x86/xen: Probe target addresses in set_aliased_prot() before the hypercall
authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Thu, 30 Jul 2015 21:31:31 +0000 (14:31 -0700)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Wed, 12 Aug 2015 14:33:24 +0000 (16:33 +0200)
commit aa1acff356bbedfd03b544051f5b371746735d89 upstream.

The update_va_mapping hypercall can fail if the VA isn't present
in the guest's page tables.  Under certain loads, this can
result in an OOPS when the target address is in unpopulated vmap
space.

While we're at it, add comments to help explain what's going on.

This isn't a great long-term fix.  This code should probably be
changed to use something like set_memory_ro.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Vrabel <dvrabel@cantab.net>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: security@kernel.org <security@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0b0e55b995cda11e7829f140b833ef932fcabe3a.1438291540.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c

index 5189fe8..81afe1b 100644 (file)
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
        pte_t pte;
        unsigned long pfn;
        struct page *page;
        pte_t pte;
        unsigned long pfn;
        struct page *page;
+       unsigned char dummy;
 
        ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level);
        BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
 
        ptep = lookup_address((unsigned long)v, &level);
        BUG_ON(ptep == NULL);
@@ -330,6 +331,32 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
 
        pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
 
 
        pte = pfn_pte(pfn, prot);
 
+       /*
+        * Careful: update_va_mapping() will fail if the virtual address
+        * we're poking isn't populated in the page tables.  We don't
+        * need to worry about the direct map (that's always in the page
+        * tables), but we need to be careful about vmap space.  In
+        * particular, the top level page table can lazily propagate
+        * entries between processes, so if we've switched mms since we
+        * vmapped the target in the first place, we might not have the
+        * top-level page table entry populated.
+        *
+        * We disable preemption because we want the same mm active when
+        * we probe the target and when we issue the hypercall.  We'll
+        * have the same nominal mm, but if we're a kernel thread, lazy
+        * mm dropping could change our pgd.
+        *
+        * Out of an abundance of caution, this uses __get_user() to fault
+        * in the target address just in case there's some obscure case
+        * in which the target address isn't readable.
+        */
+
+       preempt_disable();
+
+       pagefault_disable();    /* Avoid warnings due to being atomic. */
+       __get_user(dummy, (unsigned char __user __force *)v);
+       pagefault_enable();
+
        if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0))
                BUG();
 
        if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping((unsigned long)v, pte, 0))
                BUG();
 
@@ -341,6 +368,8 @@ static void set_aliased_prot(void *v, pgprot_t prot)
                                BUG();
        } else
                kmap_flush_unused();
                                BUG();
        } else
                kmap_flush_unused();
+
+       preempt_enable();
 }
 
 static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
 }
 
 static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
@@ -348,6 +377,17 @@ static void xen_alloc_ldt(struct desc_struct *ldt, unsigned entries)
        const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
        int i;
 
        const unsigned entries_per_page = PAGE_SIZE / LDT_ENTRY_SIZE;
        int i;
 
+       /*
+        * We need to mark the all aliases of the LDT pages RO.  We
+        * don't need to call vm_flush_aliases(), though, since that's
+        * only responsible for flushing aliases out the TLBs, not the
+        * page tables, and Xen will flush the TLB for us if needed.
+        *
+        * To avoid confusing future readers: none of this is necessary
+        * to load the LDT.  The hypervisor only checks this when the
+        * LDT is faulted in due to subsequent descriptor access.
+        */
+
        for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
                set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
 }
        for(i = 0; i < entries; i += entries_per_page)
                set_aliased_prot(ldt + i, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
 }