do_exit(): make sure that we run with get_fs() == USER_DS

commit 33dd94ae1ccbfb7bf0fb6c692bc3d1c4269e6177 upstream.

If a user manages to trigger an oops with fs set to KERNEL_DS, fs is not
otherwise reset before do_exit().  do_exit may later (via mm_release in
fork.c) do a put_user to a user-controlled address, potentially allowing
a user to leverage an oops into a controlled write into kernel memory.

This is only triggerable in the presence of another bug, but this
potentially turns a lot of DoS bugs into privilege escalations, so it's
worth fixing.  I have proof-of-concept code which uses this bug along
with CVE-2010-3849 to write a zero to an arbitrary kernel address, so
I've tested that this is not theoretical.

A more logical place to put this fix might be when we know an oops has
occurred, before we call do_exit(), but that would involve changing
every architecture, in multiple places.

Let's just stick it in do_exit instead.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: update code comment]
Signed-off-by: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@ksplice.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 8715136..ac5ab8c 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -1004,6 +1004,15 @@ NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
        if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
                panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
 
+       /*
+        * If do_exit is called because this processes oopsed, it's possible
+        * that get_fs() was left as KERNEL_DS, so reset it to USER_DS before
+        * continuing. Amongst other possible reasons, this is to prevent
+        * mm_release()->clear_child_tid() from writing to a user-controlled
+        * kernel address.
+        */
+       set_fs(USER_DS);
+
        tracehook_report_exit(&code);
 
        /*