From: Eric Paris Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2012 16:37:02 +0000 (-0700) Subject: LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data X-Git-Tag: v3.4-rc2~20^2~5 X-Git-Url: https://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=pandora-kernel.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=3b3b0e4fc15efa507b902d90cea39e496a523c3b LSM: shrink sizeof LSM specific portion of common_audit_data Linus found that the gigantic size of the common audit data caused a big perf hit on something as simple as running stat() in a loop. This patch requires LSMs to declare the LSM specific portion separately rather than doing it in a union. Thus each LSM can be responsible for shrinking their portion and don't have to pay a penalty just because other LSMs have a bigger space requirement. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h index eab507f2b1cb..6f4fb37aac88 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h @@ -72,61 +72,15 @@ struct common_audit_data { /* this union contains LSM specific data */ union { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK - /* SMACK data */ - struct smack_audit_data { - const char *function; - char *subject; - char *object; - char *request; - int result; - } smack_audit_data; + struct smack_audit_data *smack_audit_data; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX - /* SELinux data */ - struct { - u32 ssid; - u32 tsid; - u16 tclass; - u32 requested; - u32 audited; - u32 denied; - /* - * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the - * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. - */ - u32 auditdeny; - struct av_decision *avd; - int result; - } selinux_audit_data; + struct selinux_audit_data *selinux_audit_data; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR - struct { - int error; - int op; - int type; - void *profile; - const char *name; - const char *info; - union { - void *target; - struct { - long pos; - void *target; - } iface; - struct { - int rlim; - unsigned long max; - } rlim; - struct { - const char *target; - u32 request; - u32 denied; - uid_t ouid; - } fs; - }; - } apparmor_audit_data; + struct apparmor_audit_data *apparmor_audit_data; #endif - }; + }; /* per LSM data pointer union */ /* these callback will be implemented by a specific LSM */ void (*lsm_pre_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); void (*lsm_post_audit)(struct audit_buffer *, void *); diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 5ff67776a5ad..23f7eb658d9c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -115,23 +115,23 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor="); - audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad.type]); + audit_log_string(ab, aa_audit_type[sa->aad->type]); } - if (sa->aad.op) { + if (sa->aad->op) { audit_log_format(ab, " operation="); - audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad.op]); + audit_log_string(ab, op_table[sa->aad->op]); } - if (sa->aad.info) { + if (sa->aad->info) { audit_log_format(ab, " info="); - audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad.info); - if (sa->aad.error) - audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad.error); + audit_log_string(ab, sa->aad->info); + if (sa->aad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", sa->aad->error); } - if (sa->aad.profile) { - struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad.profile; + if (sa->aad->profile) { + struct aa_profile *profile = sa->aad->profile; pid_t pid; rcu_read_lock(); pid = rcu_dereference(tsk->real_parent)->pid; @@ -145,9 +145,9 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, profile->base.hname); } - if (sa->aad.name) { + if (sa->aad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->name); } } @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { - sa->aad.type = type; + sa->aad->type = type; sa->lsm_pre_audit = audit_pre; sa->lsm_post_audit = cb; common_lsm_audit(sa); @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, BUG_ON(!profile); if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { - if (likely(!sa->aad.error)) { + if (likely(!sa->aad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -196,21 +196,21 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET)) - return sa->aad.error; + return sa->aad->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; if (!unconfined(profile)) - sa->aad.profile = profile; + sa->aad->profile = profile; aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); - if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, sa->tsk ? sa->tsk : current); - if (sa->aad.type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) - return complain_error(sa->aad.error); + if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(sa->aad->error); - return sa->aad.error; + return sa->aad->error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 9982c48def4e..088dba3bf7dc 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -64,11 +64,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task, struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, CAP); + sa.aad = &aad; sa.tsk = task; sa.u.cap = cap; - sa.aad.op = OP_CAPABLE; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad->op = OP_CAPABLE; + sa.aad->error = error; if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 5d176f2530c9..2f8fcba9ce4b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -67,22 +67,22 @@ static void file_audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; uid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); - if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.request); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.request); } - if (sa->aad.fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.denied & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); - audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad.fs.denied); + audit_file_mask(ab, sa->aad->fs.denied); } - if (sa->aad.fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { + if (sa->aad->fs.request & AA_AUDIT_FILE_MASK) { audit_log_format(ab, " fsuid=%d", fsuid); - audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad.fs.ouid); + audit_log_format(ab, " ouid=%d", sa->aad->fs.ouid); } - if (sa->aad.fs.target) { + if (sa->aad->fs.target) { audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.fs.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->fs.target); } } @@ -107,45 +107,47 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms, { int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = op, - sa.aad.fs.request = request; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.fs.target = target; - sa.aad.fs.ouid = ouid; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; - - if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) { + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = op, + aad.fs.request = request; + aad.name = name; + aad.fs.target = target; + aad.fs.ouid = ouid; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; + + if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) { u32 mask = perms->audit; if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) mask = 0xffff; /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ - sa.aad.fs.request &= mask; + sa.aad->fs.request &= mask; - if (likely(!sa.aad.fs.request)) + if (likely(!sa.aad->fs.request)) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; } else { /* only report permissions that were denied */ - sa.aad.fs.request = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + sa.aad->fs.request = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow; - if (sa.aad.fs.request & perms->kill) + if (sa.aad->fs.request & perms->kill) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ - if ((sa.aad.fs.request & perms->quiet) && + if ((sa.aad->fs.request & perms->quiet) && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) - sa.aad.fs.request &= ~perms->quiet; + sa.aad->fs.request &= ~perms->quiet; - if (!sa.aad.fs.request) - return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error; + if (!sa.aad->fs.request) + return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error; } - sa.aad.fs.denied = sa.aad.fs.request & ~perms->allow; + sa.aad->fs.denied = sa.aad->fs.request & ~perms->allow; return aa_audit(type, profile, gfp, &sa, file_audit_cb); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index 4ba78c203af1..3868b1e5d5ba 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -103,7 +103,33 @@ enum aa_ops { }; -/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data portion of common_audit_data */ +struct apparmor_audit_data { + int error; + int op; + int type; + void *profile; + const char *name; + const char *info; + union { + void *target; + struct { + long pos; + void *target; + } iface; + struct { + int rlim; + unsigned long max; + } rlim; + struct { + const char *target; + u32 request; + u32 denied; + uid_t ouid; + } fs; + }; +}; + +/* define a short hand for apparmor_audit_data structure */ #define aad apparmor_audit_data void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 7ee05c6f3c64..c3da93a5150d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; audit_log_format(ab, " target="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad.target); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->target); } /** @@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static int aa_audit_ptrace(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *target, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_PTRACE; - sa.aad.target = target; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_PTRACE; + aad.target = target; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, &sa, audit_cb); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 9516948041ad..e75829ba0ff9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str) { if (audit_enabled) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.info = str; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.info = str; aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, &sa, NULL); } printk(KERN_INFO "AppArmor: %s\n", str); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 97ce8fae49b3..ad05d391974d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -588,10 +588,12 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args); } else { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; - sa.aad.info = name; - sa.aad.error = -EINVAL; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR; + aad.info = name; + aad.error = -EINVAL; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, __aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL, &sa, NULL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 906414383022..f1f7506a464d 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -964,11 +964,13 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = op; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = op; + aad.name = name; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, __aa_current_profile(), gfp, &sa, NULL); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 25fd51edc8da..deab7c7e8dc0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -70,13 +70,13 @@ struct aa_ext { static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { struct common_audit_data *sa = va; - if (sa->aad.iface.target) { - struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad.iface.target; + if (sa->aad->iface.target) { + struct aa_profile *name = sa->aad->iface.target; audit_log_format(ab, " name="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name->base.hname); } - if (sa->aad.iface.pos) - audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad.iface.pos); + if (sa->aad->iface.pos) + audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", sa->aad->iface.pos); } /** @@ -94,13 +94,15 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name, { struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile(); struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); + sa.aad = &aad; if (e) - sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; - sa.aad.iface.target = new; - sa.aad.name = name; - sa.aad.info = info; - sa.aad.error = error; + aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; + aad.iface.target = new; + aad.name = name; + aad.info = info; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index 72c25a4f2cfd..2fe8613efe33 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) struct common_audit_data *sa = va; audit_log_format(ab, " rlimit=%s value=%lu", - rlim_names[sa->aad.rlim.rlim], sa->aad.rlim.max); + rlim_names[sa->aad->rlim.rlim], sa->aad->rlim.max); } /** @@ -50,12 +50,14 @@ static int audit_resource(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int resource, unsigned long value, int error) { struct common_audit_data sa; + struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE); - sa.aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, - sa.aad.rlim.rlim = resource; - sa.aad.rlim.max = value; - sa.aad.error = error; + sa.aad = &aad; + aad.op = OP_SETRLIMIT, + aad.rlim.rlim = resource; + aad.rlim.max = value; + aad.error = error; return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb); } diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 1a70fa26da72..00f3860c2370 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, "avc: %s ", - ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted"); - avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass, - ad->selinux_audit_data.audited); + ad->selinux_audit_data->denied ? "denied" : "granted"); + avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass, + ad->selinux_audit_data->audited); audit_log_format(ab, " for "); } @@ -452,9 +452,9 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; audit_log_format(ab, " "); - avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid, - ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass); + avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid, + ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass); } /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */ @@ -464,10 +464,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data stack_data; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; if (!a) { a = &stack_data; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE); + a->selinux_audit_data = &sad; } /* @@ -481,12 +483,12 @@ static noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, (flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK)) return -ECHILD; - a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass; - a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested; - a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid; - a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid; - a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited; - a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied; + a->selinux_audit_data->tclass = tclass; + a->selinux_audit_data->requested = requested; + a->selinux_audit_data->ssid = ssid; + a->selinux_audit_data->tsid = tsid; + a->selinux_audit_data->audited = audited; + a->selinux_audit_data->denied = denied; a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback; a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback; common_lsm_audit(a); @@ -523,7 +525,7 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, if (unlikely(denied)) { audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; /* - * a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in + * a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny is TRICKY! Setting a bit in * this field means that ANY denials should NOT be audited if * the policy contains an explicit dontaudit rule for that * permission. Take notice that this is unrelated to the @@ -532,15 +534,15 @@ inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, * * denied == READ * avd.auditdeny & ACCESS == 0 (not set means explicit rule) - * selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 + * selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & ACCESS == 1 * * We will NOT audit the denial even though the denied * permission was READ and the auditdeny checks were for * ACCESS */ if (a && - a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny && - !(a->selinux_audit_data.auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) + a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny && + !(a->selinux_audit_data->auditdeny & avd->auditdeny)) audited = 0; } else if (result) audited = denied = requested; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 28482f9e15b8..3861ce4b1007 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct av_decision avd; u16 sclass; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); @@ -1427,6 +1428,7 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.tsk = current; ad.u.cap = cap; @@ -1492,9 +1494,11 @@ static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred, unsigned flags) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); ad.u.inode = inode; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags); } @@ -1507,9 +1511,11 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1522,9 +1528,11 @@ static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, { struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); ad.u.path = *path; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0); } @@ -1543,11 +1551,13 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); int rc; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); ad.u.path = file->f_path; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; if (sid != fsec->sid) { rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, @@ -1577,6 +1587,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; u32 sid, newsid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; dsec = dir->i_security; @@ -1587,6 +1598,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, @@ -1631,6 +1643,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, { struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int rc; @@ -1640,6 +1653,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir, COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); ad.u.dentry = dentry; + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; av = DIR__SEARCH; av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); @@ -1674,6 +1688,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, { struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); u32 av; int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; @@ -1685,6 +1700,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, @@ -1970,6 +1986,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; struct inode_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int rc; @@ -2009,6 +2026,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) @@ -2098,6 +2116,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, struct files_struct *files) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; struct tty_struct *tty; struct fdtable *fdt; @@ -2135,6 +2154,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; spin_lock(&files->file_lock); for (;;) { @@ -2472,6 +2492,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int rc; rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); @@ -2483,6 +2504,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); } @@ -2491,8 +2513,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); } @@ -2656,6 +2680,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 perms; bool from_access; unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; @@ -2668,10 +2693,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.inode = inode; if (from_access) - ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; + ad.selinux_audit_data->auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS; perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); @@ -2737,6 +2763,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; @@ -2751,6 +2778,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return -EPERM; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.dentry = dentry; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, @@ -3345,10 +3373,12 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { u32 sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; sid = task_sid(current); COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, @@ -3721,12 +3751,14 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 tsid = task_sid(task); if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = sk; return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -3805,6 +3837,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in char *addrp; struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3831,6 +3864,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in if (err) goto out; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, @@ -3864,6 +3898,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in goto out; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = family; @@ -3897,6 +3932,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; unsigned short snum; @@ -3922,6 +3958,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum); ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family; err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); @@ -4012,9 +4049,11 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; int err; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = other; err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, @@ -4042,8 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.sk = other->sk; return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, @@ -4080,9 +4121,11 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net.family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); @@ -4111,6 +4154,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4135,6 +4179,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif; ad.u.net.family = family; err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); @@ -4471,6 +4516,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, char *addrp; u32 peer_sid; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u8 secmark_active; u8 netlbl_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4488,6 +4534,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, return NF_DROP; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) @@ -4576,6 +4623,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk = skb->sk; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 proto; @@ -4584,6 +4632,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, sksec = sk->sk_security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) @@ -4607,6 +4656,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, u32 peer_sid; struct sock *sk; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; char *addrp; u8 secmark_active; u8 peerlbl_active; @@ -4653,6 +4703,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex, } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.net.netif = ifindex; ad.u.net.family = family; if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) @@ -4769,11 +4820,13 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = ipc_perms->security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); @@ -4794,6 +4847,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4804,6 +4858,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) isec = msq->q_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4824,11 +4879,13 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = msq->q_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, @@ -4868,6 +4925,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4889,6 +4947,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, } COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; /* Can this process write to the queue? */ @@ -4913,6 +4972,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct msg_security_struct *msec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = task_sid(target); int rc; @@ -4920,6 +4980,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, msec = msg->security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, @@ -4935,6 +4996,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -4945,6 +5007,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) isec = shp->shm_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -4965,11 +5028,13 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = shp->shm_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, @@ -5027,6 +5092,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); int rc; @@ -5037,6 +5103,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) isec = sma->sem_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, @@ -5057,11 +5124,13 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) { struct ipc_security_struct *isec; struct common_audit_data ad; + struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,}; u32 sid = current_sid(); isec = sma->sem_perm.security; COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC); + ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad; ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index 005a91bcb200..fa13f17ce0ff 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -46,6 +46,22 @@ struct avc_cache_stats { unsigned int frees; }; +struct selinux_audit_data { + u32 ssid; + u32 tsid; + u16 tclass; + u32 requested; + u32 audited; + u32 denied; + /* + * auditdeny is a bit tricky and unintuitive. See the + * comments in avc.c for it's meaning and usage. + */ + u32 auditdeny; + struct av_decision *avd; + int result; +}; + /* * AVC operations */ diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 2ad00657b801..ccba3823d9ef 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -185,6 +185,15 @@ struct smack_known { */ #define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 5 +/* SMACK data */ +struct smack_audit_data { + const char *function; + char *subject; + char *object; + char *request; + int result; +}; + /* * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set * to save some stack @@ -192,6 +201,7 @@ struct smack_known { struct smk_audit_info { #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT struct common_audit_data a; + struct smack_audit_data sad; #endif }; /* @@ -311,7 +321,8 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func, { memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a)); a->a.type = type; - a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func; + a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad; + a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func; } static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index cc7cb6edba08..2af7fcc98a71 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -275,9 +275,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access) static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a) { struct common_audit_data *ad = a; - struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data; + struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data; audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", - ad->smack_audit_data.function, + ad->smack_audit_data->function, sad->result ? "denied" : "granted"); audit_log_format(ab, " subject="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject); @@ -310,11 +310,12 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request, if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0) return; - if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL) - a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown"; + sad = a->smack_audit_data; + + if (sad->function == NULL) + sad->function = "unknown"; /* end preparing the audit data */ - sad = &a->smack_audit_data; smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request); sad->subject = subject_label; sad->object = object_label;