Merge branch 'stable-3.2' into pandora-3.2

[pandora-kernel.git] / security / commoncap.c

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f848..7790e48 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -140,12 +141,17 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
        int ret = 0;
        const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
+       const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
 
        rcu_read_lock();
        cred = current_cred();
        child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+       if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
+       else
+               caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
        if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
-           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+           cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
                goto out;
        if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                goto out;
@@ -514,6 +520,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        }
 skip:
 
+       /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+       if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+               bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
        /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
         * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
         */
@@ -975,3 +986,4 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
        }
        return ret;
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_file_mmap);