kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Fri, 19 Oct 2012 20:56:51 +0000 (13:56 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fri, 19 Oct 2012 21:07:47 +0000 (14:07 -0700)
commit2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e
treea41af3d56a6e37af19bc7ed392f2580750ba86cb
parent1d46e232f8637f31f8df2e50b27fd20d8135bd93
kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26

Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents.  This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).

CVE-2012-0957

Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
kernel/sys.c