2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1279 context[len] = '\0';
1280 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1282 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1283 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1284 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1292 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1298 context[len] = '\0';
1299 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1305 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1306 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1307 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1308 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1312 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1313 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1316 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1320 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1321 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1323 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1324 if (printk_ratelimit())
1325 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1326 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1327 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1329 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1330 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1331 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1334 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1342 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1343 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1345 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1346 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1347 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1349 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1350 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1351 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1359 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1360 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1363 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1364 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1366 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1367 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1369 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1370 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1381 isec->initialized = 1;
1384 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1386 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1387 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1391 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1392 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1398 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1399 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1402 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1403 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1406 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1407 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1410 /* All other signals. */
1411 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1419 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1420 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1422 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1423 const struct cred *target,
1426 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1428 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1432 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1433 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1434 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1435 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1437 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1438 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1441 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1445 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1446 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1448 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1452 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1453 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1454 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1455 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1457 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 sid = current_sid();
1463 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1467 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1468 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1471 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1472 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1473 const struct cred *cred,
1476 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1477 struct av_decision avd;
1479 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1480 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1483 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1487 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1489 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1492 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1496 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1500 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1501 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1502 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1506 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1507 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1510 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1512 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1513 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1516 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1517 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1518 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1519 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1520 struct inode *inode,
1522 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1524 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1525 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1528 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1531 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1532 isec = inode->i_security;
1536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1537 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1540 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1543 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1544 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1545 pathname if needed. */
1546 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1547 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1548 struct dentry *dentry,
1551 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1554 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1555 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1556 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1557 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1560 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1561 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1562 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1563 check a particular permission to the file.
1564 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1565 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1566 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1567 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1568 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1572 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1573 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1574 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1575 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1578 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1579 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1581 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1582 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1590 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1593 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1599 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1600 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1601 struct dentry *dentry,
1604 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1605 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1606 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1607 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1609 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1612 dsec = dir->i_security;
1613 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1616 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1618 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1619 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1621 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1622 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1627 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1628 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1637 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1638 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1639 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1642 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1643 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1644 struct task_struct *ctx)
1646 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1648 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1652 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1655 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1656 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1657 struct dentry *dentry,
1661 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1662 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1663 u32 sid = current_sid();
1667 dsec = dir->i_security;
1668 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1670 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1674 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1675 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1690 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1699 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1700 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1701 struct inode *new_dir,
1702 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1704 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1705 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1706 u32 sid = current_sid();
1708 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1711 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1712 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1713 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1714 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1716 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1718 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1719 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1720 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1723 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1724 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1727 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1734 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1735 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1736 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1737 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1738 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1742 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1743 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1744 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1746 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1754 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1755 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1756 struct super_block *sb,
1758 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1760 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1761 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1763 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1764 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1767 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1768 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1772 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1774 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1775 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1778 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1780 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1784 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1786 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1788 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1795 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1796 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1800 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1802 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1803 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1810 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1819 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1822 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1824 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1826 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1827 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1829 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1833 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1834 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1835 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1836 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1837 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1838 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1839 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1842 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1843 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1848 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1850 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1855 rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1859 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1860 u32 sid = current_sid();
1861 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1862 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1865 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1872 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1876 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1879 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1880 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1884 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1888 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1891 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1892 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1893 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1894 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1898 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1899 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1903 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1907 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1908 * which was removed).
1910 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1911 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1912 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1913 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1916 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1921 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1925 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1928 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1931 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1934 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1939 end = buffer+buflen;
1945 const char *name = table->procname;
1946 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1947 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1951 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1954 table = table->parent;
1960 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1962 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1964 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1969 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1976 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1980 sid = current_sid();
1982 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1983 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1985 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1986 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1989 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1990 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1992 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1993 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2001 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2002 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2008 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2010 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2022 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2027 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2030 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2036 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2038 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2040 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2043 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2047 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2052 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2053 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2054 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2056 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2057 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2058 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2059 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2061 case 0: /* Close log */
2062 case 1: /* Open log */
2063 case 2: /* Read from log */
2064 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2065 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2067 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2074 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2075 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2076 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2078 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2079 * processes that allocate mappings.
2081 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2083 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2085 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2086 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2090 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2093 /* binprm security operations */
2095 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2097 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2098 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2099 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2100 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2101 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2104 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2108 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2109 * the script interpreter */
2110 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2113 old_tsec = current_security();
2114 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2115 isec = inode->i_security;
2117 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2118 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2119 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2121 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2122 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2123 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2124 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2126 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2127 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2128 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2129 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2131 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2132 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2133 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2138 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2139 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2141 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2142 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2144 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2145 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2146 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2150 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2151 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2152 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2156 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2157 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2161 /* Check for shared state */
2162 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2163 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2164 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2170 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2171 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2173 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2174 struct task_struct *tracer;
2175 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2179 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2180 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2181 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2187 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2189 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2195 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2196 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2202 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2204 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2205 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2213 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2214 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2215 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2216 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2218 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2221 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2224 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2225 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2227 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2228 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2229 struct files_struct *files)
2231 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2232 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2233 struct tty_struct *tty;
2234 struct fdtable *fdt;
2238 tty = get_current_tty();
2241 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2242 struct inode *inode;
2244 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2245 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2246 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2247 file may belong to another process and we are only
2248 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2249 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2250 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2251 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2252 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2259 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2263 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2265 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2267 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2269 unsigned long set, i;
2274 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2275 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2277 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2280 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2281 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2286 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2288 file_to_av(file))) {
2290 fd = get_unused_fd();
2300 devnull = dentry_open(
2302 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2304 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2311 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2316 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2319 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2323 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2325 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2327 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2328 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2331 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2332 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2335 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2336 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2338 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2339 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2341 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2342 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2343 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2345 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2346 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2347 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2348 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2349 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2351 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2352 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2354 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2355 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2356 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2357 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2359 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2364 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2367 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2369 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2370 struct itimerval itimer;
2371 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2374 unsigned long flags;
2382 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2383 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2384 * flush and unblock signals.
2386 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2387 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2389 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2391 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2392 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2393 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2394 flush_signals(current);
2395 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2396 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2397 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2398 recalc_sigpending();
2399 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2402 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2403 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2404 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2405 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2406 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2407 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2408 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2409 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2412 /* superblock security operations */
2414 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2416 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2419 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2421 superblock_free_security(sb);
2424 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2429 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2432 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2434 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2441 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2448 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2452 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2455 int current_size = 0;
2463 while (current_size < len) {
2473 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2475 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2476 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2477 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2483 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2491 in_save = in_end = orig;
2495 open_quote = !open_quote;
2496 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2498 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2500 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2501 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2503 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2505 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2507 } while (*in_end++);
2509 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2510 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2515 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2518 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2521 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2525 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2526 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2529 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2530 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2531 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2534 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2536 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2537 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2539 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2540 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2541 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2544 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2547 unsigned long flags,
2550 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2552 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2553 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2554 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2556 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2560 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2562 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2564 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2565 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2568 /* inode security operations */
2570 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2572 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2575 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2577 inode_free_security(inode);
2580 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2581 char **name, void **value,
2584 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2585 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2586 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2587 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2588 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2590 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2592 dsec = dir->i_security;
2593 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2596 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2598 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2599 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2600 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2603 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2604 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2607 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2612 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2613 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2614 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2615 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2617 isec->initialized = 1;
2620 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2624 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2631 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2643 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2645 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2648 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2650 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2653 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2655 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2658 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2660 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2663 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2665 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2668 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2670 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2673 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2675 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2678 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2679 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2681 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2684 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2686 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2688 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2691 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2698 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2700 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2703 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2707 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2708 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2711 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2713 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2715 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2718 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2719 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2720 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2725 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2729 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2732 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2737 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2738 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2739 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2741 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2742 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2743 Restrict to administrator. */
2748 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2749 ordinary setattr permission. */
2750 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2753 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2754 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2756 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2757 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2758 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2759 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2760 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2763 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2764 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2766 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2767 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2770 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2773 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2774 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2776 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2777 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2781 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2782 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2783 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2785 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2790 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2791 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2795 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2800 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2802 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2803 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2807 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2808 const void *value, size_t size,
2811 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2812 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2816 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2817 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2821 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2823 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2824 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2825 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2833 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2835 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2837 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2840 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2842 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2844 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2847 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2849 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2850 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2852 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2853 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2858 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2860 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2862 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2866 char *context = NULL;
2867 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2869 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2873 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2874 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2875 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2876 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2877 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2878 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2879 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2881 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2882 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2884 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2887 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2900 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2901 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2903 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2907 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2910 if (!value || !size)
2913 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2921 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2923 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2924 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2925 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2929 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2931 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2935 /* file security operations */
2937 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2939 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2941 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2944 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2948 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2949 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2952 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2953 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2957 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2960 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2962 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2963 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2964 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2965 u32 sid = current_sid();
2968 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2972 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2973 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2974 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2976 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2979 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2981 return file_alloc_security(file);
2984 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2986 file_free_security(file);
2989 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2992 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2995 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2997 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3002 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3005 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3007 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3010 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3011 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3013 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3014 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3015 * This has an additional check.
3017 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3024 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3025 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3027 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3028 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3031 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3032 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3034 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3041 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3042 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3043 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3046 u32 sid = current_sid();
3048 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3049 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3050 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3051 if (rc || addr_only)
3054 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3057 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3058 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3061 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3062 unsigned long reqprot,
3065 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3067 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3070 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3071 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3073 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3074 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3075 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3076 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3077 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3078 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3079 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3080 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3082 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3083 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3084 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3085 * modified content. This typically should only
3086 * occur for text relocations.
3088 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3095 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3098 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3100 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3102 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3105 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3113 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3118 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3119 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3128 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3129 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3134 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3139 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3143 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3150 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3152 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3154 fsec = file->f_security;
3155 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3160 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3161 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3164 u32 sid = current_sid();
3166 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3168 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3169 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3171 fsec = file->f_security;
3174 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3176 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3178 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3179 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3182 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3184 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3186 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3189 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3191 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3192 struct inode *inode;
3193 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3195 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3196 fsec = file->f_security;
3197 isec = inode->i_security;
3199 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3200 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3201 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3202 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3203 * struct as its SID.
3205 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3206 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3208 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3209 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3210 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3211 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3212 * new inode label or new policy.
3213 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3215 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3218 /* task security operations */
3220 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3222 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3226 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3228 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3230 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3231 cred->security = NULL;
3236 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3238 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3241 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3242 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3244 old_tsec = old->security;
3246 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3250 new->security = tsec;
3255 * set the security data for a kernel service
3256 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3258 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3260 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3261 u32 sid = current_sid();
3264 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3265 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3266 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3270 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3271 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3272 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3278 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3279 * objective context of the specified inode
3281 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3283 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3284 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3285 u32 sid = current_sid();
3288 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3289 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3290 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3294 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3298 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3300 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3303 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3305 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3308 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3310 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3313 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3315 *secid = task_sid(p);
3318 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3322 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3326 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3329 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3333 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3337 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3340 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3342 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3345 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3347 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3349 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3350 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3351 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3352 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3353 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3354 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3359 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3363 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3370 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3375 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3377 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3380 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3387 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3389 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3391 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3392 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3394 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3398 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3400 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3403 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3404 struct inode *inode)
3406 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3407 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3410 isec->initialized = 1;
3413 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3414 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3415 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3417 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3418 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3420 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3421 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3425 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3426 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3429 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3430 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3434 *proto = ih->protocol;
3436 switch (ih->protocol) {
3438 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3440 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3444 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3448 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3449 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3454 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3456 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3460 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3464 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3465 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3469 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3470 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3472 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3476 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3480 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3481 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3492 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3494 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3495 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3496 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3499 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3500 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3502 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3503 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3507 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3508 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3511 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3512 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3513 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3522 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3524 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3528 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3529 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3534 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3536 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3540 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3541 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3545 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3546 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3548 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3552 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3553 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3557 /* includes fragments */
3567 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3568 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3573 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3575 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3578 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3579 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3582 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3584 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3587 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3588 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3598 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3599 " unable to parse packet\n");
3609 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3611 * @family: protocol family
3612 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3615 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3616 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3617 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3618 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3619 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3623 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3630 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3631 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3633 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3634 if (unlikely(err)) {
3636 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3637 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3644 /* socket security operations */
3645 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3648 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3649 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3653 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3655 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3657 sid = task_sid(task);
3659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3660 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3661 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3667 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3668 int protocol, int kern)
3670 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3671 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3680 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3682 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3683 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3689 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3690 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3693 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3694 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3695 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3700 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3702 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3705 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3711 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3712 isec->initialized = 1;
3715 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3716 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3717 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3718 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3724 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3725 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3726 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3728 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3733 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3738 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3739 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3740 * check the first address now.
3742 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3743 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3745 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3746 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3747 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3748 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3749 unsigned short snum;
3750 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3753 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3755 if (family == PF_INET) {
3756 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3757 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3758 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3760 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3761 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3762 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3768 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3770 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3771 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3775 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3776 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3777 ad.u.net.family = family;
3778 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3780 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3786 switch (isec->sclass) {
3787 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3788 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3791 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3792 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3795 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3796 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3800 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3804 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3808 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3809 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3810 ad.u.net.family = family;
3812 if (family == PF_INET)
3813 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3815 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3817 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3818 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3826 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3828 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3829 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3832 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3837 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3839 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3840 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3841 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3842 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3843 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3844 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3845 unsigned short snum;
3848 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3849 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3850 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3852 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3854 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3855 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3857 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3860 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3864 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3865 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3867 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3868 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3869 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3870 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3875 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3881 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3883 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3886 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3889 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3890 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3892 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3896 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3898 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3899 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3900 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3901 newisec->initialized = 1;
3906 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3911 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3915 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3918 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3919 int size, int flags)
3921 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3924 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3926 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3929 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3931 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3934 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3938 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3942 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3945 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3948 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3951 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3953 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3956 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3957 struct socket *other,
3960 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3961 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3962 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3966 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3967 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3969 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3970 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3972 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3974 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3978 /* connecting socket */
3979 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3980 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3982 /* server child socket */
3983 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3984 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3985 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3990 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3991 struct socket *other)
3993 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3994 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3995 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3998 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3999 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4001 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4002 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4004 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4005 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4012 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4014 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4020 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4023 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4024 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4028 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4031 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4032 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4035 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4036 struct sk_buff *skb,
4037 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4042 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4044 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4045 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4047 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4048 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4051 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4052 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4053 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4054 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4056 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4057 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4058 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4059 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4061 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4062 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4063 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4064 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4067 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4068 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4073 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4076 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4080 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4083 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4089 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4090 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4091 if (unlikely(err)) {
4093 "SELinux: failure in"
4094 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4095 " network port label not found\n");
4098 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4101 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4105 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4107 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4108 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4111 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4112 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4113 ad.u.net.family = family;
4114 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4118 if (selinux_compat_net)
4119 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4121 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4122 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4127 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4128 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4131 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4132 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4134 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4136 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4139 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4145 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4148 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4149 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4150 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4151 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4156 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4159 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4160 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4163 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4164 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4165 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4166 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4167 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4168 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4170 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4171 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4172 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4175 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4176 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4177 ad.u.net.family = family;
4178 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4182 if (peerlbl_active) {
4185 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4188 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4191 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4194 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4197 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4200 if (secmark_active) {
4201 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4210 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4211 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4216 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4217 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4218 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4220 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4222 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4223 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4224 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4225 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4227 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4232 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4237 if (scontext_len > len) {
4242 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4246 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4254 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4256 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4259 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4261 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4264 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4268 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4269 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4271 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4274 *secid = peer_secid;
4275 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4280 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4282 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4285 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4287 sk_free_security(sk);
4290 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4293 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4295 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4296 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4297 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4299 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4302 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4305 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4309 *secid = sksec->sid;
4313 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4315 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4316 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4318 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4319 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4320 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4321 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4324 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4325 struct request_sock *req)
4327 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4329 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4333 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4334 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4337 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4340 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4341 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4342 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4346 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4350 req->secid = newsid;
4351 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4355 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4356 const struct request_sock *req)
4358 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4360 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4361 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4362 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4363 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4364 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4365 time it will have been created and available. */
4367 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4368 * thread with access to newsksec */
4369 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4372 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4374 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4375 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4377 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4378 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4381 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4383 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4386 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4389 fl->secid = req->secid;
4392 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4396 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4397 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4398 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4400 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4404 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4406 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4408 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4409 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4410 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4411 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4412 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4413 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4423 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4428 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4430 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4436 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4441 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4444 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4445 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4446 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4447 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4450 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4453 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4454 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4455 ad.u.net.family = family;
4456 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4459 if (peerlbl_active) {
4460 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4463 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4469 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4470 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4474 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4475 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4476 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4478 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4484 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4485 struct sk_buff *skb,
4486 const struct net_device *in,
4487 const struct net_device *out,
4488 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4490 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4493 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4494 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4495 struct sk_buff *skb,
4496 const struct net_device *in,
4497 const struct net_device *out,
4498 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4500 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4504 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4509 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4512 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4513 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4514 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4516 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4519 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4520 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4526 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4527 struct sk_buff *skb,
4528 const struct net_device *in,
4529 const struct net_device *out,
4530 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4532 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4535 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4537 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4538 u16 family, char *addrp)
4541 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4543 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4544 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4546 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4547 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4550 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4551 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4552 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4553 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4555 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4556 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4557 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4558 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4560 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4561 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4562 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4563 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4566 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4567 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4572 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4575 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4578 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4581 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4588 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4589 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4590 if (unlikely(err)) {
4592 "SELinux: failure in"
4593 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4594 " network port label not found\n");
4597 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4600 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4604 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4605 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4606 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4612 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4614 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4615 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4616 ad.u.net.family = family;
4617 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4620 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4621 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4622 &ad, family, addrp))
4624 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4625 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4626 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4630 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4631 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4637 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4643 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4648 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4649 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4650 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4651 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4652 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4653 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4655 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4656 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4657 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4658 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4659 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4660 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4661 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4664 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4665 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4666 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4669 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4670 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4671 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4672 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4677 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4678 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4680 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4683 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4684 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4686 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4691 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4692 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4695 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4697 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4698 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4699 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4702 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4703 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4704 ad.u.net.family = family;
4705 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4709 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4710 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4713 if (peerlbl_active) {
4717 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4719 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4720 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4723 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4725 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4726 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4733 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4734 struct sk_buff *skb,
4735 const struct net_device *in,
4736 const struct net_device *out,
4737 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4739 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4742 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4743 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4744 struct sk_buff *skb,
4745 const struct net_device *in,
4746 const struct net_device *out,
4747 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4749 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4753 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4755 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4759 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4763 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4764 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4769 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4772 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4774 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4778 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4779 ad.u.cap = capability;
4781 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4782 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4785 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4786 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4789 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4792 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4796 sid = task_sid(task);
4797 isec->sclass = sclass;
4799 perm->security = isec;
4804 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4807 perm->security = NULL;
4811 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4813 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4815 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4819 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4820 msg->security = msec;
4825 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4827 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4829 msg->security = NULL;
4833 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4836 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4837 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4838 u32 sid = current_sid();
4840 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4843 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4845 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4848 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4850 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4853 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4855 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4858 /* message queue security operations */
4859 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4861 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4862 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4863 u32 sid = current_sid();
4866 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4870 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4872 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4873 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4875 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4878 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4884 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4886 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4889 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4891 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4892 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4893 u32 sid = current_sid();
4895 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4897 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4898 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4900 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4901 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4904 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4912 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4913 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4916 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4919 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4922 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4928 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4932 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4934 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4935 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4937 u32 sid = current_sid();
4940 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4941 msec = msg->security;
4944 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4946 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4948 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4949 * message queue this message will be stored in
4951 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4957 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4958 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4960 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4961 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4964 /* Can this process send the message */
4965 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4968 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4969 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4970 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4975 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4976 struct task_struct *target,
4977 long type, int mode)
4979 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4980 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4981 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4982 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4985 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4986 msec = msg->security;
4988 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4989 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4991 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4992 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4994 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4995 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4999 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5000 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5002 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5003 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5004 u32 sid = current_sid();
5007 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5011 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5013 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5014 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5016 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5019 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5025 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5027 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5030 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5032 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5033 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5034 u32 sid = current_sid();
5036 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5038 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5039 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5041 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5042 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5045 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5046 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5054 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5055 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5058 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5061 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5068 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5074 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5078 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5079 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5083 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5086 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5088 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5091 /* Semaphore security operations */
5092 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5094 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5096 u32 sid = current_sid();
5099 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5103 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5105 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5106 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5108 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5111 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5117 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5119 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5122 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5124 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5126 u32 sid = current_sid();
5128 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5130 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5131 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5133 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5134 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5137 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5138 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5146 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5147 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5151 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5162 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5165 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5169 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5175 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5179 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5180 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5185 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5189 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5192 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5198 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5200 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5205 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5208 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5210 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5214 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5217 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5220 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5221 char *name, char **value)
5223 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5229 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5235 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5237 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5242 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5244 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5246 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5247 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5248 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5256 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5266 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5267 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5269 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5270 struct task_struct *tracer;
5277 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5278 security attributes. */
5283 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5284 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5285 * above restriction is ever removed.
5287 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5288 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5289 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5291 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5292 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5293 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5294 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5295 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5296 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5302 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5303 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5304 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5308 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5309 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5310 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5312 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5319 new = prepare_creds();
5323 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5324 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5325 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5326 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5327 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5328 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5329 tsec = new->security;
5330 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5331 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5332 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5333 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5334 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5335 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5338 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5339 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5340 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5341 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5346 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5348 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5349 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5354 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5355 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5356 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5360 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5361 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5364 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5366 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5370 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5371 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5390 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5392 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5395 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5397 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5400 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5407 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5408 unsigned long flags)
5410 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5411 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5413 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5417 tsec = cred->security;
5418 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5419 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5421 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5427 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5429 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5435 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5436 const struct cred *cred,
5440 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5443 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5444 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5445 appear to be created. */
5449 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5451 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5452 ksec = key->security;
5454 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5457 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5459 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5460 char *context = NULL;
5464 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5473 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5476 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5477 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5478 .capget = selinux_capget,
5479 .capset = selinux_capset,
5480 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5481 .capable = selinux_capable,
5482 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5483 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5484 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5485 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5487 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5488 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5490 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5491 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5492 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5493 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5495 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5496 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5497 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5498 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5499 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5500 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5501 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5502 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5503 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5504 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5505 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5508 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5509 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5510 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5511 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5512 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5513 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5514 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5515 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5516 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5517 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5518 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5519 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5520 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5521 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5522 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5523 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5524 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5525 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5526 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5527 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5528 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5529 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5530 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5531 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5532 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5534 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5535 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5536 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5537 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5538 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5539 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5540 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5541 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5542 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5543 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5544 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5546 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5548 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5549 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5550 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5551 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5552 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5553 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5554 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5555 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5556 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5557 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5558 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5559 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5560 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5561 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5562 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5563 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5564 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5565 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5566 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5568 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5569 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5571 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5572 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5574 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5575 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5576 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5577 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5578 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5579 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5581 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5582 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5583 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5584 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5585 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5587 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5588 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5589 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5590 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5591 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5593 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5595 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5596 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5598 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5599 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5600 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5602 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5603 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5605 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5606 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5607 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5608 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5609 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5610 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5611 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5612 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5613 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5614 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5615 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5616 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5617 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5618 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5619 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5620 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5621 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5622 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5623 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5624 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5625 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5626 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5627 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5628 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5629 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5631 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5632 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5633 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5634 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5635 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5636 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5637 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5638 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5639 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5640 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5641 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5645 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5646 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5647 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5648 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5652 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5653 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5654 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5655 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5659 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5661 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5662 selinux_enabled = 0;
5666 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5667 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5671 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5673 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5674 cred_init_security();
5676 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5677 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5678 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5681 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5683 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5684 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5685 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5687 if (selinux_enforcing)
5688 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5690 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5695 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5697 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5699 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5700 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5701 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5702 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5704 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5705 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5706 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5707 struct superblock_security_struct,
5709 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5711 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5712 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5713 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5715 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5717 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5718 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5719 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5722 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5723 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5726 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5727 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5728 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5730 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5732 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5734 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5735 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5737 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5738 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5741 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5742 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5744 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5745 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5748 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5749 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5751 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5752 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5756 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5758 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5760 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5761 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5763 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5764 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5767 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5768 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5770 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5771 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5777 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5781 if (!selinux_enabled)
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5786 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5788 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5790 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5791 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5793 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5800 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5802 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5803 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5805 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5807 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5808 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5809 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5814 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5816 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5817 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5820 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5822 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5823 static int selinux_disabled;
5825 int selinux_disable(void)
5827 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5829 if (ss_initialized) {
5830 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5834 if (selinux_disabled) {
5835 /* Only do this once. */
5839 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5841 selinux_disabled = 1;
5842 selinux_enabled = 0;
5844 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5845 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5847 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5848 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5850 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */