NFS: Don't drop CB requests with invalid principals
authorChuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Wed, 29 Jun 2016 17:55:22 +0000 (13:55 -0400)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Sun, 20 Nov 2016 01:01:25 +0000 (01:01 +0000)
commit a4e187d83d88eeaba6252aac0a2ffe5eaa73a818 upstream.

Before commit 778be232a207 ("NFS do not find client in NFSv4
pg_authenticate"), the Linux callback server replied with
RPC_AUTH_ERROR / RPC_AUTH_BADCRED, instead of dropping the CB
request. Let's restore that behavior so the server has a chance to
do something useful about it, and provide a warning that helps
admins correct the problem.

Fixes: 778be232a207 ("NFS do not find client in NFSv4 ...")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
fs/nfs/callback_xdr.c
net/sunrpc/svc.c

index 6d22d35..9839726 100644 (file)
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ static __be32 nfs4_callback_compound(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, void *argp, void *r
        if (hdr_arg.minorversion == 0) {
                cps.clp = nfs4_find_client_ident(hdr_arg.cb_ident);
                if (!cps.clp || !check_gss_callback_principal(cps.clp, rqstp))
-                       return rpc_drop_reply;
+                       goto out_invalidcred;
        }
 
        hdr_res.taglen = hdr_arg.taglen;
@@ -905,6 +905,10 @@ static __be32 nfs4_callback_compound(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, void *argp, void *r
        nfs_put_client(cps.clp);
        dprintk("%s: done, status = %u\n", __func__, ntohl(status));
        return rpc_success;
+
+out_invalidcred:
+       pr_warn_ratelimited("NFS: NFSv4 callback contains invalid cred\n");
+       return rpc_autherr_badcred;
 }
 
 /*
index 9a70a80..efd443d 100644 (file)
@@ -1172,6 +1172,11 @@ svc_process_common(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct kvec *argv, struct kvec *resv)
                                procp->pc_release(rqstp, NULL, rqstp->rq_resp);
                        goto dropit;
                }
+               if (*statp == rpc_autherr_badcred) {
+                       if (procp->pc_release)
+                               procp->pc_release(rqstp, NULL, rqstp->rq_resp);
+                       goto err_bad_auth;
+               }
                if (*statp == rpc_success &&
                    (xdr = procp->pc_encode) &&
                    !xdr(rqstp, resv->iov_base+resv->iov_len, rqstp->rq_resp)) {