eCryptfs: Infinite loop due to overflow in ecryptfs_write()

commit 684a3ff7e69acc7c678d1a1394fe9e757993fd34 upstream.

ecryptfs_write() can enter an infinite loop when truncating a file to a
size larger than 4G. This only happens on architectures where size_t is
represented by 32 bits.

This was caused by a size_t overflow due to it incorrectly being used to
store the result of a calculation which uses potentially large values of
type loff_t.

[tyhicks@canonical.com: rewrite subject and commit message]
Signed-off-by: Li Wang <liwang@nudt.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yunchuan Wen <wenyunchuan@kylinos.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c
index 54eb14c..608c1c3 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/read_write.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ int ecryptfs_write(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, char *data, loff_t offset,
                pgoff_t ecryptfs_page_idx = (pos >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
                size_t start_offset_in_page = (pos & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK);
                size_t num_bytes = (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - start_offset_in_page);
-               size_t total_remaining_bytes = ((offset + size) - pos);
+               loff_t total_remaining_bytes = ((offset + size) - pos);
 
                if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
                        rc = -EINTR;
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int ecryptfs_write(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode, char *data, loff_t offset,
                        num_bytes = total_remaining_bytes;
                if (pos < offset) {
                        /* remaining zeros to write, up to destination offset */
-                       size_t total_remaining_zeros = (offset - pos);
+                       loff_t total_remaining_zeros = (offset - pos);
 
                        if (num_bytes > total_remaining_zeros)
                                num_bytes = total_remaining_zeros;