usb: ohci: Proper handling of ed_rm_list to handle race condition between usb_kill_ur...

[pandora-kernel.git] / security / keys / request_key_auth.c

diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 60d4e3f..40a06a3 100644 (file)
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -106,6 +106,18 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
        }
 }
 
+static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+       if (!rka)
+               return;
+       key_put(rka->target_key);
+       key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
+       if (rka->cred)
+               put_cred(rka->cred);
+       kfree(rka->callout_info);
+       kfree(rka);
+}
+
 /*
  * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key.
  */
@@ -115,15 +127,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
 
        kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
-       if (rka->cred) {
-               put_cred(rka->cred);
-               rka->cred = NULL;
-       }
-
-       key_put(rka->target_key);
-       key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
-       kfree(rka->callout_info);
-       kfree(rka);
+       free_request_key_auth(rka);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -137,22 +141,17 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
        const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
        struct key *authkey = NULL;
        char desc[20];
-       int ret;
+       int ret = -ENOMEM;
 
        kenter("%d,", target->serial);
 
        /* allocate a auth record */
-       rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!rka) {
-               kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
-               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-       }
+       rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (!rka)
+               goto error;
        rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-       if (!rka->callout_info) {
-               kleave(" = -ENOMEM");
-               kfree(rka);
-               return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-       }
+       if (!rka->callout_info)
+               goto error_free_rka;
 
        /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
         * another process */
@@ -162,8 +161,12 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 
                /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're
                 * servicing is already instantiated */
-               if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
-                       goto auth_key_revoked;
+               if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+                            &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
+                       up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
+                       ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
+                       goto error_free_rka;
+               }
 
                irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
                rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
@@ -191,32 +194,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
                            KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
        if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
                ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
-               goto error_alloc;
+               goto error_free_rka;
        }
 
        /* construct the auth key */
        ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL);
        if (ret < 0)
-               goto error_inst;
+               goto error_put_authkey;
 
        kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, atomic_read(&authkey->usage));
        return authkey;
 
-auth_key_revoked:
-       up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
-       kfree(rka->callout_info);
-       kfree(rka);
-       kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED");
-       return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
-
-error_inst:
-       key_revoke(authkey);
+error_put_authkey:
        key_put(authkey);
-error_alloc:
-       key_put(rka->target_key);
-       key_put(rka->dest_keyring);
-       kfree(rka->callout_info);
-       kfree(rka);
+error_free_rka:
+       free_request_key_auth(rka);
+error:
        kleave("= %d", ret);
        return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }