X-Git-Url: https://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=pandora-kernel.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=security%2Fcommoncap.c;h=4f338aba1ddb7b44214ed255db0ac2e66f184d72;hp=ee4f8486e5f563dff63c13278a1258e43e2b7859;hb=7aa2c8a3d19e27d8913b66e4f0e09ee86d56095e;hpb=f81f5e14de1203b9389aad383aa3f7b2a221efdd

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f8486e5f5..4f338aba1ddb 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -140,12 +141,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+	const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	cred = current_cred();
 	child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+		caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+	else
+		caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
 	if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
-	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+	    cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
 		goto out;
 	if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
 		goto out;
@@ -514,6 +520,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	}
 skip:
 
+	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+	if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+		bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
 	/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
 	 * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
 	 */