897 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5898 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5900 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5902 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5903 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5904 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5909 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5911 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5912 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5915 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5917 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5918 static int selinux_disabled;
5920 int selinux_disable(void)
5922 if (ss_initialized) {
5923 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5927 if (selinux_disabled) {
5928 /* Only do this once. */
5932 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5934 selinux_disabled = 1;
5935 selinux_enabled = 0;
5937 reset_security_ops();
5939 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5942 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5943 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5945 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */