2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
43 #include <linux/namei.h>
44 #include <linux/mount.h>
45 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
50 #include <linux/tty.h>
52 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
53 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
54 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
56 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
57 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
58 #include <asm/atomic.h>
59 #include <linux/bitops.h>
60 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
61 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
62 #include <linux/netlink.h>
63 #include <linux/tcp.h>
64 #include <linux/udp.h>
65 #include <linux/dccp.h>
66 #include <linux/quota.h>
67 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <linux/parser.h>
70 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
72 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
73 #include <linux/personality.h>
74 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
121 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
123 int selinux_enabled = 1;
126 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
127 static struct security_operations *original_ops;
129 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
130 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
131 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
132 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
133 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
135 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
136 before the policy was loaded. */
137 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
138 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
140 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
143 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
146 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
147 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
148 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
149 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
152 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
154 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
157 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
159 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
161 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
163 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
167 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
168 task->security = tsec;
173 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
175 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
176 task->security = NULL;
180 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
182 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
183 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
185 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
189 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
190 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
192 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
193 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
194 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
195 inode->i_security = isec;
200 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
203 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
206 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
207 list_del_init(&isec->list);
208 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210 inode->i_security = NULL;
211 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
214 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
217 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
223 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
224 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
225 file->f_security = fsec;
230 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
232 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
233 file->f_security = NULL;
237 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
239 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
241 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
246 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
248 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
250 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
251 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
252 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sb->s_security = sbsec;
258 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
262 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
263 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
264 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
265 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
267 sb->s_security = NULL;
271 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
273 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
275 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
279 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sk->sk_security = ssec;
283 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
288 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
290 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
292 sk->sk_security = NULL;
296 /* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298 extern int ss_initialized;
300 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
302 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
304 "uses transition SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
311 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
313 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
326 static match_table_t tokens = {
327 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
328 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
334 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
336 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
337 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
342 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
343 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
352 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
353 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
354 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
357 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
358 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
362 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
363 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
367 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
369 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
370 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
371 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
374 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
375 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
376 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
377 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
378 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
379 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
380 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
382 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
386 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
387 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
388 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
389 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
390 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
391 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
394 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
395 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
400 sbsec->initialized = 1;
402 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
403 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
404 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
406 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
407 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
408 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
417 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
421 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
422 struct inode_security_struct, list);
423 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
425 inode = igrab(inode);
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
432 list_del_init(&isec->list);
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
445 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
446 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
449 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
450 char *context = NULL;
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
456 if (!sbsec->initialized)
463 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
464 * settings this is going to need a mask
467 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
468 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
470 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
474 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
475 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
480 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
481 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
487 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
488 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
491 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
492 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
494 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
495 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
498 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
499 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
501 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
502 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
505 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
506 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
508 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
509 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
510 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
512 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
515 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
516 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
519 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
524 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
529 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
532 if (sbsec->initialized)
533 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
534 (old_sid != new_sid))
537 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
538 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
540 if (!sbsec->initialized)
541 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
547 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
548 * labeling information.
550 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
551 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
554 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
555 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
556 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
557 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
558 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
559 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
560 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
561 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
562 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
563 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
565 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
567 if (!ss_initialized) {
569 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
570 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
571 server is ready to handle calls. */
572 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
573 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
574 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
575 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
579 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
580 "before the security server is initialized\n");
585 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
586 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
587 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
588 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
591 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
592 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
593 * will be used for both mounts)
595 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
600 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
601 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
602 * than once with different security options.
604 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
607 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
609 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
610 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
611 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
618 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
620 goto out_double_mount;
622 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
627 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
629 goto out_double_mount;
631 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
633 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
634 rootcontext_sid = sid;
636 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
638 goto out_double_mount;
640 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
644 defcontext_sid = sid;
646 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
648 goto out_double_mount;
650 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
659 if (sbsec->initialized) {
660 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
661 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
662 goto out_double_mount;
667 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
671 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
673 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
674 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
678 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
685 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
690 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
691 * the superblock context if not already set.
694 if (!fscontext_sid) {
695 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
698 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
700 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
704 if (!rootcontext_sid)
705 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
707 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
708 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
711 if (rootcontext_sid) {
712 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
716 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
717 root_isec->initialized = 1;
720 if (defcontext_sid) {
721 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
724 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
728 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
729 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
735 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
738 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
740 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
744 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
745 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
749 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
750 struct super_block *newsb)
752 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
753 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
755 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
756 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
760 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
761 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
764 if (!ss_initialized) {
765 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
766 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
767 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
768 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec->initialized)
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
781 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
783 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
784 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
785 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
788 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
792 if (!set_rootcontext) {
793 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
794 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
797 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
799 if (set_rootcontext) {
800 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
802 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
805 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
812 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
813 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
816 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
817 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
818 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
825 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
830 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
834 if (context || defcontext) {
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
839 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
852 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
859 case Opt_rootcontext:
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
865 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
873 if (context || defcontext) {
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
878 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
887 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
894 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
900 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
905 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
906 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
909 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
910 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
913 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
914 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
917 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
918 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
921 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
932 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
934 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
937 char *options = data;
938 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
940 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
945 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
947 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
952 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
955 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
959 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
961 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
963 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
965 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
967 return SECCLASS_FILE;
969 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
973 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
975 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
979 return SECCLASS_FILE;
982 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
984 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
987 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
989 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
992 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
999 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1001 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1008 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1009 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1011 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1013 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1014 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1016 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1018 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1020 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1026 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1027 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1028 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1029 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1030 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1032 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1034 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1035 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1036 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1038 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1039 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1040 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1041 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1042 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1043 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1044 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1046 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1049 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1051 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1056 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1059 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1060 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1065 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1067 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1072 end = buffer+buflen;
1077 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1078 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1082 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1087 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1088 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1092 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1100 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1101 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1103 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1104 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1106 struct dentry *dentry;
1107 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1108 char *context = NULL;
1112 if (isec->initialized)
1115 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1116 if (isec->initialized)
1119 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1120 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1121 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1122 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1123 server is ready to handle calls. */
1124 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1125 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1126 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1127 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1131 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1132 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1133 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1134 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1138 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1139 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1141 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1142 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1144 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1145 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1148 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1149 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1154 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1155 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1161 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1163 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1164 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1165 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1173 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1179 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1185 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1186 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1187 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1188 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1192 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1193 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1196 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1200 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1201 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1202 __func__, context, -rc,
1203 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1205 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1213 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1214 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1216 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1217 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1218 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1220 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1221 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1222 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1230 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1231 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1234 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1235 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1238 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1240 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1241 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1252 isec->initialized = 1;
1255 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1257 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1258 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1262 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1263 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1269 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1270 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1273 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1274 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1277 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1278 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1281 /* All other signals. */
1282 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1289 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1290 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1291 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1292 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1295 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1297 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1298 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1299 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1300 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1303 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1304 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1307 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1308 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1311 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1312 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1314 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1316 tsec = tsk->security;
1318 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1322 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1324 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1327 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1331 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1334 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1337 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1338 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1341 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1343 tsec = tsk->security;
1345 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1346 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1349 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1350 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1351 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1352 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1353 struct inode *inode,
1355 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1357 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1358 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1359 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1361 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1364 tsec = tsk->security;
1365 isec = inode->i_security;
1369 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1370 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1373 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1376 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1377 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1378 pathname if needed. */
1379 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1380 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1381 struct dentry *dentry,
1384 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1385 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1386 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1387 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1388 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1389 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1392 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1393 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1394 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1395 check a particular permission to the file.
1396 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1397 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1398 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1399 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1400 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1404 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1405 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1406 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1407 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1410 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1411 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1413 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1414 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1422 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1424 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1429 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1430 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1431 struct dentry *dentry,
1434 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1435 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1436 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1438 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1441 tsec = current->security;
1442 dsec = dir->i_security;
1443 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1445 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1446 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1448 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1449 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1454 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1455 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1457 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1463 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1467 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1468 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1469 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1472 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1473 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1474 struct task_struct *ctx)
1476 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1478 tsec = ctx->security;
1480 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1484 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1487 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1488 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1489 struct dentry *dentry,
1493 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1494 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1499 tsec = current->security;
1500 dsec = dir->i_security;
1501 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1503 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1504 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1507 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1508 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1523 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1528 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1532 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1533 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1534 struct inode *new_dir,
1535 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1537 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1538 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1539 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1541 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1544 tsec = current->security;
1545 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1546 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1547 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1548 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1550 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1552 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1553 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1554 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1557 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1558 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1561 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1562 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1563 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1568 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1569 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1570 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1571 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1572 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1575 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1576 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1577 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1580 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1589 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1590 struct super_block *sb,
1592 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1597 tsec = tsk->security;
1598 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1599 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1603 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1604 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1608 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1609 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1610 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1611 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1614 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1616 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1620 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1622 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1624 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1632 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1635 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1637 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1639 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1641 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1645 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1646 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1647 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1648 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1649 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1650 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1651 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1654 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1655 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1660 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1665 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1667 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1668 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1675 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1683 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1685 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1689 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child);
1693 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1696 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1697 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1701 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1705 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1708 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1709 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1713 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1717 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1720 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1721 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1723 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1726 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1730 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1734 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1737 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1740 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1743 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1748 end = buffer+buflen;
1754 const char *name = table->procname;
1755 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1756 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1760 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1763 table = table->parent;
1769 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1771 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1773 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1778 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1782 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1786 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1790 tsec = current->security;
1792 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1793 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1795 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1796 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1799 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1800 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1802 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1803 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1811 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1812 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1818 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1831 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1837 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1841 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1847 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1849 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1852 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1856 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1861 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1862 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1863 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1865 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1866 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1867 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1868 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1870 case 0: /* Close log */
1871 case 1: /* Open log */
1872 case 2: /* Read from log */
1873 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1874 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1876 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1883 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1884 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1885 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1887 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1888 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1889 * the capability is granted.
1891 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1892 * processes that allocate mappings.
1894 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1896 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1897 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1899 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1901 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1902 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1903 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1910 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1914 * task_tracer_task - return the task that is tracing the given task
1915 * @task: task to consider
1917 * Returns NULL if noone is tracing @task, or the &struct task_struct
1918 * pointer to its tracer.
1920 * Must be called under rcu_read_lock().
1922 static struct task_struct *task_tracer_task(struct task_struct *task)
1924 if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
1925 return rcu_dereference(task->parent);
1929 /* binprm security operations */
1931 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1933 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1935 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1939 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1942 bprm->security = bsec;
1946 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1948 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1949 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1950 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1951 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1953 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1956 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1960 bsec = bprm->security;
1965 tsec = current->security;
1966 isec = inode->i_security;
1968 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1969 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1971 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1972 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1973 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1974 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1976 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1977 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1978 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1981 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1982 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1983 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1989 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1991 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1994 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1995 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1996 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2000 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2001 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2002 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2006 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2007 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2011 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2012 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2014 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2022 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2024 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2028 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2030 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2033 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2034 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2035 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2036 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2037 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2039 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2042 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2045 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2047 kfree(bprm->security);
2048 bprm->security = NULL;
2051 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2052 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2054 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2055 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2057 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2058 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2059 struct tty_struct *tty;
2060 struct fdtable *fdt;
2064 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2065 tty = get_current_tty();
2068 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2070 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2071 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2072 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2073 file may belong to another process and we are only
2074 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2075 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2076 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2077 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2083 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2084 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2088 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2090 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2092 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2094 unsigned long set, i;
2099 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2100 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2102 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2105 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2106 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2111 if (file_has_perm(current,
2113 file_to_av(file))) {
2115 fd = get_unused_fd();
2125 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2126 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2133 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2138 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2141 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2144 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2146 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2147 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2151 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2153 tsec = current->security;
2155 bsec = bprm->security;
2158 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2160 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2161 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2162 unchanged and kill. */
2163 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2164 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2165 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2172 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2173 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2174 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2175 struct task_struct *tracer;
2176 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2180 tracer = task_tracer_task(current);
2181 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2182 sec = tracer->security;
2188 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2189 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2201 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2203 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2205 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2206 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2207 struct itimerval itimer;
2208 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2211 tsec = current->security;
2212 bsec = bprm->security;
2215 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2218 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2221 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2222 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2224 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2225 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2226 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2227 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2228 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2229 will be checked against the new SID. */
2230 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2231 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2233 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2234 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2235 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2236 flush_signals(current);
2237 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2238 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2239 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2240 recalc_sigpending();
2241 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2244 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2245 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2247 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2248 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2249 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2250 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2251 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2252 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2253 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2254 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2255 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2257 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2258 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2260 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2261 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2262 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2263 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2265 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2267 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2270 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2274 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2275 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2276 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2279 /* superblock security operations */
2281 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2283 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2286 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2288 superblock_free_security(sb);
2291 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2296 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2299 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2301 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2302 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2303 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2304 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2307 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2314 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2318 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2321 int current_size = 0;
2329 while (current_size < len) {
2339 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2341 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2342 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2343 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2349 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2357 in_save = in_end = orig;
2361 open_quote = !open_quote;
2362 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2364 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2366 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2367 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2369 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2371 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2373 } while (*in_end++);
2375 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2376 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2381 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2383 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2386 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2390 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2391 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2392 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2395 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2397 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2399 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2400 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2401 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2404 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2407 unsigned long flags,
2412 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2416 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2417 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2418 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2420 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2424 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2428 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2432 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2433 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2436 /* inode security operations */
2438 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2440 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2443 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2445 inode_free_security(inode);
2448 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2449 char **name, void **value,
2452 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2453 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2454 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2457 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2459 tsec = current->security;
2460 dsec = dir->i_security;
2461 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2463 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2464 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2466 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2467 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2470 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2471 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2474 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2479 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2480 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2481 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2482 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2484 isec->initialized = 1;
2487 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2491 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2498 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2510 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2512 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2515 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2519 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2522 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2525 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2529 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2532 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2535 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2537 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2540 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2542 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2545 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2547 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2550 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2554 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2558 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2561 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2562 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2564 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2567 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2569 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2572 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2576 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2579 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2582 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2583 struct nameidata *nd)
2587 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2592 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2596 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2597 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2600 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2604 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2608 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2611 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2612 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2613 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2615 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2618 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2620 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2623 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2625 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2626 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2627 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2628 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2630 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2631 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2632 Restrict to administrator. */
2637 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2638 ordinary setattr permission. */
2639 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2642 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2643 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2645 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2646 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2647 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2648 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2649 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2653 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2654 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2656 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2657 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2660 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2663 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2664 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2666 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2667 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2671 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2672 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2673 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2675 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2680 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2681 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2685 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2690 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2692 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2693 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2697 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2698 const void *value, size_t size,
2701 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2702 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2706 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2707 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2711 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2713 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2714 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2715 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2723 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2725 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2728 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2730 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2733 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2735 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2736 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2738 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2739 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2744 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2745 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2746 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2748 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2750 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2754 char *context = NULL;
2755 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2757 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2760 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2773 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2774 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2776 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2780 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2783 if (!value || !size)
2786 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2794 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2796 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2797 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2798 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2802 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2804 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2807 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2809 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2812 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2814 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2818 /* file security operations */
2820 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2823 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2826 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2830 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2831 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2834 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2835 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2839 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2842 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2844 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2845 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2846 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2847 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2850 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2854 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2855 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2856 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2858 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2861 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2863 return file_alloc_security(file);
2866 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2868 file_free_security(file);
2871 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2883 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2885 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2886 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2889 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2891 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2892 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2895 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2899 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2904 error = task_has_capability(current, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2907 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2908 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2911 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2916 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2918 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2919 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2921 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2922 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2923 * This has an additional check.
2925 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2932 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2933 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2935 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2936 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2939 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2940 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2942 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2947 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2948 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2949 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2952 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2954 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2956 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2957 if (rc || addr_only)
2960 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2963 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2964 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2967 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2968 unsigned long reqprot,
2973 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2977 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2980 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2981 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2983 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2984 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2985 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2987 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2988 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2989 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2990 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2991 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2993 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2994 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2995 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2996 * modified content. This typically should only
2997 * occur for text relocations.
2999 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3007 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3010 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3012 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3015 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3022 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3027 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3028 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3037 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3038 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3043 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3048 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3052 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3059 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3062 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3064 tsec = current->security;
3065 fsec = file->f_security;
3066 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3071 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3072 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3076 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3077 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3079 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3080 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3082 tsec = tsk->security;
3083 fsec = file->f_security;
3086 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3088 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3090 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3091 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3094 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3096 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3099 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3101 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3102 struct inode *inode;
3103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3104 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3105 fsec = file->f_security;
3106 isec = inode->i_security;
3108 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3109 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3110 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3111 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3112 * struct as its SID.
3114 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3115 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3117 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3118 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3119 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3120 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3121 * new inode label or new policy.
3122 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3124 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3127 /* task security operations */
3129 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3133 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3137 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3140 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3142 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3145 tsec1 = current->security;
3147 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3150 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3152 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3153 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3155 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3156 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3157 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3158 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3159 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3164 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3166 task_free_security(tsk);
3169 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3171 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3172 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3173 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3174 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3175 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3180 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3182 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3185 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3187 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3191 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3193 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3196 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3198 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3201 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3203 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3206 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3208 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3212 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3214 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3218 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3222 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3226 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3229 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3233 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3237 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3240 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3242 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3245 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3247 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3250 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3254 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3255 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3256 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3257 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3258 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3259 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3264 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3268 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3272 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3275 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3277 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3280 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3282 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3285 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3290 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3292 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3297 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3299 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3302 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3304 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3308 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3315 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3316 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3317 the state of the current process. */
3318 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3321 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3323 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3326 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3328 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3330 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3333 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3334 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3338 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3339 struct inode *inode)
3341 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3344 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3345 isec->initialized = 1;
3349 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3350 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3351 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3353 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3354 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3356 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3357 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3361 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3362 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3365 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3366 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3370 *proto = ih->protocol;
3372 switch (ih->protocol) {
3374 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3376 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3380 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3384 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3385 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3390 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3392 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3396 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3400 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3401 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3405 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3406 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3408 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3412 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3416 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3417 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3428 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3430 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3431 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3432 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3435 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3436 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3438 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3439 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3443 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3444 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3447 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3448 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3449 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3458 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3460 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3470 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3472 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3476 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3477 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3481 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3482 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3484 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3488 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3489 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3493 /* includes fragments */
3503 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3504 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3508 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3510 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3513 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3514 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3517 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3519 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3522 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3523 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3532 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3533 " unable to parse packet\n");
3539 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3541 * @family: protocol family
3542 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3545 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3546 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3547 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3548 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3549 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3553 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3560 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3561 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3563 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3564 if (unlikely(err)) {
3566 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3567 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3574 /* socket security operations */
3575 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3578 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3579 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3580 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3583 tsec = task->security;
3584 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3586 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3589 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3590 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3591 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3597 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3598 int protocol, int kern)
3601 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3607 tsec = current->security;
3608 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3609 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3610 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3611 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3617 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3618 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3621 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3622 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3623 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3626 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3628 tsec = current->security;
3629 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3630 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3631 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3632 isec->initialized = 1;
3635 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3636 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3637 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3638 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3644 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3645 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3646 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3648 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3653 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3658 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3659 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3660 * check the first address now.
3662 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3663 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3666 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3668 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3669 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3670 unsigned short snum;
3671 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3672 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3674 tsec = current->security;
3675 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3677 if (family == PF_INET) {
3678 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3679 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3680 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3681 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3683 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3684 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3685 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3686 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3692 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3694 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3695 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3699 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3700 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3701 ad.u.net.family = family;
3702 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3704 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3710 switch (isec->sclass) {
3711 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3712 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3715 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3716 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3719 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3720 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3724 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3728 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3732 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3733 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3734 ad.u.net.family = family;
3736 if (family == PF_INET)
3737 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3739 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3741 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3742 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3750 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3752 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3755 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3760 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3762 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3763 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3764 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3765 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3766 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3767 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3768 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3769 unsigned short snum;
3772 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3773 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3774 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3776 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3778 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3779 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3781 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3784 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3788 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3789 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3791 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3792 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3793 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3794 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3803 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3805 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3808 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3811 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3812 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3814 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3818 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3820 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3821 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3822 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3823 newisec->initialized = 1;
3828 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3833 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3837 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3840 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3841 int size, int flags)
3843 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3846 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3848 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3851 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3853 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3856 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3860 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3864 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3867 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3870 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3873 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3875 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3878 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3879 struct socket *other,
3882 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3883 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3884 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3885 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3888 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3892 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3893 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3895 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3896 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3898 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3900 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3904 /* connecting socket */
3905 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3906 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3908 /* server child socket */
3909 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3910 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3911 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3916 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3917 struct socket *other)
3919 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3920 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3921 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3924 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3925 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3927 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3928 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3930 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3931 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3938 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3940 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3946 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3949 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3950 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3954 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3957 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3958 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3961 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3962 struct sk_buff *skb,
3963 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3968 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3970 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
3971 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
3973 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
3974 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
3977 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3978 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3979 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3980 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3982 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3983 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3984 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3985 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3987 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3988 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3989 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3990 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3993 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3994 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3999 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4002 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4006 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4009 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4015 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4016 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4017 if (unlikely(err)) {
4019 "SELinux: failure in"
4020 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4021 " network port label not found\n");
4024 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4027 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4028 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4029 u16 family, char *addrp)
4032 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4034 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4036 if (selinux_compat_net)
4037 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4040 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4045 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4046 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4049 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4050 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4052 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4055 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4061 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4064 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4065 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4066 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4067 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4070 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4073 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4074 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4077 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4078 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4079 ad.u.net.family = family;
4080 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4084 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4085 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4086 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4087 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4088 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4089 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4092 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4095 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4098 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4106 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4107 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4116 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4117 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4122 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4123 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4124 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4126 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4128 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4129 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4130 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4131 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4133 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4138 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4143 if (scontext_len > len) {
4148 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4152 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4160 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4162 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4166 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4167 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4168 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4172 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4173 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4175 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4178 *secid = peer_secid;
4179 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4184 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4186 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4189 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4191 sk_free_security(sk);
4194 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4196 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4197 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4199 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4200 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4201 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4203 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4206 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4209 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4211 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4213 *secid = sksec->sid;
4217 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4219 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4220 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4222 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4223 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4224 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4225 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4227 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4230 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4231 struct request_sock *req)
4233 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4238 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4241 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4242 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4243 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4247 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4251 req->secid = newsid;
4252 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4256 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4257 const struct request_sock *req)
4259 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4261 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4262 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4263 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4264 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4265 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4266 time it will have been created and available. */
4268 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4269 * thread with access to newsksec */
4270 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4273 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4274 struct sk_buff *skb)
4276 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4278 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4281 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4284 fl->secid = req->secid;
4287 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4291 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4292 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4293 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4295 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4299 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4301 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4303 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4304 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4305 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4306 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4307 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4308 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4318 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4323 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4325 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4330 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4334 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4337 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4338 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4339 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4342 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4343 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4344 ad.u.net.family = family;
4345 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4348 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4352 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4353 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4357 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4358 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4364 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4365 struct sk_buff *skb,
4366 const struct net_device *in,
4367 const struct net_device *out,
4368 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4370 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4373 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4374 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4375 struct sk_buff *skb,
4376 const struct net_device *in,
4377 const struct net_device *out,
4378 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4380 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4384 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4386 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4387 u16 family, char *addrp)
4390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4392 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4393 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4395 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4396 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4399 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4400 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4401 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4402 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4404 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4405 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4406 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4407 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4409 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4410 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4411 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4412 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4415 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4416 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4421 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4424 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4427 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4430 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4437 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4438 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4439 if (unlikely(err)) {
4441 "SELinux: failure in"
4442 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4443 " network port label not found\n");
4446 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4451 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4456 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4457 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4461 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4463 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4464 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4468 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4469 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4473 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4474 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4480 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4486 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4492 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4493 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4494 ad.u.net.family = family;
4495 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4498 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4499 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4500 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4501 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4502 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4503 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4504 family, addrp, proto);
4506 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4507 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4508 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4509 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4510 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4511 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4512 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4515 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4516 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4517 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4520 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4521 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4522 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4523 * directly from the packet */
4526 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4527 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4528 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4530 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4532 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4536 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4537 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4540 if (peerlbl_active) {
4544 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4546 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4547 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4550 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4552 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4553 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4560 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4561 struct sk_buff *skb,
4562 const struct net_device *in,
4563 const struct net_device *out,
4564 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4566 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4569 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4570 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4571 struct sk_buff *skb,
4572 const struct net_device *in,
4573 const struct net_device *out,
4574 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4576 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4580 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4582 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4586 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4590 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4591 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4596 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4599 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4601 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4605 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4606 ad.u.cap = capability;
4608 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4609 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4612 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4613 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4616 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4617 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4619 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4623 isec->sclass = sclass;
4624 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4625 perm->security = isec;
4630 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4632 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4633 perm->security = NULL;
4637 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4639 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4641 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4645 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4646 msg->security = msec;
4651 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4653 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4655 msg->security = NULL;
4659 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4662 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4663 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4664 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4666 tsec = current->security;
4667 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4669 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4670 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4672 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4675 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4677 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4680 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4682 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4685 /* message queue security operations */
4686 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4688 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4689 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4690 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4693 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4697 tsec = current->security;
4698 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4700 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4701 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4703 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4706 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4712 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4714 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4717 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4720 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4723 tsec = current->security;
4724 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4726 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4727 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4729 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4730 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4733 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4741 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4742 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4745 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4748 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4751 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4757 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4761 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4763 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4764 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4765 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4766 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4769 tsec = current->security;
4770 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4771 msec = msg->security;
4774 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4776 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4778 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4779 * message queue this message will be stored in
4781 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4789 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4790 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4792 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4793 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4796 /* Can this process send the message */
4797 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4798 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4800 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4801 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4802 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4807 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4808 struct task_struct *target,
4809 long type, int mode)
4811 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4812 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4813 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4814 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4817 tsec = target->security;
4818 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4819 msec = msg->security;
4821 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4822 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4824 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4825 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4827 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4828 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4832 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4833 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4835 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4840 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4844 tsec = current->security;
4845 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4847 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4848 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4850 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4853 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4859 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4861 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4864 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4866 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4867 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4868 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4870 tsec = current->security;
4871 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4873 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4874 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4876 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4877 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4880 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4881 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4889 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4890 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4893 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4896 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4903 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4909 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4913 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4914 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4919 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4923 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4926 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4928 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4931 /* Semaphore security operations */
4932 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4934 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4935 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4939 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4943 tsec = current->security;
4944 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4946 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4947 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4949 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4952 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4958 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4960 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4963 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4969 tsec = current->security;
4970 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4972 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4975 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4976 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4979 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4980 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4988 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4989 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4993 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5004 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5007 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5011 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5017 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5021 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5022 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5027 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5031 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5034 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5040 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5042 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5047 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5050 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5052 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5056 /* module stacking operations */
5057 static int selinux_register_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
5059 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
5060 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
5061 "module registered.\n", __func__);
5065 secondary_ops = ops;
5067 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
5074 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5077 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5080 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5081 char *name, char **value)
5083 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5089 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5096 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5098 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5100 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5101 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5102 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5103 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5104 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5105 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5106 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5107 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5114 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5120 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5121 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5124 struct task_struct *tracer;
5130 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5131 security attributes. */
5136 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5137 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5138 * above restriction is ever removed.
5140 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5141 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5142 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5143 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5144 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5146 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5147 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5148 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5149 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5155 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5156 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5157 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5161 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5162 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5163 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5165 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5172 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5173 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5174 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5175 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5176 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5177 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5179 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5180 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5181 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5182 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5183 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5184 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5187 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5188 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5189 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5190 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5191 struct av_decision avd;
5196 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5197 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5198 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5199 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5200 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5201 do_each_thread(g, t)
5202 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5203 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5206 while_each_thread(g, t);
5207 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5210 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5211 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5212 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5216 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5217 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5220 tracer = task_tracer_task(p);
5221 if (tracer != NULL) {
5222 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5223 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5225 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5227 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5231 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5232 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5246 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5248 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5251 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5253 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5256 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5263 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5264 unsigned long flags)
5266 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5267 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5269 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5273 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5274 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5276 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5282 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5284 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5290 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5291 struct task_struct *ctx,
5295 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5296 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5298 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5300 tsec = ctx->security;
5301 ksec = key->security;
5303 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5304 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5305 appear to be created. */
5309 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5310 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5313 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5315 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5316 char *context = NULL;
5320 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5329 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5332 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5333 .capget = selinux_capget,
5334 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5335 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5336 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5337 .capable = selinux_capable,
5338 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5339 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5340 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5341 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5343 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5344 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5346 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5347 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5348 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5349 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5350 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5351 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5352 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5354 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5355 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5356 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5357 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5358 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5359 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5360 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5361 .sb_get_mnt_opts = selinux_get_mnt_opts,
5362 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5363 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5364 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5367 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5368 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5369 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5370 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5371 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5372 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5373 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5374 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5375 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5376 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5377 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5378 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5379 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5380 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5381 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5382 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5383 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5384 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5385 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5386 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5387 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5388 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5389 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5390 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5391 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5392 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5393 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5395 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5396 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5397 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5398 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5399 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5400 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5401 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5402 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5403 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5404 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5405 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5407 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5409 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5410 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5411 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5412 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5413 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5414 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5415 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5416 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5417 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5418 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5419 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5420 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5421 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5422 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5423 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5424 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5425 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5426 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5427 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5428 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5429 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5430 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5431 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5433 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5434 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5436 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5437 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5439 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5440 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5441 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5442 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5443 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5444 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5446 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5447 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5448 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5449 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5450 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5452 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5453 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5454 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5455 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5456 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5458 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
5460 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5462 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5463 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5465 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5466 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5467 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5469 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5470 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5472 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5473 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5474 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5475 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5476 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5477 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5478 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5479 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5480 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5481 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5482 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5483 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5484 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5485 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5486 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5487 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5488 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5489 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5490 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5491 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5492 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5493 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5494 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5495 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5496 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5498 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5499 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5500 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5501 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5502 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5503 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5504 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5505 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5506 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5507 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5508 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5512 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5513 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5514 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5515 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5519 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5520 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5521 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5522 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5526 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5528 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5530 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5531 selinux_enabled = 0;
5535 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5536 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5540 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5542 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5543 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5544 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5545 tsec = current->security;
5546 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5548 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5549 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5550 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5553 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5555 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5556 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5557 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5559 if (selinux_enforcing)
5560 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5562 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5567 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5569 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5571 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5572 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5573 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5574 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5576 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5578 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5579 struct superblock_security_struct,
5581 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5583 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5584 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5585 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5587 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5589 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5590 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5591 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5594 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5595 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5598 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5599 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5600 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5602 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5604 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5606 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5607 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5609 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5610 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5613 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5614 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5616 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5617 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5621 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5623 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5625 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5626 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5628 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5629 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5632 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5633 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5635 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5636 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5642 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5647 if (!selinux_enabled)
5650 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5652 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++) {
5653 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5655 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n",
5659 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5660 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++) {
5661 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5663 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n",
5672 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5674 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5675 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5679 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5681 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops); iter++)
5682 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_ops[iter]);
5683 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5684 for (iter = 0; iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops); iter++)
5685 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_ops[iter]);
5690 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5692 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5693 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5696 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5698 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5699 static int selinux_disabled;
5701 int selinux_disable(void)
5703 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5705 if (ss_initialized) {
5706 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5710 if (selinux_disabled) {
5711 /* Only do this once. */
5715 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5717 selinux_disabled = 1;
5718 selinux_enabled = 0;
5720 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5721 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5723 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5724 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5726 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */