From b925585039cf39275c2e0e57512e5df27fa73aad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "H. Peter Anvin" Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2009 14:01:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] mm: Adjust do_pages_stat() so gcc can see copy_from_user() is safe MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Slightly adjust the logic for determining the size of the copy_form_user() in do_pages_stat(); with this change, gcc can see that the copying is safe. Without this, we get a build error for i386 allyesconfig: /home/hpa/kernel/linux-2.6-tip.urgent/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:213: error: call to ‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct Unlike an earlier patch from Arjan, this doesn't introduce new variables; merely reshuffles the compare so that gcc can see that an overflow cannot happen. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Brice Goglin Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro LKML-Reference: <20090926205406.30d55b08@infradead.org> --- mm/migrate.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/migrate.c b/mm/migrate.c index 7dbcb22316d2..0bc640fd68fa 100644 --- a/mm/migrate.c +++ b/mm/migrate.c @@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ static int do_pages_stat(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_pages, int err; for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i += chunk_nr) { - if (chunk_nr + i > nr_pages) + if (chunk_nr > nr_pages - i) chunk_nr = nr_pages - i; err = copy_from_user(chunk_pages, &pages[i], -- 2.39.2