From: Ignat Korchagin Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000 (+0000) Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write X-Git-Tag: v3.2.80~33 X-Git-Url: https://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=pandora-kernel.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=7ce55b83fbf2ff341aacfe825001d40e7bbccbe2 USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream. Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted. Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data. Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- diff --git a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c index 194e974051f3..4fbef0c28343 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c +++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c @@ -820,6 +820,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb) if (!(size > 0)) return 0; + if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) { + /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */ + if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) { + usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP); + return 0; + } else { + usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP); + return -EPIPE; + } + } + ret = usbip_xmit(0, ud->tcp_socket, (char *)urb->transfer_buffer, size, 0); if (ret != size) {