* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (61 commits)
KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
LSM: Add __init to fixup function.
TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdup
TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.
Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"
Revert "TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal"
KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()
TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.
KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()
KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links
TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archs
LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
CRED: Holding a spinlock does not imply the holding of RCU read lock
SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
...
...
}
-A function need not get RCU read lock to use __task_cred() if it is holding a
-spinlock at the time as this implicitly holds the RCU read lock.
-
Should it be necessary to hold another task's credentials for a long period of
time, and possibly to sleep whilst doing so, then the caller should get a
reference on them using:
uid_t task_uid(task) Task's real UID
uid_t task_euid(task) Task's effective UID
-If the caller is holding a spinlock or the RCU read lock at the time anyway,
-then:
+If the caller is holding the RCU read lock at the time anyway, then:
__task_cred(task)->uid
__task_cred(task)->euid
should be used instead. Similarly, if multiple aspects of a task's credentials
-need to be accessed, RCU read lock or a spinlock should be used, __task_cred()
-called, the result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential
-aspects called from that before dropping the lock. This prevents the
-potentially expensive RCU magic from being invoked multiple times.
+need to be accessed, RCU read lock should be used, __task_cred() called, the
+result stored in a temporary pointer and then the credential aspects called
+from that before dropping the lock. This prevents the potentially expensive
+RCU magic from being invoked multiple times.
Should some other single aspect of another task's credentials need to be
accessed, then this can be used:
SWSUSP Software suspend (hibernation) is enabled.
SUSPEND System suspend states are enabled.
FTRACE Function tracing enabled.
+ TPM TPM drivers are enabled.
TS Appropriate touchscreen support is enabled.
UMS USB Mass Storage support is enabled.
USB USB support is enabled.
tp720= [HW,PS2]
+ tpm_suspend_pcr=[HW,TPM]
+ Format: integer pcr id
+ Specify that at suspend time, the tpm driver
+ should extend the specified pcr with zeros,
+ as a workaround for some chips which fail to
+ flush the last written pcr on TPM_SaveState.
+ This will guarantee that all the other pcrs
+ are saved.
+
trace_buf_size=nn[KMG]
[FTRACE] will set tracing buffer size.
obtained at: <http://sourceforge.net/projects/trousers>. To
compile this driver as a module, choose M here; the module
will be called tpm. If unsure, say N.
- Note: For more TPM drivers enable CONFIG_PNP, CONFIG_ACPI
+ Notes:
+ 1) For more TPM drivers enable CONFIG_PNP, CONFIG_ACPI
and CONFIG_PNPACPI.
+ 2) Without ACPI enabled, the BIOS event log won't be accessible,
+ which is required to validate the PCR 0-7 values.
if TCG_TPM
config TCG_TIS
tristate "TPM Interface Specification 1.2 Interface"
- depends on PNP
---help---
If you have a TPM security chip that is compliant with the
TCG TIS 1.2 TPM specification say Yes and it will be accessible
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_remove_hardware);
+#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
+#define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
+
+static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(10),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
+};
+
+/* Bug workaround - some TPM's don't flush the most
+ * recently changed pcr on suspend, so force the flush
+ * with an extend to the selected _unused_ non-volatile pcr.
+ */
+static int tpm_suspend_pcr;
+static int __init tpm_suspend_setup(char *str)
+{
+ get_option(&str, &tpm_suspend_pcr);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("tpm_suspend_pcr=", tpm_suspend_setup);
+
/*
* We are about to suspend. Save the TPM state
* so that it can be restored.
int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev, pm_message_t pm_state)
{
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- u8 savestate[] = {
- 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
- 0, 0, 0, 10, /* blob length (in bytes) */
- 0, 0, 0, 152 /* TPM_ORD_SaveState */
- };
+ struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+ int rc;
+
+ u8 dummy_hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 };
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
- tpm_transmit(chip, savestate, sizeof(savestate));
- return 0;
+ /* for buggy tpm, flush pcrs with extend to selected dummy */
+ if (tpm_suspend_pcr) {
+ cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
+ cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
+ memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
+ TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ "extending dummy pcr before suspend");
+ }
+
+ /* now do the actual savestate */
+ cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE,
+ "sending savestate before suspend");
+ return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_suspend);
tpm_remove_hardware(chip->dev);
return rc;
}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
static int __devinit tpm_tis_pnp_init(struct pnp_dev *pnp_dev,
const struct pnp_device_id *pnp_id)
{
module_param_string(hid, tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id,
sizeof(tpm_pnp_tbl[TIS_HID_USR_IDX].id), 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(hid, "Set additional specific HID for this driver to probe");
-
+#endif
static int tpm_tis_suspend(struct platform_device *dev, pm_message_t msg)
{
return tpm_pm_suspend(&dev->dev, msg);
static int __init init_tis(void)
{
int rc;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
+ if (!force)
+ return pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+#endif
- if (force) {
- rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
- if (rc < 0)
- return rc;
- if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
- return PTR_ERR(pdev);
- if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
- platform_device_unregister(pdev);
- platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
- }
+ rc = platform_driver_register(&tis_drv);
+ if (rc < 0)
return rc;
+ if (IS_ERR(pdev=platform_device_register_simple("tpm_tis", -1, NULL, 0)))
+ return PTR_ERR(pdev);
+ if((rc=tpm_tis_init(&pdev->dev, TIS_MEM_BASE, TIS_MEM_LEN, 0)) != 0) {
+ platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+ platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
}
-
- return pnp_register_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+ return rc;
}
static void __exit cleanup_tis(void)
list_del(&i->list);
}
spin_unlock(&tis_lock);
-
- if (force) {
- platform_device_unregister(pdev);
- platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
- } else
+#ifdef CONFIG_PNP
+ if (!force) {
pnp_unregister_driver(&tis_pnp_driver);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ platform_device_unregister(pdev);
+ platform_driver_unregister(&tis_drv);
}
module_init(init_tis);
inodes_stat.nr_inodes--;
spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
- security_inode_delete(inode);
-
if (op->delete_inode) {
void (*delete)(struct inode *) = op->delete_inode;
/* Filesystems implementing their own
mnt->mnt_pinned = 0;
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
acct_auto_close_mnt(mnt);
- security_sb_umount_close(mnt);
goto repeat;
}
}
retval = 0;
}
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
- if (retval)
- security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
up_write(&namespace_sem);
release_mounts(&umount_list);
return retval;
if (cant_mount(path->dentry))
goto out_unlock;
- err = security_sb_check_sb(mnt, path);
- if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
-
- err = -ENOENT;
if (!d_unlinked(path->dentry))
err = attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, path, NULL);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&path->dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
- if (!err)
- security_sb_post_addmount(mnt, path);
return err;
}
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (!err) {
- security_sb_post_remount(path->mnt, flags, data);
-
spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
touch_mnt_namespace(path->mnt->mnt_ns);
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
touch_mnt_namespace(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns);
spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
chroot_fs_refs(&root, &new);
- security_sb_post_pivotroot(&root, &new);
error = 0;
path_put(&root_parent);
path_put(&parent_path);
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC 4
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK 5
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY 6
-#define LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT 7
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE 7
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD 8
struct task_struct *tsk;
union {
* @orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
* @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
* Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
- * @sb_check_sb:
- * Check permission before the device with superblock @mnt->sb is mounted
- * on the mount point named by @nd.
- * @mnt contains the vfsmount for device being mounted.
- * @path contains the path for the mount point.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @sb_umount:
* Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
* @mnt contains the mounted file system.
* @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_umount_close:
- * Close any files in the @mnt mounted filesystem that are held open by
- * the security module. This hook is called during an umount operation
- * prior to checking whether the filesystem is still busy.
- * @mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- * @sb_umount_busy:
- * Handle a failed umount of the @mnt mounted filesystem, e.g. re-opening
- * any files that were closed by umount_close. This hook is called during
- * an umount operation if the umount fails after a call to the
- * umount_close hook.
- * @mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- * @sb_post_remount:
- * Update the security module's state when a filesystem is remounted.
- * This hook is only called if the remount was successful.
- * @mnt contains the mounted file system.
- * @flags contains the new filesystem flags.
- * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- * @sb_post_addmount:
- * Update the security module's state when a filesystem is mounted.
- * This hook is called any time a mount is successfully grafetd to
- * the tree.
- * @mnt contains the mounted filesystem.
- * @mountpoint contains the path for the mount point.
* @sb_pivotroot:
* Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
* @old_path contains the path for the new location of the current root (put_old).
* @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_post_pivotroot:
- * Update module state after a successful pivot.
- * @old_path contains the path for the old root.
- * @new_path contains the path for the new root.
* @sb_set_mnt_opts:
* Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
* @sb the superblock to set security mount options for
* @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
* @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_delete:
- * @inode contains the inode structure for deleted inode.
- * This hook is called when a deleted inode is released (i.e. an inode
- * with no hard links has its use count drop to zero). A security module
- * can use this hook to release any persistent label associated with the
- * inode.
* @inode_setxattr:
* Check permission before setting the extended attributes
* @value identified by @name for @dentry.
* @old points to the original credentials.
* @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
* Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
- * @cred_commit:
- * @new points to the new credentials.
- * @old points to the original credentials.
- * Install a new set of credentials.
* @cred_transfer:
* @new points to the new credentials.
* @old points to the original credentials.
* userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
* @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
* Return 0 if successful.
- * @task_setuid:
- * Check permission before setting one or more of the user identity
- * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates
- * which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook and how to
- * interpret the @id0, @id1, and @id2 parameters. See the LSM_SETID
- * definitions at the beginning of this file for the @flags values and
- * their meanings.
- * @id0 contains a uid.
- * @id1 contains a uid.
- * @id2 contains a uid.
- * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_fix_setuid:
* Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
* identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter
* @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
* @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
* Return 0 on success.
- * @task_setgid:
- * Check permission before setting one or more of the group identity
- * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates
- * which of the set*gid system calls invoked this hook and how to
- * interpret the @id0, @id1, and @id2 parameters. See the LSM_SETID
- * definitions at the beginning of this file for the @flags values and
- * their meanings.
- * @id0 contains a gid.
- * @id1 contains a gid.
- * @id2 contains a gid.
- * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_setpgid:
* Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
* process @p to @pgid.
* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
- * @task_setgroups:
- * Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the
- * current process.
- * @group_info contains the new group information.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_setnice:
* Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
* @p contains the task_struct of process.
* Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
* an error.
* May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
- * @key_session_to_parent:
- * Forcibly assign the session keyring from a process to its parent
- * process.
- * @cred: Pointer to process's credentials
- * @parent_cred: Pointer to parent process's credentials
- * @keyring: Proposed new session keyring
- * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
*
* Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
*
* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @acct:
- * Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If
- * accounting is being enabled, then @file refers to the open file used to
- * store accounting records. If accounting is being disabled, then @file
- * is NULL.
- * @file contains the file structure for the accounting file (may be NULL).
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @sysctl:
* Check permission before accessing the @table sysctl variable in the
* manner specified by @op.
const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
int (*capable) (struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit);
- int (*acct) (struct file *file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*sb_mount) (char *dev_name, struct path *path,
char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
- int (*sb_check_sb) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path);
int (*sb_umount) (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
- void (*sb_umount_close) (struct vfsmount *mnt);
- void (*sb_umount_busy) (struct vfsmount *mnt);
- void (*sb_post_remount) (struct vfsmount *mnt,
- unsigned long flags, void *data);
- void (*sb_post_addmount) (struct vfsmount *mnt,
- struct path *mountpoint);
int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
struct path *new_path);
- void (*sb_post_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
- struct path *new_path);
int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
void (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
- void (*inode_delete) (struct inode *inode);
int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
gfp_t gfp);
- void (*cred_commit)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
- int (*task_setuid) (uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
- int (*task_setgid) (gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p);
int (*task_getsid) (struct task_struct *p);
void (*task_getsecid) (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
- int (*task_setgroups) (struct group_info *group_info);
int (*task_setnice) (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int (*task_setioprio) (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
const struct cred *cred,
key_perm_t perm);
int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
- int (*key_session_to_parent)(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct cred *parent_cred,
- struct key *key);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
int security_capable(int cap);
int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap);
-int security_acct(struct file *file);
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op);
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path);
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
-void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt);
-void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt);
-void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *data);
-void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *mountpoint);
int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
-void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
void security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
struct super_block *newsb);
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
-void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode);
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
-void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags);
-int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags);
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
-int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
return ret;
}
-static inline int security_acct(struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
{
return 0;
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt,
- struct path *path)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt,
- unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{ }
-
-static inline void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt,
- struct path *mountpoint)
-{ }
-
static inline int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
struct path *new_path)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path,
- struct path *new_path)
-{ }
-
static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
-{ }
-
static inline int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new,
- const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2,
- int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
int flags)
return cap_task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
-static inline int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2,
- int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return 0;
*secid = 0;
}
-static inline int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
-int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct cred *parent_cred,
- struct key *key);
#else
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct cred *parent_cred,
- struct key *key)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
{
struct file *file;
struct vfsmount *mnt;
- int error;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
struct bsd_acct_struct *acct = NULL;
}
}
- error = security_acct(file);
- if (error) {
- kfree(acct);
- filp_close(file, NULL);
- return error;
- }
-
spin_lock(&acct_lock);
if (ns->bacct == NULL) {
ns->bacct = acct;
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(acct, const char __user *, name)
{
- int error;
+ int error = 0;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_PACCT))
return -EPERM;
if (acct == NULL)
return 0;
- error = security_acct(NULL);
- if (!error) {
- spin_lock(&acct_lock);
- acct_file_reopen(acct, NULL, NULL);
- spin_unlock(&acct_lock);
- }
+ spin_lock(&acct_lock);
+ acct_file_reopen(acct, NULL, NULL);
+ spin_unlock(&acct_lock);
}
+
return error;
}
#endif
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
- security_commit_creds(new, old);
-
get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
/* dumpability changes */
*/
int set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info)
{
- int retval;
-
- retval = security_task_setgroups(group_info);
- if (retval)
- return retval;
-
put_group_info(new->group_info);
groups_sort(group_info);
get_group_info(group_info);
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
- retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
-
retval = -EPERM;
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
if (old->gid == rgid ||
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
- retval = security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
-
retval = -EPERM;
if (capable(CAP_SETGID))
new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = gid;
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
- retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_RE);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
-
retval = -EPERM;
if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
new->uid = ruid;
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
- retval = security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_ID);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
-
retval = -EPERM;
if (capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
new->suid = new->uid = uid;
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- retval = security_task_setuid(ruid, euid, suid, LSM_SETID_RES);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
old = current_cred();
retval = -EPERM;
return -ENOMEM;
old = current_cred();
- retval = security_task_setgid(rgid, egid, sgid, LSM_SETID_RES);
- if (retval)
- goto error;
-
retval = -EPERM;
if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && rgid != old->gid &&
old = current_cred();
old_fsuid = old->fsuid;
- if (security_task_setuid(uid, (uid_t)-1, (uid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS) < 0)
- goto error;
-
if (uid == old->uid || uid == old->euid ||
uid == old->suid || uid == old->fsuid ||
capable(CAP_SETUID)) {
}
}
-error:
abort_creds(new);
return old_fsuid;
old = current_cred();
old_fsgid = old->fsgid;
- if (security_task_setgid(gid, (gid_t)-1, (gid_t)-1, LSM_SETID_FS))
- goto error;
-
if (gid == old->gid || gid == old->egid ||
gid == old->sgid || gid == old->fsgid ||
capable(CAP_SETGID)) {
}
}
-error:
abort_creds(new);
return old_fsgid;
fprintf(fout, "\n");
for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
- char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%s", s);
for (j = 0; j < max(1, 40 - strlen(s)); j++)
fprintf(fout, " ");
#include <linux/security.h>
-static int cap_acct(struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
{
return 0;
return 0;
}
-static int cap_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags,
- void *data)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
-}
-
static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
-}
-
static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_inode_delete(struct inode *ino)
-{
-}
-
static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
return 0;
}
-static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
}
return 0;
}
-static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return 0;
*secid = 0;
}
-static int cap_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
return 0;
return 0;
}
-static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct cred *parent_cred,
- struct key *key)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
} \
} while (0)
-void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
+void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
{
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, acct);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_check_sb);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_close);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount_busy);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_remount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_addmount);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_post_pivotroot);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_delete);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgroups);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
}
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
* @addr_only: unused
*
- * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
.name = "devices",
.can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
.create = devcgroup_create,
- .destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
+ .destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
.populate = devcgroup_populate,
.subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
};
#
config IMA
bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
- depends on ACPI
depends on SECURITY
select SECURITYFS
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_MD5
select CRYPTO_SHA1
- select TCG_TPM
- select TCG_TIS
+ select TCG_TPM if !S390
+ select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM
help
The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
-int ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
void ima_delete_rules(void);
/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
return;
ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
- audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
current->pid, current_cred()->uid,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current));
desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
- pr_info("failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
+ pr_info("IMA: failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
return rc;
return;
if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
- pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+ pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
}
/*
static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *data;
- int rc;
+ char *data = NULL;
+ ssize_t result;
if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (*ppos != 0) {
- /* No partial writes. */
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ result = -ENOMEM;
data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
- if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) {
- kfree(data);
- return -EFAULT;
- }
*(data + datalen) = '\0';
- rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
- if (rc < 0) {
- datalen = -EINVAL;
- valid_policy = 0;
- }
+ result = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen))
+ goto out;
+
+ result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+out:
+ if (result < 0)
+ valid_policy = 0;
kfree(data);
- return datalen;
+ return result;
}
static struct dentry *ima_dir;
iint->version = 0;
iint->flags = 0UL;
if (iint->readcount != 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __func__,
iint->readcount);
iint->readcount = 0;
}
if (iint->writecount != 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __func__,
iint->writecount);
iint->writecount = 0;
}
if (iint->opencount != 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __func__,
iint->opencount);
iint->opencount = 0;
}
ima_used_chip = 1;
if (!ima_used_chip)
- pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+ pr_info("IMA: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
ima_init_policy();
(iint->writecount < 0)) &&
!ima_limit_imbalance(file)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld)\n",
- __FUNCTION__, iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
+ __func__, iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
iint->opencount);
dump_stack();
}
{
int result;
+ if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal, args,
return result;
}
+static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
+{
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+}
+
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
- entry->action = -1;
- while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
+ entry->uid = -1;
+ entry->action = UNKNOWN;
+ while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int token;
unsigned long lnum;
if (result < 0)
break;
- if (!*p)
+ if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
continue;
token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_measure:
- audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
entry->action = MEASURE;
break;
case Opt_dont_measure:
- audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
+ ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
+
+ if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
break;
case Opt_func:
- audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
+
+ if (entry->func)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
/* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
break;
case Opt_mask:
- audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
+
+ if (entry->mask)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
break;
case Opt_fsmagic:
- audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
+
+ if (entry->fsmagic) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
&entry->fsmagic);
if (!result)
entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
break;
case Opt_uid:
- audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+
+ if (entry->uid != -1) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
}
break;
case Opt_obj_user:
- audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_USER,
AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_obj_role:
- audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_obj_type:
- audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_subj_user:
- audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_USER,
AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
break;
case Opt_subj_role:
- audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
break;
case Opt_subj_type:
- audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
break;
case Opt_err:
- audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
+ ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
+ result = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
- if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+ if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
result = -EINVAL;
- audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
audit_log_end(ab);
return result;
}
* @rule - ima measurement policy rule
*
* Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
- * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
*/
-int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
{
const char *op = "update_policy";
+ char *p;
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
- int result = 0;
+ ssize_t result, len;
int audit_info = 0;
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
- result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
- if (!result) {
- mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
- mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
- } else {
+ p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
+ len = strlen(p) + 1;
+
+ if (*p == '#') {
+ kfree(entry);
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
+ if (result) {
kfree(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
audit_info);
+ return result;
}
- return result;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+
+ return len;
}
/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
if (qe == NULL) {
- pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+ pr_err("IMA: OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
qe->entry = entry;
result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
if (result != 0)
- pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+ pr_err("IMA: Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
return result;
}
extern struct key_type *key_type_lookup(const char *type);
extern void key_type_put(struct key_type *ktype);
-extern int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
+extern int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring,
+ const struct key_type *type,
+ const char *description,
+ struct keyring_list **_prealloc);
+extern int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key);
+extern void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ struct keyring_list **_prealloc);
+extern void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring,
+ struct key_type *type,
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc);
extern key_ref_t __keyring_search_one(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
const struct key_type *type,
*/
int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen)
{
- int delta = (int) datalen - key->datalen;
+ int delta = (int)datalen - key->datalen;
int ret = 0;
key_check(key);
const void *data,
size_t datalen,
struct key *keyring,
- struct key *authkey)
+ struct key *authkey,
+ struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
{
int ret, awaken;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
if (keyring)
- ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
+ __key_link(keyring, key, _prealloc);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc;
int ret;
- if (keyring)
- down_write(&keyring->sem);
+ if (keyring) {
+ ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description,
+ &prealloc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey);
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, data, datalen, keyring, authkey,
+ &prealloc);
if (keyring)
- up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
return ret;
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc;
struct timespec now;
- int ret, awaken;
+ int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
ret = -EBUSY;
if (keyring)
- down_write(&keyring->sem);
+ link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type,
+ key->description, &prealloc);
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
ret = 0;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
- if (keyring)
- ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
+ if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
+ __key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (keyring)
- up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
- return ret;
+ return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
} /* end key_negate_and_link() */
key_perm_t perm,
unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key_type *ktype;
struct key *keyring, *key = NULL;
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
goto error_2;
- down_write(&keyring->sem);
+ ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, ktype, description, &prealloc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_2;
/* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
* to modify the keyring */
}
/* instantiate it and link it into the target keyring */
- ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL);
+ ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, payload, plen, keyring, NULL,
+ &prealloc);
if (ret < 0) {
key_put(key);
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, is_key_possessed(keyring_ref));
error_3:
- up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
error_2:
key_type_put(ktype);
error:
/* we found a matching key, so we're going to try to update it
* - we can drop the locks first as we have the key pinned
*/
- up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ __key_link_end(keyring, ktype, prealloc);
key_type_put(ktype);
key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
ret = key->serial;
key_put(key);
- error5:
+error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
- error4:
+error4:
key_ref_put(dest_ref);
- error3:
+error3:
kfree(callout_info);
- error2:
+error2:
kfree(description);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end sys_request_key() */
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_get_keyring_ID() */
ret = join_session_keyring(name);
kfree(name);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_join_session_keyring() */
ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
kfree(payload);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_update_key() */
ret = 0;
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_revoke_key() */
ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_keyring_clear() */
ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_keyring_link() */
ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_keyring_unlink() */
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
- error2:
+error2:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_describe_key() */
ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
- error6:
+error6:
key_ref_put(key_ref);
- error5:
+error5:
key_type_put(ktype);
- error4:
+error4:
key_ref_put(dest_ref);
- error3:
+error3:
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
- error2:
+error2:
kfree(description);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_keyring_search() */
}
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
- can_read_key:
+can_read_key:
ret = key_validate(key);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
}
- error2:
+error2:
key_put(key);
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyctl_read_key() */
/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
* SUID/SGID */
- if (pcred-> uid != mycred->euid ||
+ if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid ||
pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
- pcred-> gid != mycred->egid ||
+ pcred->gid != mycred->egid ||
pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
goto not_permitted;
/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
- if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+ if (pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
goto not_permitted;
- /* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
- * keyring from this process */
- ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
- key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto not_permitted;
-
/* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
* that */
oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
-#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
#define rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring) \
unsigned bucket = 0;
for (; *desc; desc++)
- bucket += (unsigned char) *desc;
+ bucket += (unsigned char)*desc;
return bucket & (KEYRING_NAME_HASH_SIZE - 1);
}
{
struct keyring_list *klist;
- if (keyring->description) {
+ if (keyring->description)
seq_puts(m, keyring->description);
- }
- else {
+ else
seq_puts(m, "[anon]");
- }
rcu_read_lock();
klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
ret = qty;
}
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end keyring_read() */
key_check(keyring);
/* top keyring must have search permission to begin the search */
- err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+ err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, cred, KEY_SEARCH);
if (err < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(err);
goto error;
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- found:
+found:
atomic_inc(&key->usage);
rcu_read_unlock();
return make_key_ref(key, possessed);
sp = 0;
/* start processing a new keyring */
- descend:
+descend:
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &subtree->flags))
goto not_this_keyring;
goto not_this_keyring;
kix = 0;
- ascend:
+ascend:
/* iterate through the remaining keys in this keyring */
for (; kix < keylist->nkeys; kix++) {
key = keylist->keys[kix];
/* the keyring we're looking at was disqualified or didn't contain a
* matching key */
- not_this_keyring:
+not_this_keyring:
if (sp > 0) {
/* resume the checking of a keyring higher up in the tree */
sp--;
ret = 0; /* no cycles detected */
- error:
+error:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
- too_deep:
+too_deep:
ret = -ELOOP;
goto error;
- cycle_detected:
+cycle_detected:
ret = -EDEADLK;
goto error;
} /* end keyring_detect_cycle() */
-/*****************************************************************************/
-/*
- * dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period
- */
-static void keyring_link_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
-{
- struct keyring_list *klist =
- container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
-
- kfree(klist);
-
-} /* end keyring_link_rcu_disposal() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* dispose of a keyring list after the RCU grace period, freeing the unlinked
* key
struct keyring_list *klist =
container_of(rcu, struct keyring_list, rcu);
- key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
+ if (klist->delkey != USHORT_MAX)
+ key_put(klist->keys[klist->delkey]);
kfree(klist);
+}
-} /* end keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal() */
-
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
- * link a key into to a keyring
- * - must be called with the keyring's semaphore write-locked
- * - discard already extant link to matching key if there is one
+ * preallocate memory so that a key can be linked into to a keyring
*/
-int __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type,
+ const char *description,
+ struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
+ __acquires(&keyring->sem)
{
struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
unsigned max;
size_t size;
int loop, ret;
- ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
- if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
- goto error;
+ kenter("%d,%s,%s,", key_serial(keyring), type->name, description);
- ret = -ENOTDIR;
if (keyring->type != &key_type_keyring)
- goto error;
+ return -ENOTDIR;
- /* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a
- * cycle when applied to two keyring in opposite orders */
- down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+ down_write(&keyring->sem);
- /* check that we aren't going to create a cycle adding one keyring to
- * another */
- if (key->type == &key_type_keyring) {
- ret = keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error2;
- }
+ ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+ if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+ goto error_krsem;
+
+ /* serialise link/link calls to prevent parallel calls causing a cycle
+ * when linking two keyring in opposite orders */
+ if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+ down_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
- /* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
klist = rcu_dereference_locked_keyring(keyring);
- if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
- struct key_type *type = key->type;
+ /* see if there's a matching key we can displace */
+ if (klist && klist->nkeys > 0) {
for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
if (klist->keys[loop]->type == type &&
strcmp(klist->keys[loop]->description,
- key->description) == 0
+ description) == 0
) {
- /* found a match - replace with new key */
+ /* found a match - we'll replace this one with
+ * the new key */
size = sizeof(struct key *) * klist->maxkeys;
size += sizeof(*klist);
BUG_ON(size > PAGE_SIZE);
ret = -ENOMEM;
nklist = kmemdup(klist, size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nklist)
- goto error2;
-
- /* replace matched key */
- atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- nklist->keys[loop] = key;
-
- rcu_assign_pointer(
- keyring->payload.subscriptions,
- nklist);
-
- /* dispose of the old keyring list and the
- * displaced key */
- klist->delkey = loop;
- call_rcu(&klist->rcu,
- keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
+ goto error_sem;
+ /* note replacement slot */
+ klist->delkey = nklist->delkey = loop;
goto done;
}
}
ret = key_payload_reserve(keyring,
keyring->datalen + KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error2;
+ goto error_sem;
if (klist && klist->nkeys < klist->maxkeys) {
- /* there's sufficient slack space to add directly */
- atomic_inc(&key->usage);
-
- klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
- smp_wmb();
- klist->nkeys++;
- smp_wmb();
- }
- else {
+ /* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
+ nklist = NULL;
+ } else {
/* grow the key list */
max = 4;
if (klist)
max += klist->maxkeys;
ret = -ENFILE;
- if (max > 65535)
- goto error3;
+ if (max > USHORT_MAX - 1)
+ goto error_quota;
size = sizeof(*klist) + sizeof(struct key *) * max;
if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
- goto error3;
+ goto error_quota;
ret = -ENOMEM;
nklist = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nklist)
- goto error3;
- nklist->maxkeys = max;
- nklist->nkeys = 0;
+ goto error_quota;
+ nklist->maxkeys = max;
if (klist) {
- nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys;
- memcpy(nklist->keys,
- klist->keys,
+ memcpy(nklist->keys, klist->keys,
sizeof(struct key *) * klist->nkeys);
+ nklist->delkey = klist->nkeys;
+ nklist->nkeys = klist->nkeys + 1;
+ klist->delkey = USHORT_MAX;
+ } else {
+ nklist->nkeys = 1;
+ nklist->delkey = 0;
}
/* add the key into the new space */
- atomic_inc(&key->usage);
- nklist->keys[nklist->nkeys++] = key;
-
- rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
-
- /* dispose of the old keyring list */
- if (klist)
- call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_link_rcu_disposal);
+ nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = NULL;
}
done:
- ret = 0;
-error2:
- up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
-error:
- return ret;
+ *_prealloc = nklist;
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
-error3:
+error_quota:
/* undo the quota changes */
key_payload_reserve(keyring,
keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
- goto error2;
+error_sem:
+ if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+ up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+error_krsem:
+ up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
-} /* end __key_link() */
+/*
+ * check already instantiated keys aren't going to be a problem
+ * - the caller must have called __key_link_begin()
+ * - don't need to call this for keys that were created since __key_link_begin()
+ * was called
+ */
+int __key_link_check_live_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
+{
+ if (key->type == &key_type_keyring)
+ /* check that we aren't going to create a cycle by linking one
+ * keyring to another */
+ return keyring_detect_cycle(keyring, key);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * link a key into to a keyring
+ * - must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called
+ * - discard already extant link to matching key if there is one
+ */
+void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
+ struct keyring_list **_prealloc)
+{
+ struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist;
+
+ nklist = *_prealloc;
+ *_prealloc = NULL;
+
+ kenter("%d,%d,%p", keyring->serial, key->serial, nklist);
+
+ klist = rcu_dereference_protected(keyring->payload.subscriptions,
+ rwsem_is_locked(&keyring->sem));
+
+ atomic_inc(&key->usage);
+
+ /* there's a matching key we can displace or an empty slot in a newly
+ * allocated list we can fill */
+ if (nklist) {
+ kdebug("replace %hu/%hu/%hu",
+ nklist->delkey, nklist->nkeys, nklist->maxkeys);
+
+ nklist->keys[nklist->delkey] = key;
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, nklist);
+
+ /* dispose of the old keyring list and, if there was one, the
+ * displaced key */
+ if (klist) {
+ kdebug("dispose %hu/%hu/%hu",
+ klist->delkey, klist->nkeys, klist->maxkeys);
+ call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* there's sufficient slack space to append directly */
+ klist->keys[klist->nkeys] = key;
+ smp_wmb();
+ klist->nkeys++;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * finish linking a key into to a keyring
+ * - must be called with __key_link_begin() having being called
+ */
+void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type,
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc)
+ __releases(&keyring->sem)
+{
+ BUG_ON(type == NULL);
+ BUG_ON(type->name == NULL);
+ kenter("%d,%s,%p", keyring->serial, type->name, prealloc);
+
+ if (type == &key_type_keyring)
+ up_write(&keyring_serialise_link_sem);
+
+ if (prealloc) {
+ kfree(prealloc);
+ key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+ keyring->datalen - KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES);
+ }
+ up_write(&keyring->sem);
+}
-/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* link a key to a keyring
*/
int key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key)
{
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc;
int ret;
key_check(keyring);
key_check(key);
- down_write(&keyring->sem);
- ret = __key_link(keyring, key);
- up_write(&keyring->sem);
+ ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, key->type, key->description, &prealloc);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = __key_link_check_live_key(keyring, key);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ __key_link(keyring, key, &prealloc);
+ __key_link_end(keyring, key->type, prealloc);
+ }
return ret;
-
-} /* end key_link() */
+}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_link);
}
}
- error:
+error:
return ret;
} /* end key_validate() */
static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
{
(*_pos)++;
- return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+ return key_user_next((struct rb_node *)v);
}
static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
ret = install_thread_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
- key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
ret = install_process_keyring();
if (ret < 0) {
- key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto error;
}
goto reget_creds;
case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
/* group keyrings are not yet supported */
- key = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
goto error;
case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
struct key_user *user,
struct key **_key)
{
+ struct keyring_list *prealloc;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
+ int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,,,", type->name, description);
+ *_key = NULL;
mutex_lock(&user->cons_lock);
key = key_alloc(type, description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred,
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags);
- if (dest_keyring)
- down_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ if (dest_keyring) {
+ ret = __key_link_begin(dest_keyring, type, description,
+ &prealloc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto link_prealloc_failed;
+ }
/* attach the key to the destination keyring under lock, but we do need
* to do another check just in case someone beat us to it whilst we
goto key_already_present;
if (dest_keyring)
- __key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (dest_keyring)
- up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ __key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
*_key = key;
kleave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
return 0;
+ /* the key is now present - we tell the caller that we found it by
+ * returning -EINPROGRESS */
key_already_present:
+ key_put(key);
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (dest_keyring) {
- __key_link(dest_keyring, key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
- up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ ret = __key_link_check_live_key(dest_keyring, key);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ __key_link(dest_keyring, key, &prealloc);
+ __key_link_end(dest_keyring, type, prealloc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto link_check_failed;
}
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
- key_put(key);
- *_key = key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ *_key = key;
kleave(" = -EINPROGRESS [%d]", key_serial(key));
return -EINPROGRESS;
+link_check_failed:
+ mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ key_put(key);
+ kleave(" = %d [linkcheck]", ret);
+ return ret;
+
+link_prealloc_failed:
+ up_write(&dest_keyring->sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
+ kleave(" = %d [prelink]", ret);
+ return ret;
+
alloc_failed:
mutex_unlock(&user->cons_lock);
- *_key = NULL;
kleave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(key));
return PTR_ERR(key);
}
kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
}
+ } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ key = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
key_ref_t key_ref;
+ int ret;
kenter("%s,%s,%p,%zu,%p,%p,%lx",
type->name, description, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
if (dest_keyring) {
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
- key_link(dest_keyring, key);
+ ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key);
key_put(dest_keyring);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ key_put(key);
+ key = ERR_PTR(ret);
+ goto error;
+ }
}
} else if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EAGAIN) {
key = ERR_CAST(key_ref);
}
switch (a->type) {
- case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
return;
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
/* things that live in capability.c */
-extern void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
+extern void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
static struct security_operations *security_ops;
static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
.name = "default",
};
-static inline int verify(struct security_operations *ops)
+static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops)
{
/* verify the security_operations structure exists */
if (!ops)
* If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
* an error will be returned. Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
*/
-int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
+int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
{
if (verify(ops)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
return ret;
}
-int security_acct(struct file *file)
-{
- return security_ops->acct(file);
-}
-
int security_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
{
return security_ops->sysctl(table, op);
return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
-int security_sb_check_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
-{
- return security_ops->sb_check_sb(mnt, path);
-}
-
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
}
-void security_sb_umount_close(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
- security_ops->sb_umount_close(mnt);
-}
-
-void security_sb_umount_busy(struct vfsmount *mnt)
-{
- security_ops->sb_umount_busy(mnt);
-}
-
-void security_sb_post_remount(struct vfsmount *mnt, unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{
- security_ops->sb_post_remount(mnt, flags, data);
-}
-
-void security_sb_post_addmount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *mountpoint)
-{
- security_ops->sb_post_addmount(mnt, mountpoint);
-}
-
int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
}
-void security_sb_post_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
- security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
-}
-
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
return security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
}
-void security_inode_delete(struct inode *inode)
-{
- if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
- return;
- security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
-}
-
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
}
-void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
- security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
}
-int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
-}
-
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
}
-int security_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- return security_ops->task_setgid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
-}
-
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
-int security_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
- return security_ops->task_setgroups(group_info);
-}
-
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
}
-int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
- const struct cred *parent_cred,
- struct key *key)
-{
- return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
-}
-
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
return;
if (!a) {
a = &stack_data;
- memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
- a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
}
a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
- if (!ssec)
+ sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
+ if (!sksec)
return -ENOMEM;
- ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
- sk->sk_security = ssec;
+ sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ sk->sk_security = sksec;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec);
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
return 0;
}
static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
sk->sk_security = NULL;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
- kfree(ssec);
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
+ kfree(sksec);
}
/* The security server must be initialized before
/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
-static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
+static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
"uses xattr",
"uses transition SIDs",
"uses task SIDs",
return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
}
+static int default_noexec;
+
static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int rc = 0;
-#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
- if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
+ if (default_noexec &&
+ (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
/*
* We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
* private file mapping that will also be writable.
if (rc)
goto error;
}
-#endif
if (file) {
/* read access is always possible with a mapping */
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
-#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
- if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
+ if (default_noexec &&
+ (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
int rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
if (rc)
return rc;
}
-#endif
return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
}
struct socket *other,
struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
return err;
/* connecting socket */
- ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
+ sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ sksec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
/* server child socket */
- ssec = newsk->sk_security;
- ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
- err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
+ sksec = newsk->sk_security;
+ sksec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
+ err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, sksec->peer_sid, &sksec->sid);
return err;
}
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
- ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
- peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+ sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
}
if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
- struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
- newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
- newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
- newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
+ newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
+ newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
+ newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
- selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec);
+ selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
}
static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
cred_init_security();
+ default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
+
sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */
-static char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
+static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
{
"null",
"kernel",
void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
u16 family,
}
static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
return;
}
static inline void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
return;
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free - Free the NetLabel fields
- * @sssec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
*
* Description:
* Free all of the memory in the NetLabel fields of a sk_security_struct.
*
*/
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
- if (ssec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
- netlbl_secattr_free(ssec->nlbl_secattr);
+ if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL)
+ netlbl_secattr_free(sksec->nlbl_secattr);
}
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
- * @ssec: the sk_security_struct
+ * @sksec: the sk_security_struct
* @family: the socket family
*
* Description:
* The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
-void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *ssec)
+void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
{
- ssec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
+ sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET;
}
/**
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stddef.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/selinux_netlink.h>
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- con = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ con = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!con)
return length;
- user = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ user = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!user)
goto out;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con)+1, &sid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(con, strlen(con) + 1, &sid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
return length;
length = -ENOMEM;
- scon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ scon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!scon)
return length;
- tcon = kzalloc(size+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ tcon = kzalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon)
goto out;
if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon)+1, &ssid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(scon, strlen(scon) + 1, &ssid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
- length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon)+1, &tsid);
+ length = security_context_to_sid(tcon, strlen(tcon) + 1, &tsid);
if (length < 0)
goto out2;
}
inode->i_fop = &sel_perm_ops;
/* i+1 since perm values are 1-indexed */
- inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i+1);
+ inode->i_ino = sel_perm_to_ino(classvalue, i + 1);
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
goto out;
/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
- last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses+2);
+ last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
struct dentry *class_name_dir;
goto out1;
/* i+1 since class values are 1-indexed */
- rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i+1,
+ rc = sel_make_class_dir_entries(classes[i], i + 1,
class_name_dir);
if (rc)
goto out1;
if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
if (def_sid != SECSID_NULL && oldc)
- *scontext += strlen(*scontext)+1;
+ *scontext += strlen(*scontext) + 1;
return 0;
}
#define _DEBUG_HASHES
#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
-static char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
"common prefixes",
"classes",
"roles",
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out_free_role;
}
- key = kmalloc(strlen(OBJECT_R)+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_role;
}
- strcpy(key, OBJECT_R);
rc = hashtab_insert(p->p_roles.table, key, role);
if (rc)
goto out_free_key;
rangetr_hash_eval(p->range_tr);
}
- p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim*sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
+ p->type_attr_map = kmalloc(p->p_types.nprim * sizeof(struct ebitmap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->type_attr_map)
goto bad;
case CEXPR_AND:
BUG_ON(sp < 1);
sp--;
- s[sp] &= s[sp+1];
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
break;
case CEXPR_OR:
BUG_ON(sp < 1);
sp--;
- s[sp] |= s[sp+1];
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
break;
case CEXPR_ATTR:
- if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return 0;
switch (e->attr) {
case CEXPR_USER:
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
/* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
- scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len+1, gfp_flags);
+ scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
if (!scontext2)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
- if (policydb_read(&policydb, fp)) {
+ rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
+ if (rc) {
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return -EINVAL;
+ return rc;
}
- if (selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
- ¤t_mapping,
- ¤t_mapping_size)) {
+
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
+ ¤t_mapping,
+ ¤t_mapping_size);
+ if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return -EINVAL;
+ return rc;
}
- if (policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab)) {
+
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
+ if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
- return -EINVAL;
+ return rc;
}
+
security_load_policycaps();
ss_initialized = 1;
seqno = ++latest_granting;
sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
#endif
- if (policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp))
- return -EINVAL;
+ rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
return rc;
}
- if (selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map,
- &map, &map_size))
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
/* Clone the SID table. */
sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
- if (sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab)) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+ if (rc)
goto err;
- }
/*
* Convert the internal representations of contexts
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
- usercon.role = i+1;
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
- usercon.type = j+1;
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
-#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <asm/ioctls.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
return 0;
}
-/**
- * smack_cred_commit - commit new credentials
- * @new: the new credentials
- * @old: the original credentials
- */
-static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
/**
* smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
* @new: the new credentials
.cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
.cred_free = smack_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
- .cred_commit = smack_cred_commit,
.cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
.kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
.kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
-obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o gc.o path_group.o
static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
const int buffer_len);
+/**
+ * tomoyo_parse_name_union - Parse a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @filename: Name or name group.
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0))
+ return false;
+ if (filename[0] == '@') {
+ ptr->group = tomoyo_get_path_group(filename + 1);
+ ptr->is_group = true;
+ return ptr->group != NULL;
+ }
+ ptr->filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+ ptr->is_group = false;
+ return ptr->filename != NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_name_union - Print a tomoyo_name_union.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_name_union".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_name_union(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+ const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+ int pos = head->read_avail;
+ if (pos && head->read_buf[pos - 1] == ' ')
+ head->read_avail--;
+ if (ptr->is_group)
+ return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " @%s",
+ ptr->group->group_name->name);
+ return tomoyo_io_printf(head, " %s", ptr->filename->name);
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
*
*dp = '\0';
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_tokenize - Tokenize string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to tokenize.
+ * @w: Pointer to "char *".
+ * @size: Sizeof @w .
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size)
+{
+ int count = size / sizeof(char *);
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ w[i] = "";
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ char *cp = strchr(buffer, ' ');
+ if (cp)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ w[i] = buffer;
+ if (!cp)
+ break;
+ buffer = cp + 1;
+ }
+ return i < count || !*buffer;
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
* @filename: The pathname to check.
static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
int profile)
{
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL;
int i;
if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
return NULL;
- mutex_lock(&lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ return NULL;
ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
if (ptr)
goto ok;
- ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ptr = kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), GFP_NOFS);
if (!tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
kfree(ptr);
ptr = NULL;
mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
ok:
- mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
return ptr;
}
static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_manager;
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry e = { };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- bool is_domain = false;
if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) {
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager))
return -EINVAL;
- is_domain = true;
+ e.is_domain = true;
} else {
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1))
return -EINVAL;
}
- saved_manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager);
- if (!saved_manager)
+ e.manager = tomoyo_get_name(manager);
+ if (!e.manager)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
- if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+ if (ptr->manager != e.manager)
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->manager = saved_manager;
- saved_manager = NULL;
- entry->is_domain = is_domain;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+ &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_manager);
- kfree(entry);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.manager);
return error;
}
name.name = domainname;
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ return 0;
/* Is there an active domain? */
list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
/* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
{
int pos;
u8 bit;
- const char *atmark = "";
- const char *filename;
const u32 perm = ptr->perm | (((u32) ptr->perm_high) << 16);
- filename = ptr->filename->name;
for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH_OPERATION; bit++) {
- const char *msg;
if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
continue;
/* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ || bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE)
&& (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)))
continue;
- msg = tomoyo_path2keyword(bit);
pos = head->read_avail;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
- atmark, filename))
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ",
+ tomoyo_path2keyword(bit)) ||
+ !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name) ||
+ !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"))
goto out;
}
head->read_bit = 0;
struct tomoyo_path2_acl *ptr)
{
int pos;
- const char *atmark1 = "";
- const char *atmark2 = "";
- const char *filename1;
- const char *filename2;
const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
u8 bit;
- filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
- filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_PATH2_OPERATION; bit++) {
- const char *msg;
if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
continue;
- msg = tomoyo_path22keyword(bit);
pos = head->read_avail;
- if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
- atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s ",
+ tomoyo_path22keyword(bit)) ||
+ !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name1) ||
+ !tomoyo_print_name_union(head, &ptr->name2) ||
+ !tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n"))
goto out;
}
head->read_bit = 0;
return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP))
+ return tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(data, is_delete);
return -EINVAL;
}
head->read_var2 = NULL;
head->read_step = 9;
case 9:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var1 = NULL;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 10;
+ case 10:
head->read_eof = true;
break;
default:
*/
static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
{
- struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc(sizeof(*head), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = kzalloc(sizeof(*head), GFP_NOFS);
if (!head)
return -ENOMEM;
} else {
if (!head->readbuf_size)
head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
- head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ head->read_buf = kzalloc(head->readbuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!head->read_buf) {
kfree(head);
return -ENOMEM;
head->write = NULL;
} else if (head->write) {
head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
- head->write_buf = kzalloc(head->writebuf_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ head->write_buf = kzalloc(head->writebuf_size, GFP_NOFS);
if (!head->write_buf) {
kfree(head->read_buf);
kfree(head);
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "keep_domain "
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain "
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP "path_group "
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT "select "
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile "
#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read"
char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
};
+struct tomoyo_name_union {
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+ u8 is_group;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_path_group {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *group_name;
+ struct list_head member_list;
+ atomic_t users;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "path_group" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_path_group_member {
+ struct list_head list;
+ bool is_deleted;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *member_name;
+};
+
/*
* tomoyo_acl_info is a structure which is used for holding
*
*
* (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
* (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
- * (3) "filename" is the pathname.
+ * (3) "name" is the pathname.
*
* Directives held by this structure are "allow_read/write", "allow_execute",
* "allow_read", "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir",
struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL */
u8 perm_high;
u16 perm;
- /* Pointer to single pathname. */
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+ struct tomoyo_name_union name;
};
/*
*
* (1) "head" which is a "struct tomoyo_acl_info".
* (2) "perm" which is a bitmask of permitted operations.
- * (3) "filename1" is the source/old pathname.
- * (4) "filename2" is the destination/new pathname.
+ * (3) "name1" is the source/old pathname.
+ * (4) "name2" is the destination/new pathname.
*
* Directives held by this structure are "allow_rename", "allow_link" and
* "allow_pivot_root".
struct tomoyo_path2_acl {
struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL */
u8 perm;
- /* Pointer to single pathname. */
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1;
- /* Pointer to single pathname. */
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2;
+ struct tomoyo_name_union name1;
+ struct tomoyo_name_union name2;
};
/*
/********** Function prototypes. **********/
+/* Check whether the given name matches the given name_union. */
+bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name,
+ const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain);
/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type);
/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+bool tomoyo_parse_name_union(const char *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given path_group. */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_group *group,
+ const bool may_use_pattern);
/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern);
bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "path_group" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Tokenize a line. */
+bool tomoyo_tokenize(char *buffer, char *w[], size_t size);
/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "path_group" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
/* Find a domain by the given name. */
struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname);
/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
domainname,
const u8 profile);
+
+/* Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group". */
+struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name);
+
/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
const u8 index);
/* Check memory quota. */
bool tomoyo_memory_ok(void *ptr);
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size);
/*
* Keep the given name on the RAM.
int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct file *filp);
int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+/* Drop refcount on tomoyo_name_union. */
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr);
+
/* Run garbage collector. */
void tomoyo_run_gc(void);
/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list;
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_path_group_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_initializer_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_keeper_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_alias_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_no_rewrite_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_policy_manager_list;
extern struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
-extern struct mutex tomoyo_name_list_lock;
/* Lock for protecting policy. */
extern struct mutex tomoyo_policy_lock;
}
}
+static inline void tomoyo_put_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group)
+{
+ if (group)
+ atomic_dec(&group->users);
+}
+
static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
{
return current_cred()->security;
return task_cred_xxx(task, security);
}
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_acl_info *p2)
+{
+ return p1->type == p2->type;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_name_union
+(const struct tomoyo_name_union *p1, const struct tomoyo_name_union *p2)
+{
+ return p1->filename == p2->filename && p1->group == p2->group &&
+ p1->is_group == p2->is_group;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_acl *p2)
+{
+ return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) &&
+ tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name, &p2->name);
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_path2_acl *p2)
+{
+ return tomoyo_is_same_acl_head(&p1->head, &p2->head) &&
+ tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name1, &p2->name1) &&
+ tomoyo_is_same_name_union(&p1->name2, &p2->name2);
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *p2)
+{
+ return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name
+ && p1->domainname == p2->domainname
+ && p1->program == p2->program;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p1,
+ const struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *p2)
+{
+ return p1->is_not == p2->is_not && p1->is_last_name == p2->is_last_name
+ && p1->domainname == p2->domainname
+ && p1->program == p2->program;
+}
+
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry
+(const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p1, const struct tomoyo_alias_entry *p2)
+{
+ return p1->original_name == p2->original_name &&
+ p1->aliased_name == p2->aliased_name;
+}
+
/**
* list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
* @pos: the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor.
const bool is_not,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry e = { .is_not = is_not };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- bool is_last_name = false;
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1))
return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
if (domainname) {
if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1))
- is_last_name = true;
+ e.is_last_name = true;
else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname))
return -EINVAL;
- saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
- if (!saved_domainname)
+ e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+ if (!e.domainname)
goto out;
}
- saved_program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
- if (!saved_program)
+ e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
+ if (!e.program)
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
goto out;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
- if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
- ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
- ptr->program != saved_program)
+ if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_initializer_entry(ptr, &e))
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
- saved_domainname = NULL;
- entry->program = saved_program;
- saved_program = NULL;
- entry->is_not = is_not;
- entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
- &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+ &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
out:
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_program);
- kfree(entry);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.program);
return error;
}
const bool is_not,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry e = { .is_not = is_not };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- bool is_last_name = false;
if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1))
- is_last_name = true;
+ e.is_last_name = true;
else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname))
return -EINVAL;
if (program) {
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1))
return -EINVAL;
- saved_program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
- if (!saved_program)
+ e.program = tomoyo_get_name(program);
+ if (!e.program)
goto out;
}
- saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
- if (!saved_domainname)
+ e.domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
+ if (!e.domainname)
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
goto out;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
- if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
- ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
- ptr->program != saved_program)
+ if (!tomoyo_is_same_domain_keeper_entry(ptr, &e))
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
- saved_domainname = NULL;
- entry->program = saved_program;
- saved_program = NULL;
- entry->is_not = is_not;
- entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+ &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
out:
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_program);
- kfree(entry);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.domainname);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.program);
return error;
}
const char *aliased_name,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_alias_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_original_name;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_aliased_name;
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry e = { };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1) ||
!tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1))
return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
- saved_original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name);
- saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_get_name(aliased_name);
- if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
+ e.original_name = tomoyo_get_name(original_name);
+ e.aliased_name = tomoyo_get_name(aliased_name);
+ if (!e.original_name || !e.aliased_name)
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
goto out;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
- if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
- ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name)
+ if (!tomoyo_is_same_alias_entry(ptr, &e))
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->original_name = saved_original_name;
- saved_original_name = NULL;
- entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name;
- saved_aliased_name = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
out:
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_original_name);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_aliased_name);
- kfree(entry);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.original_name);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.aliased_name);
return error;
}
const u8 profile)
{
struct tomoyo_domain_info *entry;
- struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
bool found = false;
saved_domainname = tomoyo_get_name(domainname);
if (!saved_domainname)
return NULL;
- entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
if (domain->is_deleted ||
tomoyo_pathcmp(saved_domainname, domain->domainname))
found = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
tomoyo_put_name(saved_domainname);
kfree(entry);
return found ? domain : NULL;
* This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
* tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN.
*/
- struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_NOFS);
struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name;
[TOMOYO_TYPE_PIVOT_ROOT] = "pivot_root",
};
+void tomoyo_put_name_union(struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+ if (!ptr)
+ return;
+ if (ptr->is_group)
+ tomoyo_put_path_group(ptr->group);
+ else
+ tomoyo_put_name(ptr->filename);
+}
+
+bool tomoyo_compare_name_union(const struct tomoyo_path_info *name,
+ const struct tomoyo_name_union *ptr)
+{
+ if (ptr->is_group)
+ return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group, 1);
+ return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename);
+}
+
+static bool tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info
+ *name,
+ const struct tomoyo_name_union
+ *ptr, const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+ if (ptr->is_group)
+ return tomoyo_path_matches_group(name, ptr->group,
+ may_use_pattern);
+ if (may_use_pattern || !ptr->filename->is_patterned)
+ return tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(name, ptr->filename);
+ return false;
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_path2keyword - Get the name of single path operation.
*
{
int error;
struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(*buf),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ GFP_NOFS);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry e = { };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1))
return -EINVAL;
- saved_filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
- if (!saved_filename)
+ e.filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
+ if (!e.filename)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
- if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
+ if (ptr->filename != e.filename)
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->filename = saved_filename;
- saved_filename = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+ &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename);
- kfree(entry);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.filename);
return error;
}
static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry e = { .pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern) };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- saved_pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
- if (!saved_pattern)
+ if (!e.pattern)
return error;
- if (!saved_pattern->is_patterned)
+ if (!e.pattern->is_patterned)
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
goto out;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
- if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
+ if (e.pattern != ptr->pattern)
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
- saved_pattern = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
out:
- kfree(entry);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_pattern);
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern);
return error;
}
static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
const bool is_delete)
{
- struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *entry = NULL;
struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+ struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry e = { };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0))
return -EINVAL;
- saved_pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
- if (!saved_pattern)
+ e.pattern = tomoyo_get_name(pattern);
+ if (!e.pattern)
return error;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
- if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
+ if (ptr->pattern != e.pattern)
continue;
ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
- saved_pattern = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list,
+ &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_pattern);
- kfree(entry);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.pattern);
return error;
}
if (!(acl->perm_high & (perm >> 16)))
continue;
}
- if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) {
- if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename,
- acl->filename))
- continue;
- } else {
+ if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union_pattern(filename, &acl->name,
+ may_use_pattern))
continue;
- }
error = 0;
break;
}
struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain,
const bool is_delete)
{
- static const u32 rw_mask =
+ static const u32 tomoyo_rw_mask =
(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE);
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+ const u32 perm = 1 << type;
struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
- struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_path_acl e = {
+ .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL,
+ .perm_high = perm >> 16,
+ .perm = perm
+ };
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- const u32 perm = 1 << type;
+ if (type == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)
+ e.perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask;
if (!domain)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0))
+ if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename, &e.name))
return -EINVAL;
- saved_filename = tomoyo_get_name(filename);
- if (!saved_filename)
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
struct tomoyo_path_acl *acl =
container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path_acl, head);
- if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL)
- continue;
- if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+ if (!tomoyo_is_same_path_acl(acl, &e))
continue;
if (is_delete) {
if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
acl->perm &= ~perm;
else
acl->perm_high &= ~(perm >> 16);
- if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask)
+ if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) != tomoyo_rw_mask)
acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE);
else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE)))
- acl->perm &= ~rw_mask;
+ acl->perm &= ~tomoyo_rw_mask;
} else {
if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
acl->perm |= perm;
else
acl->perm_high |= (perm >> 16);
- if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask)
+ if ((acl->perm & tomoyo_rw_mask) == tomoyo_rw_mask)
acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE;
else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))
- acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+ acl->perm |= tomoyo_rw_mask;
}
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH_ACL;
- if (perm <= 0xFFFF)
- entry->perm = perm;
- else
- entry->perm_high = (perm >> 16);
- if (perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE))
- entry->perm |= rw_mask;
- entry->filename = saved_filename;
- saved_filename = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list,
+ &domain->acl_info_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- kfree(entry);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name);
return error;
}
struct tomoyo_domain_info *const domain,
const bool is_delete)
{
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename1;
- const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename2;
+ const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+ struct tomoyo_path2_acl e = {
+ .head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL,
+ .perm = perm
+ };
struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
- struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry = NULL;
int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
- const u8 perm = 1 << type;
if (!domain)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0) ||
- !tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0))
- return -EINVAL;
- saved_filename1 = tomoyo_get_name(filename1);
- saved_filename2 = tomoyo_get_name(filename2);
- if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
+ if (!tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename1, &e.name1) ||
+ !tomoyo_parse_name_union(filename2, &e.name2))
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
goto out;
- if (!is_delete)
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
struct tomoyo_path2_acl *acl =
container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head);
- if (ptr->type != TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL)
- continue;
- if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
- acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+ if (!tomoyo_is_same_path2_acl(acl, &e))
continue;
if (is_delete)
acl->perm &= ~perm;
error = 0;
break;
}
- if (!is_delete && error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
- entry->head.type = TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL;
- entry->perm = perm;
- entry->filename1 = saved_filename1;
- saved_filename1 = NULL;
- entry->filename2 = saved_filename2;
- saved_filename2 = NULL;
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
- entry = NULL;
- error = 0;
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->head.list,
+ &domain->acl_info_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
}
mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
out:
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename1);
- tomoyo_put_name(saved_filename2);
- kfree(entry);
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name1);
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&e.name2);
return error;
}
acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_path2_acl, head);
if (!(acl->perm & perm))
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1))
+ if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename1, &acl->name1))
continue;
- if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2))
+ if (!tomoyo_compare_name_union(filename2, &acl->name2))
continue;
error = 0;
break;
#include <linux/slab.h>
enum tomoyo_gc_id {
+ TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP,
+ TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_INITIALIZER,
TOMOYO_ID_DOMAIN_KEEPER,
TOMOYO_ID_ALIAS,
{
struct tomoyo_path_acl *entry
= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
- tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename);
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name);
}
break;
case TOMOYO_TYPE_PATH2_ACL:
{
struct tomoyo_path2_acl *entry
= container_of(acl, typeof(*entry), head);
- tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename1);
- tomoyo_put_name(entry->filename2);
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name1);
+ tomoyo_put_name_union(&entry->name2);
}
break;
default:
{
}
+static void tomoyo_del_path_group_member(struct tomoyo_path_group_member
+ *member)
+{
+ tomoyo_put_name(member->member_name);
+}
+
+static void tomoyo_del_path_group(struct tomoyo_path_group *group)
+{
+ tomoyo_put_name(group->group_name);
+}
+
static void tomoyo_collect_entry(void)
{
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ return;
{
struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list,
break;
}
}
- mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++) {
}
}
}
- mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+ {
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list,
+ list) {
+ if (!member->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER,
+ member))
+ list_del_rcu(&member->list);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!list_empty(&group->member_list) ||
+ atomic_read(&group->users))
+ continue;
+ if (tomoyo_add_to_gc(TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP, group))
+ list_del_rcu(&group->list);
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
}
static void tomoyo_kfree_entry(void)
if (!tomoyo_del_domain(p->element))
continue;
break;
+ case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP_MEMBER:
+ tomoyo_del_path_group_member(p->element);
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_ID_PATH_GROUP:
+ tomoyo_del_path_group(p->element);
+ break;
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING "Unknown type\n");
break;
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/path_group.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "common.h"
+/* The list for "struct ccs_path_group". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_path_group_list);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_path_group - Allocate memory for "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ *
+ * @group_name: The name of pathname group.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_path_group *tomoyo_get_path_group(const char *group_name)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *entry = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *group = NULL;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_group_name;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(group_name, 0, 0, 0) ||
+ !group_name[0])
+ return NULL;
+ saved_group_name = tomoyo_get_name(group_name);
+ if (!saved_group_name)
+ return NULL;
+ entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(group, &tomoyo_path_group_list, list) {
+ if (saved_group_name != group->group_name)
+ continue;
+ atomic_inc(&group->users);
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (error && tomoyo_memory_ok(entry)) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->member_list);
+ entry->group_name = saved_group_name;
+ saved_group_name = NULL;
+ atomic_set(&entry->users, 1);
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &tomoyo_path_group_list);
+ group = entry;
+ entry = NULL;
+ error = 0;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name(saved_group_name);
+ kfree(entry);
+ return !error ? group : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_path_group_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, nagative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_path_group_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member e = { };
+ int error = is_delete ? -ENOENT : -ENOMEM;
+ char *w[2];
+ if (!tomoyo_tokenize(data, w, sizeof(w)) || !w[1][0])
+ return -EINVAL;
+ group = tomoyo_get_path_group(w[0]);
+ if (!group)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ e.member_name = tomoyo_get_name(w[1]);
+ if (!e.member_name)
+ goto out;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ goto out;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
+ if (member->member_name != e.member_name)
+ continue;
+ member->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!is_delete && error) {
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member *entry =
+ tomoyo_commit_ok(&e, sizeof(e));
+ if (entry) {
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, &group->member_list);
+ error = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_put_name(e.member_name);
+ tomoyo_put_path_group(group);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_path_group_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_path_group" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_path_group_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *gpos;
+ struct list_head *mpos;
+ list_for_each_cookie(gpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_path_group_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_path_group *group;
+ group = list_entry(gpos, struct tomoyo_path_group, list);
+ list_for_each_cookie(mpos, head->read_var2,
+ &group->member_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+ member = list_entry(mpos,
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member,
+ list);
+ if (member->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_PATH_GROUP
+ "%s %s\n",
+ group->group_name->name,
+ member->member_name->name))
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_group - Check whether the given pathname matches members of the given pathname group.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The name of pathname.
+ * @group: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_group".
+ * @may_use_pattern: True if wild card is permitted.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @pathname matches pathnames in @group, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_group(const struct tomoyo_path_info *pathname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_group *group,
+ const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_path_group_member *member;
+ bool matched = false;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(member, &group->member_list, list) {
+ if (member->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!member->member_name->is_patterned) {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(pathname, member->member_name))
+ continue;
+ } else if (may_use_pattern) {
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(pathname,
+ member->member_name))
+ continue;
+ } else
+ continue;
+ matched = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ return matched;
+}
*/
char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
{
- char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_KERNEL);
+ char *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer), GFP_NOFS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)
<= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
return false;
}
+/**
+ * tomoyo_commit_ok - Check memory quota.
+ *
+ * @data: Data to copy from.
+ * @size: Size in byte.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_commit_ok(void *data, const unsigned int size)
+{
+ void *ptr = kzalloc(size, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (tomoyo_memory_ok(ptr)) {
+ memmove(ptr, data, size);
+ memset(data, 0, size);
+ return ptr;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/**
* tomoyo_memory_free - Free memory for elements.
*
* "const struct tomoyo_path_info *".
*/
struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
-/* Lock for protecting tomoyo_name_list . */
-DEFINE_MUTEX(tomoyo_name_list_lock);
/**
* tomoyo_get_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
len = strlen(name) + 1;
hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
head = &tomoyo_name_list[hash_long(hash, TOMOYO_HASH_BITS)];
- mutex_lock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
+ return NULL;
list_for_each_entry(ptr, head, list) {
if (hash != ptr->entry.hash || strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
continue;
atomic_inc(&ptr->users);
goto out;
}
- ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ptr = kzalloc(sizeof(*ptr) + len, GFP_NOFS);
allocated_len = ptr ? ksize(ptr) : 0;
if (!ptr || (tomoyo_quota_for_policy &&
atomic_read(&tomoyo_policy_memory_size) + allocated_len
tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
list_add_tail(&ptr->list, head);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_name_list_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&tomoyo_policy_lock);
return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
}
git.openpandora.org / pandora-kernel.git / commitdiff