Merge tag 'hwmon-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck...
[pandora-kernel.git] / security / integrity / ima / ima_policy.c
1 /*
2  * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3  * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
4  *
5  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7  * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
8  *
9  * ima_policy.c
10  *      - initialize default measure policy rules
11  *
12  */
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19
20 #include "ima.h"
21
22 /* flags definitions */
23 #define IMA_FUNC        0x0001
24 #define IMA_MASK        0x0002
25 #define IMA_FSMAGIC     0x0004
26 #define IMA_UID         0x0008
27
28 enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
29
30 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
31 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
32         LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
33 };
34
35 struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
36         struct list_head list;
37         enum ima_action action;
38         unsigned int flags;
39         enum ima_hooks func;
40         int mask;
41         unsigned long fsmagic;
42         uid_t uid;
43         struct {
44                 void *rule;     /* LSM file metadata specific */
45                 int type;       /* audit type */
46         } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
47 };
48
49 /*
50  * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
51  * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
52  */
53
54 /*
55  * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage.  Measures all files
56  * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root.  Dangerous because
57  * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
58  * and running executables.
59  */
60 static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
61         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
62         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
63         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
64         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
65         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
66         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
67         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
68         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
69         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
70         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
71          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
72         {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
73          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
74         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
75          .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
76 };
77
78 static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
79 static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
80 static struct list_head *ima_measure;
81
82 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
83
84 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
85 static int __init default_policy_setup(char *str)
86 {
87         ima_use_tcb = 1;
88         return 1;
89 }
90 __setup("ima_tcb", default_policy_setup);
91
92 /**
93  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
94  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
95  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
96  * @func: LIM hook identifier
97  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
98  *
99  * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
100  */
101 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
102                             struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
103 {
104         struct task_struct *tsk = current;
105         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
106         int i;
107
108         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
109                 return false;
110         if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
111                 return false;
112         if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
113             && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
114                 return false;
115         if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != cred->uid)
116                 return false;
117         for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
118                 int rc = 0;
119                 u32 osid, sid;
120
121                 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
122                         continue;
123
124                 switch (i) {
125                 case LSM_OBJ_USER:
126                 case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
127                 case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
128                         security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
129                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
130                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
131                                                         Audit_equal,
132                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
133                                                         NULL);
134                         break;
135                 case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
136                 case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
137                 case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
138                         security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
139                         rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
140                                                         rule->lsm[i].type,
141                                                         Audit_equal,
142                                                         rule->lsm[i].rule,
143                                                         NULL);
144                 default:
145                         break;
146                 }
147                 if (!rc)
148                         return false;
149         }
150         return true;
151 }
152
153 /**
154  * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
155  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
156  * @func: IMA hook identifier
157  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
158  *
159  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
160  * conditions.
161  *
162  * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
163  * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
164  * change.)
165  */
166 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
167 {
168         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
169
170         list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
171                 bool rc;
172
173                 rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
174                 if (rc)
175                         return entry->action;
176         }
177         return 0;
178 }
179
180 /**
181  * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
182  *
183  * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
184  * the new measure_policy_rules.
185  */
186 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
187 {
188         int i, entries;
189
190         /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
191         if (ima_use_tcb)
192                 entries = ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules);
193         else
194                 entries = 0;
195
196         for (i = 0; i < entries; i++)
197                 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
198         ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
199 }
200
201 /**
202  * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
203  *
204  * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
205  * policy.  Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
206  * added to the policy.
207  */
208 void ima_update_policy(void)
209 {
210         const char *op = "policy_update";
211         const char *cause = "already exists";
212         int result = 1;
213         int audit_info = 0;
214
215         if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
216                 ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
217                 cause = "complete";
218                 result = 0;
219         }
220         integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
221                             NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
222 }
223
224 enum {
225         Opt_err = -1,
226         Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
227         Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
228         Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
229         Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
230 };
231
232 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
233         {Opt_measure, "measure"},
234         {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
235         {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
236         {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
237         {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
238         {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
239         {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
240         {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
241         {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
242         {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
243         {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
244         {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
245         {Opt_err, NULL}
246 };
247
248 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
249                              char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
250 {
251         int result;
252
253         if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
254                 return -EINVAL;
255
256         entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
257         result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
258                                            Audit_equal, args,
259                                            &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
260         if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
261                 return -EINVAL;
262         return result;
263 }
264
265 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
266 {
267         audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
268         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
269         audit_log_format(ab, " ");
270 }
271
272 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
273 {
274         struct audit_buffer *ab;
275         char *p;
276         int result = 0;
277
278         ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
279
280         entry->uid = -1;
281         entry->action = UNKNOWN;
282         while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
283                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
284                 int token;
285                 unsigned long lnum;
286
287                 if (result < 0)
288                         break;
289                 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
290                         continue;
291                 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
292                 switch (token) {
293                 case Opt_measure:
294                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
295
296                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
297                                 result = -EINVAL;
298
299                         entry->action = MEASURE;
300                         break;
301                 case Opt_dont_measure:
302                         ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
303
304                         if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
305                                 result = -EINVAL;
306
307                         entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
308                         break;
309                 case Opt_func:
310                         ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
311
312                         if (entry->func)
313                                 result  = -EINVAL;
314
315                         if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
316                                 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
317                         /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
318                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
319                                 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
320                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
321                                 entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
322                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
323                                 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
324                         else
325                                 result = -EINVAL;
326                         if (!result)
327                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
328                         break;
329                 case Opt_mask:
330                         ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
331
332                         if (entry->mask)
333                                 result = -EINVAL;
334
335                         if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
336                                 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
337                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
338                                 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
339                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
340                                 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
341                         else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
342                                 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
343                         else
344                                 result = -EINVAL;
345                         if (!result)
346                                 entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
347                         break;
348                 case Opt_fsmagic:
349                         ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
350
351                         if (entry->fsmagic) {
352                                 result = -EINVAL;
353                                 break;
354                         }
355
356                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
357                                                 &entry->fsmagic);
358                         if (!result)
359                                 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
360                         break;
361                 case Opt_uid:
362                         ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
363
364                         if (entry->uid != -1) {
365                                 result = -EINVAL;
366                                 break;
367                         }
368
369                         result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
370                         if (!result) {
371                                 entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
372                                 if (entry->uid != lnum)
373                                         result = -EINVAL;
374                                 else
375                                         entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
376                         }
377                         break;
378                 case Opt_obj_user:
379                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
380                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
381                                                    LSM_OBJ_USER,
382                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
383                         break;
384                 case Opt_obj_role:
385                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
386                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
387                                                    LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
388                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
389                         break;
390                 case Opt_obj_type:
391                         ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
392                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
393                                                    LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
394                                                    AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
395                         break;
396                 case Opt_subj_user:
397                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
398                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
399                                                    LSM_SUBJ_USER,
400                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
401                         break;
402                 case Opt_subj_role:
403                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
404                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
405                                                    LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
406                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
407                         break;
408                 case Opt_subj_type:
409                         ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
410                         result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
411                                                    LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
412                                                    AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
413                         break;
414                 case Opt_err:
415                         ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
416                         result = -EINVAL;
417                         break;
418                 }
419         }
420         if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
421                 result = -EINVAL;
422
423         audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
424         audit_log_end(ab);
425         return result;
426 }
427
428 /**
429  * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
430  * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
431  *
432  * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
433  * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
434  */
435 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
436 {
437         const char *op = "update_policy";
438         char *p;
439         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
440         ssize_t result, len;
441         int audit_info = 0;
442
443         /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
444         if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
445                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
446                                     NULL, op, "already exists",
447                                     -EACCES, audit_info);
448                 return -EACCES;
449         }
450
451         entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
452         if (!entry) {
453                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
454                                     NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
455                 return -ENOMEM;
456         }
457
458         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
459
460         p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
461         len = strlen(p) + 1;
462
463         if (*p == '#') {
464                 kfree(entry);
465                 return len;
466         }
467
468         result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
469         if (result) {
470                 kfree(entry);
471                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
472                                     NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
473                                     audit_info);
474                 return result;
475         }
476
477         mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
478         list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
479         mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
480
481         return len;
482 }
483
484 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
485 void ima_delete_rules(void)
486 {
487         struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
488
489         mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
490         list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
491                 list_del(&entry->list);
492                 kfree(entry);
493         }
494         mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
495 }