2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 * initialise the security for the init task
161 static void cred_init_security(void)
163 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
164 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
170 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
171 cred->security = tsec;
175 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
177 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
179 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = cred->security;
186 * get the objective security ID of a task
188 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
193 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
199 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
201 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
203 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
208 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
210 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
212 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
213 u32 sid = current_sid();
215 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
219 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
220 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
222 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
223 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
224 isec->task_sid = sid;
225 inode->i_security = isec;
230 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
232 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
233 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
235 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
236 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
237 list_del_init(&isec->list);
238 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
240 inode->i_security = NULL;
241 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
244 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
247 u32 sid = current_sid();
249 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
254 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
255 file->f_security = fsec;
260 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
262 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
263 file->f_security = NULL;
267 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
271 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
275 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
276 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
278 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
280 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
282 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sb->s_security = sbsec;
288 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
290 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
292 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
293 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
294 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
295 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
297 sb->s_security = NULL;
301 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
303 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
305 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
309 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sk->sk_security = ssec;
313 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
318 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
320 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
322 sk->sk_security = NULL;
323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
327 /* The security server must be initialized before
328 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
329 extern int ss_initialized;
331 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
333 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
335 "uses transition SIDs",
337 "uses genfs_contexts",
338 "not configured for labeling",
339 "uses mountpoint labeling",
342 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
344 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
346 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
355 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
358 static const match_table_t tokens = {
359 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
367 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
369 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
371 const struct cred *cred)
373 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
376 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
377 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
381 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
382 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
386 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
387 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
388 const struct cred *cred)
390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
392 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
393 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
397 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
398 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
402 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
404 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
405 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
406 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
409 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
411 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
412 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
413 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
414 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
415 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
417 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
421 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
422 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
423 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
424 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
425 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
426 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
429 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
430 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
435 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
437 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
438 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
442 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
443 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
445 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
446 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
448 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
451 /* Initialize the root inode. */
452 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
454 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
455 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
456 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
458 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
460 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
461 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
462 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
463 struct inode_security_struct, list);
464 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
465 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
466 inode = igrab(inode);
468 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
472 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
473 list_del_init(&isec->list);
476 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
482 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
483 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
484 * mount options, or whatever.
486 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
487 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
491 char *context = NULL;
495 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
497 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
503 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
504 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
505 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
507 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
510 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
511 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
512 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
514 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
515 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
520 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
527 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
528 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
531 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
534 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
552 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
555 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
556 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
558 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
559 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
560 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
563 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
568 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
572 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
573 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
575 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
577 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
578 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
579 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
580 (old_sid != new_sid))
583 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
584 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
587 if (mnt_flags & flag)
593 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
594 * labeling information.
596 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
597 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
599 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
601 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
602 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
603 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
604 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
605 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
606 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
607 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
608 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
609 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
611 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
613 if (!ss_initialized) {
615 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
616 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
617 server is ready to handle calls. */
618 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
619 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
620 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
621 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
625 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
626 "before the security server is initialized\n");
631 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
632 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
633 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
634 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
636 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
637 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
638 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
639 * will be used for both mounts)
641 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
646 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
647 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
648 * than once with different security options.
650 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
653 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
655 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
656 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
659 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
660 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
667 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
669 goto out_double_mount;
671 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
676 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
678 goto out_double_mount;
680 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
682 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
683 rootcontext_sid = sid;
685 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
687 goto out_double_mount;
689 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
693 defcontext_sid = sid;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
697 goto out_double_mount;
699 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
708 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
709 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
710 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
711 goto out_double_mount;
716 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
717 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
719 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
720 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
722 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
723 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
727 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
729 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
733 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
737 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
738 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
739 * the superblock context if not already set.
742 if (!fscontext_sid) {
743 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
747 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
749 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
754 if (!rootcontext_sid)
755 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
757 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
761 if (rootcontext_sid) {
762 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
767 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
768 root_isec->initialized = 1;
771 if (defcontext_sid) {
772 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
774 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
775 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
779 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
786 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
789 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
791 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
796 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
800 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
801 struct super_block *newsb)
803 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
804 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
806 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
807 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
811 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
812 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
815 if (!ss_initialized) {
816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
817 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
818 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
819 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
823 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
824 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
826 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
827 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
830 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
832 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
834 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
835 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
836 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
839 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
843 if (!set_rootcontext) {
844 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
848 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
850 if (set_rootcontext) {
851 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
852 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
853 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
854 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
856 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
859 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
860 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
863 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
864 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
867 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
868 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
869 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
871 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
873 /* Standard string-based options. */
874 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
876 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
881 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
885 if (context || defcontext) {
887 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
890 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
900 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
903 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
910 case Opt_rootcontext:
913 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
916 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
924 if (context || defcontext) {
926 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
929 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
935 case Opt_labelsupport:
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
946 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
950 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
952 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
957 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
958 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
961 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
962 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
965 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
966 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
969 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
970 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
973 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
984 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
986 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
989 char *options = data;
990 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
992 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
997 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
999 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1004 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1007 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1011 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1012 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1017 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1020 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1021 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1025 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1030 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1033 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1036 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1045 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1050 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1056 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1061 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1069 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1076 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1096 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1099 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1104 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1109 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1115 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1116 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1125 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1126 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1131 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1143 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1144 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1145 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1146 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1147 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1152 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1153 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1156 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1157 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1158 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1159 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1160 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1161 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1173 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1176 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1177 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1182 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1189 end = buffer+buflen;
1194 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1195 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1199 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1204 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1205 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1209 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1217 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1218 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223 struct dentry *dentry;
1224 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1225 char *context = NULL;
1229 if (isec->initialized)
1232 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1233 if (isec->initialized)
1236 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1237 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1238 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1239 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1240 server is ready to handle calls. */
1241 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1242 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1243 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1244 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1248 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1249 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1250 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1251 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1255 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1256 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1259 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1262 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1267 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1268 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1269 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1270 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1271 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1272 * be used again by userspace.
1277 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1278 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1284 context[len] = '\0';
1285 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1287 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1288 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1289 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1297 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1303 context[len] = '\0';
1304 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1310 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1312 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1317 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1318 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1321 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1325 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1326 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1328 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1329 if (printk_ratelimit())
1330 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1331 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1332 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1335 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1336 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1339 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1347 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1348 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1350 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1351 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1352 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1354 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1355 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1356 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1364 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1365 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1368 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1369 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1371 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1372 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1374 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1375 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1386 isec->initialized = 1;
1389 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1391 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1392 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1396 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1397 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1403 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1404 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1407 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1408 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1411 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1412 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1415 /* All other signals. */
1416 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1424 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1425 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1427 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1428 const struct cred *target,
1431 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1433 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1437 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1438 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1439 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1440 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1442 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1443 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1446 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1450 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1451 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1457 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1458 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1459 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1460 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1462 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1467 sid = current_sid();
1468 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1469 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1472 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1473 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1476 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1477 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1478 const struct cred *cred,
1481 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1482 struct av_decision avd;
1484 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1485 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1488 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1492 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1494 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1497 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1501 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1505 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1506 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1507 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1511 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1512 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1515 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1517 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1518 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1521 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1522 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1523 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1524 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1525 struct inode *inode,
1527 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1529 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1530 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1533 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1536 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1537 isec = inode->i_security;
1541 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1542 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1545 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1548 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1549 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1550 pathname if needed. */
1551 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1552 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1553 struct dentry *dentry,
1556 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1557 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1559 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1560 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1562 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1565 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1566 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1567 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1568 check a particular permission to the file.
1569 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1570 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1571 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1572 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1573 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1577 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1578 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1579 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1580 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1583 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1584 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1586 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1587 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1595 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1598 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1604 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1605 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1606 struct dentry *dentry,
1609 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1610 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1611 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1612 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1614 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1617 dsec = dir->i_security;
1618 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1621 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1623 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1626 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1627 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1632 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1633 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1638 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1642 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1643 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1644 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1647 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1648 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1649 struct task_struct *ctx)
1651 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1653 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1657 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1660 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1661 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1662 struct dentry *dentry,
1666 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1667 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1668 u32 sid = current_sid();
1672 dsec = dir->i_security;
1673 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1675 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1676 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1679 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1680 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1695 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1704 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1705 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1706 struct inode *new_dir,
1707 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1709 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1710 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1711 u32 sid = current_sid();
1713 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1716 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1717 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1718 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1719 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1724 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1725 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1728 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1729 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1732 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1734 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1739 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1740 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1741 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1742 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1743 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1746 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1747 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1748 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1749 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1751 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1759 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1760 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1761 struct super_block *sb,
1763 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1765 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1766 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1768 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1769 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1772 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1773 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1777 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1778 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1779 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1780 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1783 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1785 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1789 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1791 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1793 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1800 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1801 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1805 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1807 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1808 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1815 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1824 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1827 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1829 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1831 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1832 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1834 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1838 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1839 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1840 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1841 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1842 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1843 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1844 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1846 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1847 av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1849 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1850 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1855 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1862 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1866 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1867 u32 sid = current_sid();
1868 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1869 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1872 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1875 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1879 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1883 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1886 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1887 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1891 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1895 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1898 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1899 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1900 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1901 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1905 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1906 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1910 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1914 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1915 * which was removed).
1917 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1918 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1919 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1920 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1923 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1928 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1932 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1935 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1938 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1941 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1946 end = buffer+buflen;
1952 const char *name = table->procname;
1953 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1954 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1958 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1961 table = table->parent;
1967 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1969 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1971 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1976 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1983 sid = current_sid();
1985 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1986 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1988 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1989 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1992 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1993 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1995 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1996 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2004 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2005 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2011 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2013 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2025 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2030 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2033 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2039 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2041 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2043 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2046 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2050 rc = cap_syslog(type);
2055 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2056 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2057 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2059 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2060 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2061 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2062 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2064 case 0: /* Close log */
2065 case 1: /* Open log */
2066 case 2: /* Read from log */
2067 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2068 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2070 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2077 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2078 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2079 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2081 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2082 * processes that allocate mappings.
2084 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2086 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2088 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2089 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2093 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2096 /* binprm security operations */
2098 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2100 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2101 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2102 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2103 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2104 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2107 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2111 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2112 * the script interpreter */
2113 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2116 old_tsec = current_security();
2117 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2118 isec = inode->i_security;
2120 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2121 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2122 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2124 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2125 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2126 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2127 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2129 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2130 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2131 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2132 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2134 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2135 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2136 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2141 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2142 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2144 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2145 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2147 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2148 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2149 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2153 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2154 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2155 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2159 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2160 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2164 /* Check for shared state */
2165 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2166 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2167 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2173 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2174 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2176 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2177 struct task_struct *tracer;
2178 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2182 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2183 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2184 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2190 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2192 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2198 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2199 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2205 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2207 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2208 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2216 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2217 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2218 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2219 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2221 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2224 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2227 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2228 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2230 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2231 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2232 struct files_struct *files)
2234 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2235 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2236 struct tty_struct *tty;
2237 struct fdtable *fdt;
2241 tty = get_current_tty();
2244 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2245 struct inode *inode;
2247 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2248 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2249 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2250 file may belong to another process and we are only
2251 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2252 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2253 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2254 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2255 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2262 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2266 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2268 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2270 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2272 unsigned long set, i;
2277 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2278 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2280 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2283 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2284 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2289 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2291 file_to_av(file))) {
2293 fd = get_unused_fd();
2303 devnull = dentry_open(
2305 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2307 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2314 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2319 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2322 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2326 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2328 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2330 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2331 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2334 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2335 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2338 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2339 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2341 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2342 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2344 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2345 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2346 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2348 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2349 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2350 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2351 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2352 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2354 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2355 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2357 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2358 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2359 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2360 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2362 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2367 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2370 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2372 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2373 struct itimerval itimer;
2383 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2384 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2385 * flush and unblock signals.
2387 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2388 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2390 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2392 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2393 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2394 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2395 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2396 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2397 __flush_signals(current);
2398 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2399 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2401 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2404 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2405 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2406 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2407 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->real_parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2408 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2411 /* superblock security operations */
2413 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2415 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2418 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2420 superblock_free_security(sb);
2423 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2428 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2431 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2433 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2434 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2435 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2436 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2437 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2440 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2447 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2451 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2454 int current_size = 0;
2462 while (current_size < len) {
2472 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2474 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2475 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2476 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2482 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2490 in_save = in_end = orig;
2494 open_quote = !open_quote;
2495 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2497 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2499 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2500 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2502 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2504 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2506 } while (*in_end++);
2508 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2509 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2514 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2516 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2517 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2520 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2524 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2525 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2528 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2529 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2530 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2533 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2535 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2536 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2538 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2539 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2540 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2543 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2546 unsigned long flags,
2549 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2551 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2552 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2553 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2555 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2559 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2561 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2563 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2564 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2567 /* inode security operations */
2569 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2571 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2574 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2576 inode_free_security(inode);
2579 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2580 char **name, void **value,
2583 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2584 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2585 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2586 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2587 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2589 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2591 dsec = dir->i_security;
2592 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2595 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2597 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2598 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2599 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2602 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2603 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2606 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2611 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2612 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2613 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2614 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2616 isec->initialized = 1;
2619 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2623 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2630 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2642 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2644 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2647 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2649 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2652 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2654 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2657 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2659 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2662 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2664 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2667 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2669 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2672 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2674 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2677 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2678 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2680 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2683 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2690 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2694 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2697 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2699 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2702 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2706 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2707 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2710 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2712 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2714 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2717 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2718 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2719 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2721 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2724 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2726 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2728 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2731 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2733 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2735 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2736 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2737 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2738 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2740 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2741 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2742 Restrict to administrator. */
2747 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2748 ordinary setattr permission. */
2749 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2752 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2753 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2755 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2756 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2757 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2758 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2759 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2762 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2763 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2765 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2766 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2769 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2772 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2773 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2775 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2776 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2780 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2781 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2782 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2784 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2789 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2790 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2794 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2799 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2801 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2802 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2806 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2807 const void *value, size_t size,
2810 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2811 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2815 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2816 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2820 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2822 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2823 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2824 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2832 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2834 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2836 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2839 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2841 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2843 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2846 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2848 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2849 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2851 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2852 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2857 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2859 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2861 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2865 char *context = NULL;
2866 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2868 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2872 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2873 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2874 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2875 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2876 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2877 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2878 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2880 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2881 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2883 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2886 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2899 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2900 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2902 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2906 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2909 if (!value || !size)
2912 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2920 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2922 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2923 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2924 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2928 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2930 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2934 /* file security operations */
2936 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2938 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2939 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2941 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2942 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2945 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2946 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2949 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2951 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2952 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2953 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2954 u32 sid = current_sid();
2957 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2960 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2961 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2962 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2965 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2968 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2970 return file_alloc_security(file);
2973 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2975 file_free_security(file);
2978 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2981 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2984 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2986 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2991 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2994 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2996 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2999 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3000 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3002 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3003 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3004 * This has an additional check.
3006 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3013 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3014 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3016 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3017 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3020 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3021 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3023 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3030 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3031 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3032 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3035 u32 sid = current_sid();
3037 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3038 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3039 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3040 if (rc || addr_only)
3043 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3046 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3047 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3050 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3051 unsigned long reqprot,
3054 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3056 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3059 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3060 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3062 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3063 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3064 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3065 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3066 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3067 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3068 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3069 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3071 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3072 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3073 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3074 * modified content. This typically should only
3075 * occur for text relocations.
3077 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3084 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3087 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3089 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3091 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3094 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3097 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3102 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3107 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3108 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3117 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3118 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3123 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3128 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3132 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3139 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3141 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3143 fsec = file->f_security;
3144 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3149 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3150 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3153 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3155 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3157 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3158 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3160 fsec = file->f_security;
3163 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3165 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3167 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3168 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3171 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3173 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3175 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3178 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3180 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3181 struct inode *inode;
3182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3184 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3185 fsec = file->f_security;
3186 isec = inode->i_security;
3188 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3189 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3190 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3191 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3192 * struct as its SID.
3194 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3195 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3197 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3198 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3199 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3200 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3201 * new inode label or new policy.
3202 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3204 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3207 /* task security operations */
3209 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3211 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3215 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3217 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3219 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3220 cred->security = NULL;
3225 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3227 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3230 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3231 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3233 old_tsec = old->security;
3235 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3239 new->security = tsec;
3244 * set the security data for a kernel service
3245 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3247 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3249 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3250 u32 sid = current_sid();
3253 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3254 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3255 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3259 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3260 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3261 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3267 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3268 * objective context of the specified inode
3270 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3272 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3273 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3274 u32 sid = current_sid();
3277 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3278 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3279 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3283 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3287 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3289 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3292 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3294 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3297 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3299 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3302 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3304 *secid = task_sid(p);
3307 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3311 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3315 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3318 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3322 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3326 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3329 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3331 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3334 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3336 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3338 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3339 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3340 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3341 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3342 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3343 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3348 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3352 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3356 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3359 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3361 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3364 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3366 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3369 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3376 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3378 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3380 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3381 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3383 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3387 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3389 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3392 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3393 struct inode *inode)
3395 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3396 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3399 isec->initialized = 1;
3402 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3403 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3404 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3406 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3407 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3409 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3410 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3414 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3415 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3418 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3419 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3423 *proto = ih->protocol;
3425 switch (ih->protocol) {
3427 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3429 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3433 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3437 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3438 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3443 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3445 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3449 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3453 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3454 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3458 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3459 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3461 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3465 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3469 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3470 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3481 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3483 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3484 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3485 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3488 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3489 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3491 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3492 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3496 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3497 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3500 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3501 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3502 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3511 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3513 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3517 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3518 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3523 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3525 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3529 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3530 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3534 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3535 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3537 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3541 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3542 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3546 /* includes fragments */
3556 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3557 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3562 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3564 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3567 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3568 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3571 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3573 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3576 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3577 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3587 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3588 " unable to parse packet\n");
3598 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3600 * @family: protocol family
3601 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3604 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3605 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3606 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3607 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3608 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3612 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3619 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3620 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3622 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3623 if (unlikely(err)) {
3625 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3626 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3633 /* socket security operations */
3634 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3637 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3638 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3642 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3644 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3646 sid = task_sid(task);
3648 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3649 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3650 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3656 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3657 int protocol, int kern)
3659 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3660 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3669 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3671 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3672 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3678 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3679 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3681 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3682 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3683 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3684 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3689 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3691 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3694 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3700 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3701 isec->initialized = 1;
3704 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3705 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3706 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3707 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3713 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3714 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3715 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3717 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3722 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3727 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3728 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3729 * check the first address now.
3731 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3732 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3734 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3735 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3736 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3737 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3738 unsigned short snum;
3739 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3742 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3744 if (family == PF_INET) {
3745 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3746 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3747 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3749 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3750 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3751 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3757 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3759 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3760 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3764 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3765 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3766 ad.u.net.family = family;
3767 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3769 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3775 switch (isec->sclass) {
3776 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3777 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3780 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3781 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3784 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3785 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3789 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3793 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3797 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3798 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3799 ad.u.net.family = family;
3801 if (family == PF_INET)
3802 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3804 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3806 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3807 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3815 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3817 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3818 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3821 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3826 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3828 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3829 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3830 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3831 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3832 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3833 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3834 unsigned short snum;
3837 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3838 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3839 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3841 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3843 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3844 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3846 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3849 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3853 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3854 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3856 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3857 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3858 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3859 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3864 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3870 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3872 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3875 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3878 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3879 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3881 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3885 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3887 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3888 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3889 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3890 newisec->initialized = 1;
3895 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3898 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3901 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3902 int size, int flags)
3904 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3907 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3909 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3912 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3914 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3917 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3921 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3925 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3928 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3931 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3934 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3936 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3939 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3940 struct socket *other,
3943 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3944 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3945 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3946 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3949 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3950 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3952 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3953 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3955 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3957 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3961 /* connecting socket */
3962 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3963 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3965 /* server child socket */
3966 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3967 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3968 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3973 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3974 struct socket *other)
3976 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3977 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3978 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3981 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3982 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3984 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3985 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3987 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3988 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3995 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3997 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4003 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4006 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4007 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4011 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4014 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4015 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4018 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4022 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4024 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4025 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4028 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4029 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4030 ad.u.net.family = family;
4031 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4035 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4036 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4042 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4043 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4046 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4047 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4049 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4051 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4054 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4060 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4063 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4064 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4065 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4066 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4071 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4074 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4075 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4078 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4079 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4080 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4081 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4082 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4083 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4085 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4086 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4087 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4090 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4091 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4092 ad.u.net.family = family;
4093 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4097 if (peerlbl_active) {
4100 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4103 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4106 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4109 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4112 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4115 if (secmark_active) {
4116 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4125 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4126 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4131 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4132 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4133 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4135 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4137 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4138 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4139 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4140 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4142 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4147 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4152 if (scontext_len > len) {
4157 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4161 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4169 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4171 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4174 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4176 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4179 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4183 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4184 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4186 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4189 *secid = peer_secid;
4190 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4195 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4197 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4200 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4202 sk_free_security(sk);
4205 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4207 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4208 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4210 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4211 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4212 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4214 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
4217 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4220 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4222 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4224 *secid = sksec->sid;
4228 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4230 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4231 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4233 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4234 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4235 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4236 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4239 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4240 struct request_sock *req)
4242 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4244 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4248 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4249 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4252 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4255 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4256 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4257 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4259 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4262 req->secid = newsid;
4263 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4266 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4269 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4270 const struct request_sock *req)
4272 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4274 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4275 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4276 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4277 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4278 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4279 time it will have been created and available. */
4281 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4282 * thread with access to newsksec */
4283 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4286 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4288 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4289 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4291 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4292 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4295 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4298 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4301 fl->secid = req->secid;
4304 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4308 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4309 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4310 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4312 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4316 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4318 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4320 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4321 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4322 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4323 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4324 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4325 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4335 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4340 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4342 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4348 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4353 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4356 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4357 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4358 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4359 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4362 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4365 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4366 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4367 ad.u.net.family = family;
4368 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4371 if (peerlbl_active) {
4372 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4375 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4381 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4382 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4386 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4387 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4388 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4390 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4396 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4397 struct sk_buff *skb,
4398 const struct net_device *in,
4399 const struct net_device *out,
4400 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4402 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4405 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4406 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4407 struct sk_buff *skb,
4408 const struct net_device *in,
4409 const struct net_device *out,
4410 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4412 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4416 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4421 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4424 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4425 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4426 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4428 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4431 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4432 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4438 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4439 struct sk_buff *skb,
4440 const struct net_device *in,
4441 const struct net_device *out,
4442 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4444 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4447 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4451 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4452 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4453 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4459 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4461 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4462 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4463 ad.u.net.family = family;
4464 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4467 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4468 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4469 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4472 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4473 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4479 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4485 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4490 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4491 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4492 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4493 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4494 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4495 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4497 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4498 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4499 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4500 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4501 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4502 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4503 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4506 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4507 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4508 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4511 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4512 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4513 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4514 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4519 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4520 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4522 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4525 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4526 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4528 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4533 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4534 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4537 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4539 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4540 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4541 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4544 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4545 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4546 ad.u.net.family = family;
4547 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4551 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4552 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4555 if (peerlbl_active) {
4559 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4561 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4562 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4565 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4567 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4568 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4575 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4576 struct sk_buff *skb,
4577 const struct net_device *in,
4578 const struct net_device *out,
4579 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4581 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4584 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4585 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4586 struct sk_buff *skb,
4587 const struct net_device *in,
4588 const struct net_device *out,
4589 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4591 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4595 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4597 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4601 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4605 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4606 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4611 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4614 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4616 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4620 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4621 ad.u.cap = capability;
4623 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4624 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4627 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4628 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4631 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4634 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4638 sid = task_sid(task);
4639 isec->sclass = sclass;
4641 perm->security = isec;
4646 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4648 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4649 perm->security = NULL;
4653 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4655 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4657 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4661 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4662 msg->security = msec;
4667 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4669 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4671 msg->security = NULL;
4675 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4678 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4679 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4680 u32 sid = current_sid();
4682 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4684 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4685 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4687 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4690 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4692 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4695 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4697 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4700 /* message queue security operations */
4701 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4703 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4704 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4705 u32 sid = current_sid();
4708 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4712 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4714 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4715 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4720 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4726 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4728 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4731 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4733 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4734 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4735 u32 sid = current_sid();
4737 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4739 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4740 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4742 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4743 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4746 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4754 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4755 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4758 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4761 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4764 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4770 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4774 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4776 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4777 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4778 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4779 u32 sid = current_sid();
4782 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4783 msec = msg->security;
4786 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4788 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4790 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4791 * message queue this message will be stored in
4793 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4799 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4800 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4802 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4803 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4806 /* Can this process send the message */
4807 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4810 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4811 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4812 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4817 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4818 struct task_struct *target,
4819 long type, int mode)
4821 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4822 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4823 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4824 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4827 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4828 msec = msg->security;
4830 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4831 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4833 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4834 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4836 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4837 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4841 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4842 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4844 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4845 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4846 u32 sid = current_sid();
4849 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4853 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4855 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4856 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4858 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4861 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4867 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4869 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4872 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4874 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4875 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4876 u32 sid = current_sid();
4878 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4880 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4881 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4883 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4884 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4887 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4888 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4896 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4897 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4900 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4903 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4910 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4916 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4920 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4921 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4925 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4928 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4930 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4933 /* Semaphore security operations */
4934 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4936 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4937 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4938 u32 sid = current_sid();
4941 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4945 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4947 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4953 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4959 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4961 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4964 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4968 u32 sid = current_sid();
4970 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4972 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4975 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4976 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4979 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4980 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4988 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4989 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4993 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5004 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5007 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5011 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5017 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5021 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5022 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5027 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5031 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5034 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5040 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5042 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5047 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5050 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5052 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5056 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5059 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5062 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5063 char *name, char **value)
5065 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5071 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5077 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5079 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5081 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5083 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5084 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5085 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5086 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5087 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5088 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5089 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5090 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5098 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5108 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5109 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5111 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5112 struct task_struct *tracer;
5119 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5120 security attributes. */
5125 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5126 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5127 * above restriction is ever removed.
5129 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5130 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5131 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5132 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5133 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5134 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5135 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5136 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5137 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5138 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5144 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5145 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5146 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5150 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5151 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5152 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5154 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5161 new = prepare_creds();
5165 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5166 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5167 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5168 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5169 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5170 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5171 tsec = new->security;
5172 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5173 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5174 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5175 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5176 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5177 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5180 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5181 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5182 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5183 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5188 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5190 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5191 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5196 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5197 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5198 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5202 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5203 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5206 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5208 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5212 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5213 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5232 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5234 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5237 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5239 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5242 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5249 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5250 unsigned long flags)
5252 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5253 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5255 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5259 tsec = cred->security;
5260 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5261 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5263 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5269 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5271 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5277 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5278 const struct cred *cred,
5282 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5285 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5286 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5287 appear to be created. */
5291 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5293 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5294 ksec = key->security;
5296 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5299 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5301 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5302 char *context = NULL;
5306 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5315 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5318 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5319 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5320 .capget = selinux_capget,
5321 .capset = selinux_capset,
5322 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5323 .capable = selinux_capable,
5324 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5325 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5326 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5327 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5329 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5330 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5332 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5333 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5334 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5335 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5337 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5338 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5339 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5340 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5341 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5342 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5343 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5344 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5345 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5346 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5347 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5350 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5351 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5352 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5353 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5354 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5355 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5356 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5357 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5358 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5359 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5360 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5361 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5362 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5363 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5364 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5365 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5366 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5367 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5368 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5369 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5370 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5371 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5372 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5373 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5374 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5376 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5377 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5378 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5379 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5380 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5381 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5382 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5383 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5384 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5385 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5386 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5388 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5390 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5391 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5392 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5393 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5394 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5395 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5396 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5397 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5398 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5399 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5400 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5401 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5402 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5403 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5404 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5405 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5406 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5407 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5408 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5410 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5411 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5413 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5414 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5416 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5417 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5418 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5419 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5420 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5421 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5423 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5424 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5425 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5426 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5427 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5429 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5430 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5431 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5432 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5433 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5435 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5437 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5438 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5440 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5441 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5442 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5444 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5445 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5447 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5448 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5449 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5450 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5451 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5452 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5453 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5454 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5455 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5456 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5457 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5458 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5459 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5460 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5461 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5462 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5463 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5464 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5465 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5466 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5467 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5468 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5469 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5470 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5471 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5473 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5474 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5475 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5476 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5477 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5478 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5479 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5480 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5481 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5482 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5483 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5487 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5488 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5489 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5490 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5494 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5495 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5496 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5497 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5501 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5503 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5504 selinux_enabled = 0;
5508 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5509 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5513 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5515 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5516 cred_init_security();
5518 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5519 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5520 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5523 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5525 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5526 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5527 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5529 if (selinux_enforcing)
5530 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5532 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5537 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5539 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5541 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5542 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5543 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5544 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5546 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5547 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5548 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5549 struct superblock_security_struct,
5551 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5553 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5554 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5555 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5557 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5559 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5560 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5561 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5564 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5565 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5568 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5569 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5570 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5572 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5574 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5576 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5577 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5579 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5580 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5583 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5584 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5586 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5587 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5590 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5591 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5593 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5594 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5598 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5600 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5602 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5603 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5605 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5606 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5609 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5610 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5612 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5613 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5619 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5623 if (!selinux_enabled)
5626 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5628 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5630 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5632 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5633 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5635 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5642 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5644 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5645 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5647 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5649 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5650 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5651 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5656 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5658 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5659 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5662 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5664 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5665 static int selinux_disabled;
5667 int selinux_disable(void)
5669 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5671 if (ss_initialized) {
5672 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5676 if (selinux_disabled) {
5677 /* Only do this once. */
5681 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5683 selinux_disabled = 1;
5684 selinux_enabled = 0;
5686 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5689 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5690 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5692 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5693 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5695 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */