proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes
authorJake Edge <jake@lwn.net>
Mon, 4 May 2009 18:51:14 +0000 (12:51 -0600)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Mon, 4 May 2009 22:14:23 +0000 (15:14 -0700)
commitf83ce3e6b02d5e48b3a43b001390e2b58820389d
tree71c57abf4f9d259f5bfa22deaf724db85738f862
parent7fdf523067666b0eaff330f362401ee50ce187c4
proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes

By using the same test as is used for /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps,
only allow processes that can ptrace() a given process to see information
that might be used to bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR).
These include eip, esp, wchan, and start_stack in /proc/pid/stat as well
as the non-symbolic output from /proc/pid/wchan.

ASLR can be bypassed by sampling eip as shown by the proof-of-concept
code at http://code.google.com/p/fuzzyaslr/ As part of a presentation
(http://www.cr0.org/paper/to-jt-linux-alsr-leak.pdf) esp and wchan were
also noted as possibly usable information leaks as well.  The
start_stack address also leaks potentially useful information.

Cc: Stable Team <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jake Edge <jake@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
fs/proc/array.c
fs/proc/base.c