2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
348 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
354 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
355 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
358 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
363 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
371 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
372 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
375 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
387 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
388 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
389 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
396 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
401 sbsec->initialized = 1;
403 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
409 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
422 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
423 struct inode_security_struct, list);
424 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
426 inode = igrab(inode);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 list_del_init(&isec->list);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
447 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
451 char *context = NULL;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
457 if (!sbsec->initialized)
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
475 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
476 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
481 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
488 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
489 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
492 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
495 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
496 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
499 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
500 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
502 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
503 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
506 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
507 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
509 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
510 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
511 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
513 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec->initialized)
534 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
535 (old_sid != new_sid))
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 if (!sbsec->initialized)
542 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
552 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
557 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
558 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
559 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
560 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
562 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
563 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
564 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
575 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->initialized) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
705 if (!rootcontext_sid)
706 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
712 if (rootcontext_sid) {
713 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
717 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
718 root_isec->initialized = 1;
721 if (defcontext_sid) {
722 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
724 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
739 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
751 struct super_block *newsb)
753 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
754 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
756 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
765 if (!ss_initialized) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
768 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec->initialized)
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
782 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
784 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
785 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
786 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
789 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
793 if (!set_rootcontext) {
794 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
795 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
798 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
800 if (set_rootcontext) {
801 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
803 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
806 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
814 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
817 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
818 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
819 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
821 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
826 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
831 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
835 if (context || defcontext) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
840 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
853 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
860 case Opt_rootcontext:
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
866 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
874 if (context || defcontext) {
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
879 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
965 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
966 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
968 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
970 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
973 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
975 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
976 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
979 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
984 /* we need a comma before each option */
989 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
995 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
997 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1000 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1004 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1006 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1013 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1015 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1017 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1019 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1021 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1023 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1025 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1027 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1036 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1039 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1044 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1050 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1051 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1053 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1060 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1061 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1063 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1072 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1079 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1080 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1081 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1082 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1086 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1087 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1088 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1091 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1101 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1105 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1111 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1112 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1117 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1119 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1124 end = buffer+buflen;
1129 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1130 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1134 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1139 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1140 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1144 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1152 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1153 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1155 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1156 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1158 struct dentry *dentry;
1159 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1160 char *context = NULL;
1164 if (isec->initialized)
1167 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1168 if (isec->initialized)
1171 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1172 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1173 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1174 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1175 server is ready to handle calls. */
1176 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1177 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1178 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1179 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1183 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1184 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1185 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1186 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1190 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1191 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1193 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1194 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1196 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1197 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1200 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1201 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1206 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1207 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1213 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1215 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1216 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1217 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1225 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1237 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1238 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1239 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1240 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1244 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1245 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1248 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1252 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1253 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1254 __func__, context, -rc,
1255 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1257 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1265 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1266 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1268 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1269 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1270 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1272 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1273 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1274 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1282 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1283 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1286 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1287 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1290 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1292 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1293 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1304 isec->initialized = 1;
1307 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1309 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1310 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1314 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1315 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1321 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1322 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1325 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1326 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1329 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1330 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1333 /* All other signals. */
1334 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1341 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1342 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1343 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1344 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1347 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1349 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1350 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1351 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1352 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1355 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1356 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1359 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1360 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1363 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1364 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1366 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1368 tsec = tsk->security;
1370 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1374 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1376 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1379 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1383 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1386 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1389 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1390 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1393 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1395 tsec = tsk->security;
1397 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1398 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1401 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1402 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1403 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1404 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1405 struct inode *inode,
1407 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1409 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1410 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1411 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1413 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1416 tsec = tsk->security;
1417 isec = inode->i_security;
1421 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1422 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1425 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1428 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1429 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1430 pathname if needed. */
1431 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1432 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1433 struct dentry *dentry,
1436 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1437 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1438 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1439 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1440 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1441 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1444 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1445 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1446 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1447 check a particular permission to the file.
1448 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1449 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1450 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1451 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1452 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1456 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1457 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1458 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1459 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1462 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1463 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1465 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1466 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1474 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1476 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1481 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1482 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1483 struct dentry *dentry,
1486 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1487 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1488 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1490 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1493 tsec = current->security;
1494 dsec = dir->i_security;
1495 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1497 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1498 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1500 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1501 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1506 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1507 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1509 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1515 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1519 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1520 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1521 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1524 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1525 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1526 struct task_struct *ctx)
1528 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1530 tsec = ctx->security;
1532 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1536 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1539 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1540 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1541 struct dentry *dentry,
1545 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1546 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1547 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1551 tsec = current->security;
1552 dsec = dir->i_security;
1553 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1555 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1556 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1559 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1560 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1575 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1580 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1584 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1585 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1586 struct inode *new_dir,
1587 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1589 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1590 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1591 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1593 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1596 tsec = current->security;
1597 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1598 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1599 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1600 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1602 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1604 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1605 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1606 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1609 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1610 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1613 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1620 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1621 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1622 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1623 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1624 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1628 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1629 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1630 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1632 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1640 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1641 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1642 struct super_block *sb,
1644 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1646 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1647 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1649 tsec = tsk->security;
1650 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1651 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1655 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1656 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1660 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1661 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1662 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1663 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1666 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1668 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1672 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1674 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1676 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1684 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1687 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1689 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1691 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1693 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1697 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1698 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1699 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1700 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1701 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1702 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1703 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1706 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1707 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1712 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1713 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1717 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1719 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1720 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1727 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1735 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1737 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent,
1738 struct task_struct *child,
1743 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent, child, mode);
1747 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1748 struct task_security_struct *tsec = parent->security;
1749 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1750 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1751 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1754 return task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1757 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1758 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1762 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1766 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1769 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1770 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1774 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1778 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1781 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1782 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1784 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1787 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1791 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1795 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1798 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1801 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1804 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1809 end = buffer+buflen;
1815 const char *name = table->procname;
1816 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1817 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1821 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1824 table = table->parent;
1830 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1832 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1834 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1839 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1843 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1847 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1851 tsec = current->security;
1853 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1854 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1856 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1857 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1860 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1861 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1863 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1864 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1872 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1873 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1879 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1892 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1898 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1902 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1908 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1910 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1913 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1917 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1922 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1923 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1924 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1926 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1927 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1928 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1929 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1931 case 0: /* Close log */
1932 case 1: /* Open log */
1933 case 2: /* Read from log */
1934 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1935 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1937 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1944 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1945 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1946 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1948 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1949 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1950 * the capability is granted.
1952 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1953 * processes that allocate mappings.
1955 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1957 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1958 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1960 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1962 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1963 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1964 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1971 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1974 /* binprm security operations */
1976 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1978 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1980 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1984 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1987 bprm->security = bsec;
1991 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1993 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1994 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1995 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1996 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1998 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2001 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2005 bsec = bprm->security;
2010 tsec = current->security;
2011 isec = inode->i_security;
2013 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2014 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2016 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2017 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2018 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2019 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2021 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2022 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2023 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2026 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2027 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2028 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2033 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2034 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2036 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2039 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2040 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2041 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2045 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2046 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2047 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2051 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2052 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2056 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2057 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2059 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2067 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2069 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2073 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2075 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2078 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2079 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2080 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2081 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2082 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2084 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2087 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2090 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2092 kfree(bprm->security);
2093 bprm->security = NULL;
2096 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2097 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2099 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2100 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2102 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2103 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2104 struct tty_struct *tty;
2105 struct fdtable *fdt;
2109 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2110 tty = get_current_tty();
2113 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2115 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2116 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2117 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2118 file may belong to another process and we are only
2119 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2120 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2121 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2122 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2128 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2129 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2133 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2135 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2137 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2139 unsigned long set, i;
2144 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2145 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2147 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2150 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2151 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2156 if (file_has_perm(current,
2158 file_to_av(file))) {
2160 fd = get_unused_fd();
2170 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2171 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2178 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2183 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2186 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2189 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2191 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2192 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2196 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2198 tsec = current->security;
2200 bsec = bprm->security;
2203 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2205 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2206 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2207 unchanged and kill. */
2208 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2209 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2210 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2217 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2218 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2219 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2220 struct task_struct *tracer;
2221 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2225 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2226 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2227 sec = tracer->security;
2233 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2234 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2246 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2248 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2250 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2251 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2252 struct itimerval itimer;
2253 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2256 tsec = current->security;
2257 bsec = bprm->security;
2260 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2263 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2266 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2267 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2269 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2270 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2271 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2272 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2273 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2274 will be checked against the new SID. */
2275 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2276 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2278 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2279 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2280 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2281 flush_signals(current);
2282 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2283 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2284 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2285 recalc_sigpending();
2286 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2289 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2290 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2292 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2293 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2294 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2295 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2296 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2297 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2298 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2299 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2300 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2302 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2303 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2305 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2306 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2307 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2308 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2310 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2312 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2315 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2319 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2320 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2321 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2324 /* superblock security operations */
2326 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2328 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2331 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2333 superblock_free_security(sb);
2336 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2341 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2344 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2346 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2347 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2348 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2349 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2352 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2359 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2363 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2366 int current_size = 0;
2374 while (current_size < len) {
2384 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2386 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2387 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2388 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2394 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2402 in_save = in_end = orig;
2406 open_quote = !open_quote;
2407 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2409 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2411 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2412 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2414 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2416 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2418 } while (*in_end++);
2420 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2421 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2426 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2428 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2431 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2435 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2436 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2437 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2440 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2444 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2446 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2449 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2452 unsigned long flags,
2457 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2461 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2462 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2463 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2465 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2469 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2473 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2477 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2478 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2481 /* inode security operations */
2483 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2485 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2488 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2490 inode_free_security(inode);
2493 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2494 char **name, void **value,
2497 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2498 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2499 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2502 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2504 tsec = current->security;
2505 dsec = dir->i_security;
2506 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2508 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2509 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2511 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2512 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2515 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2516 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2519 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2524 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2525 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2526 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2527 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2529 isec->initialized = 1;
2532 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2536 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2543 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2555 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2557 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2560 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2564 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2567 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2570 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2574 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2577 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2580 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2582 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2585 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2587 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2590 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2592 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2595 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2599 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2606 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2607 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2609 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2612 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2614 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2617 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2621 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2624 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2627 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2631 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2636 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2640 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2641 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2644 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2648 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2652 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2655 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2656 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2657 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2659 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2662 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2664 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2667 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2669 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2670 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2671 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2672 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2674 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2675 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2676 Restrict to administrator. */
2681 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2682 ordinary setattr permission. */
2683 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2686 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2687 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2689 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2690 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2691 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2692 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2693 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2697 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2698 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2700 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2701 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2704 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2707 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2708 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2710 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2711 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2715 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2716 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2717 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2719 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2724 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2725 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2729 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2734 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2736 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2737 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2741 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2742 const void *value, size_t size,
2745 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2746 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2750 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2751 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2755 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2757 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2758 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2759 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2767 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2769 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2772 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2774 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2777 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2779 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2780 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2782 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2783 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2788 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2790 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2792 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2796 char *context = NULL;
2797 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2798 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2800 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2804 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2805 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2806 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2807 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2808 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2809 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2810 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2812 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2814 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2815 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2816 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2820 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2823 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2836 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2837 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2839 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2843 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2846 if (!value || !size)
2849 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2857 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2859 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2860 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2861 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2865 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2867 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2870 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2872 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2875 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2877 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2881 /* file security operations */
2883 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2886 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2889 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2893 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2894 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2897 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2898 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2902 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2905 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2907 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2908 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2909 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2910 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2913 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2917 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2918 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2919 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2921 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2924 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2926 return file_alloc_security(file);
2929 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2931 file_free_security(file);
2934 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2939 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2941 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2946 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2949 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2951 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2952 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2954 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2955 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2956 * This has an additional check.
2958 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2965 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2966 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2968 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2969 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2972 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2973 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2975 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2980 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2981 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2982 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2985 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
2987 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2988 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2989 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2990 if (rc || addr_only)
2993 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2996 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2997 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3000 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3001 unsigned long reqprot,
3006 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3010 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3013 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3014 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3016 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3017 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3018 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3020 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3021 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3022 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3023 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3024 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3026 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3027 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3028 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3029 * modified content. This typically should only
3030 * occur for text relocations.
3032 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3040 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3043 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3045 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3048 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3055 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3060 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3061 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3070 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3071 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3076 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3081 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3085 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3092 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3094 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3095 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3097 tsec = current->security;
3098 fsec = file->f_security;
3099 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3104 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3105 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3109 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3110 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3112 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3113 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3115 tsec = tsk->security;
3116 fsec = file->f_security;
3119 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3121 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3123 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3124 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3127 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3129 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3132 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3134 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3135 struct inode *inode;
3136 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3137 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3138 fsec = file->f_security;
3139 isec = inode->i_security;
3141 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3142 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3143 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3144 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3145 * struct as its SID.
3147 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3148 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3150 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3151 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3152 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3153 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3154 * new inode label or new policy.
3155 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3157 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3160 /* task security operations */
3162 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3166 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3170 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3173 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3175 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3178 tsec1 = current->security;
3180 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3183 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3185 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3186 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3188 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3189 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3190 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3191 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3192 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3197 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3199 task_free_security(tsk);
3202 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3204 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3205 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3206 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3207 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3208 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3213 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3215 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3218 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3220 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3224 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3226 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3229 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3231 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3234 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3236 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3239 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3241 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3245 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3247 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3251 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3255 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3259 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3262 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3266 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3270 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3273 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3278 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3280 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3283 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3287 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3288 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3289 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3290 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3291 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3292 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3297 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3301 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3305 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3308 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3310 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3313 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3315 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3318 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3323 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3325 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3330 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3332 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3335 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3337 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3341 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3348 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3349 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3350 the state of the current process. */
3351 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3354 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3356 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3359 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3361 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3363 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3366 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3367 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3371 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3372 struct inode *inode)
3374 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3375 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3377 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3378 isec->initialized = 1;
3382 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3383 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3384 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3386 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3387 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3389 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3390 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3394 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3395 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3398 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3399 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3403 *proto = ih->protocol;
3405 switch (ih->protocol) {
3407 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3409 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3413 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3417 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3418 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3423 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3425 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3429 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3433 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3434 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3438 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3439 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3441 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3445 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3449 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3450 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3461 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3463 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3464 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3465 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3468 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3469 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3471 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3472 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3476 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3477 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3480 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3481 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3482 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3491 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3493 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3497 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3498 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3503 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3505 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3509 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3510 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3514 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3515 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3517 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3521 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3522 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3526 /* includes fragments */
3536 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3537 char **addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3541 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3543 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3546 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3547 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3550 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3552 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3555 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3556 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3565 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3566 " unable to parse packet\n");
3572 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3574 * @family: protocol family
3575 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3578 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3579 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3580 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3581 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3582 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3586 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3593 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3594 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3596 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3597 if (unlikely(err)) {
3599 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3600 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3607 /* socket security operations */
3608 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3611 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3612 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3613 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3616 tsec = task->security;
3617 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3619 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3622 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3623 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3624 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3630 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3631 int protocol, int kern)
3634 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3640 tsec = current->security;
3641 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3642 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3643 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3644 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3650 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3651 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3654 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3655 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3656 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3659 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3661 tsec = current->security;
3662 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3663 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3664 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3665 isec->initialized = 1;
3668 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3669 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3670 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3671 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3677 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3678 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3679 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3681 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3686 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3691 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3692 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3693 * check the first address now.
3695 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3696 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3698 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3699 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3700 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3701 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3702 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3703 unsigned short snum;
3704 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3707 tsec = current->security;
3708 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3710 if (family == PF_INET) {
3711 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3712 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3713 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3715 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3716 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3717 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3723 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3725 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3726 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3730 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3731 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3732 ad.u.net.family = family;
3733 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3735 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3741 switch (isec->sclass) {
3742 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3743 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3746 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3747 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3750 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3751 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3755 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3759 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3763 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3764 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3765 ad.u.net.family = family;
3767 if (family == PF_INET)
3768 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3770 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3772 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3773 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3781 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3783 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3786 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3791 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3793 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3794 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3795 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3796 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3797 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3798 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3799 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3800 unsigned short snum;
3803 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3804 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3805 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3807 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3809 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3810 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3812 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3815 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3819 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3820 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3822 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3823 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3824 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3825 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3834 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3836 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3839 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3842 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3843 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3845 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3849 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3851 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3852 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3853 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3854 newisec->initialized = 1;
3859 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3864 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3868 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3871 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3872 int size, int flags)
3874 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3877 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3879 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3882 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3884 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3887 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3891 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3895 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3898 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3901 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3904 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3906 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3909 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3910 struct socket *other,
3913 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3914 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3915 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3916 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3919 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3923 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3924 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3926 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3927 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3929 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3931 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3935 /* connecting socket */
3936 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3937 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3939 /* server child socket */
3940 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3941 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3942 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3947 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3948 struct socket *other)
3950 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3951 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3952 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3955 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3956 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3958 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3959 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3961 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3962 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3969 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3971 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3977 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3980 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3981 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3985 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3988 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3989 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3992 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
3993 struct sk_buff *skb,
3994 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3999 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4001 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4002 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4004 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4005 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4008 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4009 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4010 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4011 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4013 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4014 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4015 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4016 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4018 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4019 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4020 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4021 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4024 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4025 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4030 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4033 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4037 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4040 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4046 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4047 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4048 if (unlikely(err)) {
4050 "SELinux: failure in"
4051 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4052 " network port label not found\n");
4055 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4058 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4059 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4060 u16 family, char *addrp)
4063 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4065 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4067 if (selinux_compat_net)
4068 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4071 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4076 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4077 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4080 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4081 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4083 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4086 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4092 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4095 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4096 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4097 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4098 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4101 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4104 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4105 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4108 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4109 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4110 ad.u.net.family = family;
4111 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4115 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4116 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4117 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4118 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4119 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4120 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4123 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4126 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4129 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4133 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4137 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4138 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4147 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4148 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4153 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4154 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4155 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4157 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4159 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4160 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4161 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4162 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4164 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4169 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4174 if (scontext_len > len) {
4179 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4183 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4191 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4193 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4197 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4198 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4199 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4203 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4204 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4206 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4209 *secid = peer_secid;
4210 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4215 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4217 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4220 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4222 sk_free_security(sk);
4225 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4227 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4228 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4230 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4231 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4232 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4234 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4237 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4240 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4242 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4244 *secid = sksec->sid;
4248 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4250 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4251 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4253 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4254 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4255 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4256 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4258 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4261 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4262 struct request_sock *req)
4264 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4269 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4272 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4273 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4274 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4278 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4282 req->secid = newsid;
4283 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4287 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4288 const struct request_sock *req)
4290 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4292 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4293 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4294 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4295 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4296 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4297 time it will have been created and available. */
4299 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4300 * thread with access to newsksec */
4301 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4304 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4305 struct sk_buff *skb)
4307 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4309 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4312 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4315 fl->secid = req->secid;
4318 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4322 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4323 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4324 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4326 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4330 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4332 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4334 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4335 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4336 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4337 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4338 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4339 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4349 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4354 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4356 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4361 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4365 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4368 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4369 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4370 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4373 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4374 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4375 ad.u.net.family = family;
4376 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4379 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4383 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4384 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4388 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4389 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4395 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4396 struct sk_buff *skb,
4397 const struct net_device *in,
4398 const struct net_device *out,
4399 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4401 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4404 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4405 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4406 struct sk_buff *skb,
4407 const struct net_device *in,
4408 const struct net_device *out,
4409 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4411 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4415 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4417 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4418 u16 family, char *addrp)
4421 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4423 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4424 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4426 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4427 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4430 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4431 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4432 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4433 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4435 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4436 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4437 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4438 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4440 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4441 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4442 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4443 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4446 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4447 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4452 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4455 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4458 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4461 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4468 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4469 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4470 if (unlikely(err)) {
4472 "SELinux: failure in"
4473 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4474 " network port label not found\n");
4477 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4480 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4482 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4487 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4488 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4492 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4494 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4495 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4499 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4500 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4504 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4505 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4511 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4517 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4523 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4524 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4525 ad.u.net.family = family;
4526 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4529 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4530 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4531 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4532 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4533 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4534 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4535 family, addrp, proto);
4537 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4538 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4539 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4540 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4541 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4542 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4543 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4546 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4547 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4548 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4551 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4552 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4553 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4554 * directly from the packet */
4557 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4558 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4559 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4561 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4563 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4567 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4568 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4571 if (peerlbl_active) {
4575 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4577 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4578 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4581 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4583 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4584 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4591 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4592 struct sk_buff *skb,
4593 const struct net_device *in,
4594 const struct net_device *out,
4595 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4597 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4600 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4601 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4602 struct sk_buff *skb,
4603 const struct net_device *in,
4604 const struct net_device *out,
4605 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4607 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4611 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4613 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4617 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4621 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4622 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4627 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4630 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4632 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4636 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4637 ad.u.cap = capability;
4639 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4640 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4643 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4644 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4647 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4648 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4650 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4654 isec->sclass = sclass;
4655 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4656 perm->security = isec;
4661 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4663 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4664 perm->security = NULL;
4668 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4670 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4672 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4676 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4677 msg->security = msec;
4682 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4684 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4686 msg->security = NULL;
4690 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4693 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4694 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4695 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4697 tsec = current->security;
4698 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4700 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4701 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4703 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4706 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4708 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4711 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4713 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4716 /* message queue security operations */
4717 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4720 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4721 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4724 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4728 tsec = current->security;
4729 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4731 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4732 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4734 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4737 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4743 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4745 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4748 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4750 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4751 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4752 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4754 tsec = current->security;
4755 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4757 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4758 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4760 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4761 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4764 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4772 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4773 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4776 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4779 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4782 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4788 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4792 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4794 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4795 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4796 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4797 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4800 tsec = current->security;
4801 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4802 msec = msg->security;
4805 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4807 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4809 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4810 * message queue this message will be stored in
4812 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4820 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4821 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4823 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4824 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4827 /* Can this process send the message */
4828 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4829 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4831 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4832 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4833 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4838 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4839 struct task_struct *target,
4840 long type, int mode)
4842 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4843 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4844 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4845 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4848 tsec = target->security;
4849 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4850 msec = msg->security;
4852 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4853 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4855 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4856 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4858 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4859 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4863 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4864 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4866 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4867 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4868 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4871 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4875 tsec = current->security;
4876 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4878 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4879 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4881 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4884 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4890 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4892 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4895 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4897 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4898 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4899 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4901 tsec = current->security;
4902 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4904 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4905 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4907 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4908 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4911 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4912 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4920 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4921 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4924 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4927 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4934 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4940 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4944 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4945 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4950 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4954 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4957 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4959 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4962 /* Semaphore security operations */
4963 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4965 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4970 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4974 tsec = current->security;
4975 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4978 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4980 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4983 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4989 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4991 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4994 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4996 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4997 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4998 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5000 tsec = current->security;
5001 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5003 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5004 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5006 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5007 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5010 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5011 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5019 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5020 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5024 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5035 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5038 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5042 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5048 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5052 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5053 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5058 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5062 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5065 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5071 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5073 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5078 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5081 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5083 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5087 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5090 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5093 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5094 char *name, char **value)
5096 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5102 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5109 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5111 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5113 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5114 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5115 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5116 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5117 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5118 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5119 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5120 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5127 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5133 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5134 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5136 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5137 struct task_struct *tracer;
5143 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5144 security attributes. */
5149 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5150 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5151 * above restriction is ever removed.
5153 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5154 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5155 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5156 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5157 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5158 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5159 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5160 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5161 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5162 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5168 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5169 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5170 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5174 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5175 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5176 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5178 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5185 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5186 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5187 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5188 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5189 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5190 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5192 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5193 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5194 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5195 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5196 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5197 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5200 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5201 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5202 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5203 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5204 struct av_decision avd;
5209 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5210 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5211 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5212 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5213 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5214 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5215 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5216 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5219 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5220 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5223 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5224 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5225 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5229 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5230 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5233 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5234 if (tracer != NULL) {
5235 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5236 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5238 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5240 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5244 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5245 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5259 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5261 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5264 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5266 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5269 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5276 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5277 unsigned long flags)
5279 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5280 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5282 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5286 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5287 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5289 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5295 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5297 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5303 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5304 struct task_struct *ctx,
5308 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5309 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5311 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5313 tsec = ctx->security;
5314 ksec = key->security;
5316 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5317 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5318 appear to be created. */
5322 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5323 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5326 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5328 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5329 char *context = NULL;
5333 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5342 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5345 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
5346 .capget = selinux_capget,
5347 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5348 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5349 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5350 .capable = selinux_capable,
5351 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5352 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5353 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5354 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5356 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5357 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5359 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5360 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5361 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5362 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5363 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5364 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5365 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5367 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5368 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5369 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5370 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5371 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5372 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5373 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5374 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5375 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5376 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5377 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5380 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5381 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5382 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5383 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5384 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5385 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5386 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5387 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5388 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5389 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5390 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5391 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5392 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5393 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5394 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5395 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5396 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5397 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5398 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5399 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5400 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5401 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5402 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5403 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5404 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5405 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5406 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5408 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5409 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5410 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5411 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5412 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5413 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5414 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5415 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5416 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5417 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5418 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5420 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5422 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5423 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5424 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5425 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5426 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5427 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5428 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5429 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5430 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5431 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5432 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5433 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5434 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5435 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5436 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5437 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5438 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5439 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5440 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5441 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5442 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5443 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5444 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5446 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5447 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5449 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5450 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5452 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5453 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5454 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5455 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5456 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5457 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5459 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5460 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5461 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5462 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5463 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5465 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5466 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5467 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5468 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5469 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5471 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5473 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5474 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5476 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5477 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5478 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5480 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5481 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5483 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5484 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5485 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5486 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5487 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5488 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5489 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5490 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5491 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5492 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5493 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5494 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5495 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5496 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5497 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5498 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5499 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5500 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5501 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5502 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5503 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5504 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5505 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5506 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5507 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5509 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5510 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5511 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5512 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5513 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5514 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5515 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5516 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5517 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5518 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5519 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5523 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5524 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5525 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5526 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5530 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5531 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5532 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5533 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5537 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5539 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5541 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5542 selinux_enabled = 0;
5546 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5547 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5551 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5553 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5554 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5555 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5556 tsec = current->security;
5557 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5559 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5560 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5561 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5564 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5566 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5567 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5568 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5570 if (selinux_enforcing)
5571 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5573 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5578 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5580 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5582 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5583 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5584 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5585 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5587 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5588 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5589 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5590 struct superblock_security_struct,
5592 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5594 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5595 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5596 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5598 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5600 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5601 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5602 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5605 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5606 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5609 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5610 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5611 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5613 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5615 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5617 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5618 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5620 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5621 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5624 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5625 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5627 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5628 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5632 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5634 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5636 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5637 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5639 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5640 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5643 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5644 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5646 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5647 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5653 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5657 if (!selinux_enabled)
5660 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5662 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5664 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5666 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5667 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5669 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5676 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5678 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5679 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5681 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5683 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5684 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5685 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5690 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5692 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5693 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5696 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5698 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5699 static int selinux_disabled;
5701 int selinux_disable(void)
5703 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5705 if (ss_initialized) {
5706 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5710 if (selinux_disabled) {
5711 /* Only do this once. */
5715 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5717 selinux_disabled = 1;
5718 selinux_enabled = 0;
5720 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5721 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5723 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5724 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5726 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */