X-Git-Url: https://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=blobdiff_plain;f=kernel%2Fcapability.c;h=39e8193b41ea658f1d67fca1d91edb38e698edea;hb=609a70ac927b72da647ccee7873d928d45055eae;hp=c8d3c776203490b763c0cc65bd7444a29655804a;hpb=b643b0fdbc59cf6bbb086974b29d2571e9e9f646;p=pandora-kernel.git diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index c8d3c7762034..39e8193b41ea 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -3,29 +3,55 @@ * * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main * - * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan + * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love - */ + */ #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include -unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */ -kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; - -EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits); -EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset); - /* * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current. * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock. */ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock); +/* + * Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities + */ + +const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET; +const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET; +const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET; + +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); + +/* + * More recent versions of libcap are available from: + * + * http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/ + */ + +static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void) +{ + static int warned; + if (!warned) { + char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; + + printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities" + " (legacy support in use)\n", + get_task_comm(name, current)); + warned = 1; + } +} + /* * For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three * capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is @@ -43,49 +69,91 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock); */ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr) { - int ret = 0; - pid_t pid; - __u32 version; - struct task_struct *target; - struct __user_cap_data_struct data; + int ret = 0; + pid_t pid; + __u32 version; + struct task_struct *target; + unsigned tocopy; + kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; + + if (get_user(version, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + + switch (version) { + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: + warn_legacy_capability_use(); + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; + break; + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2; + break; + default: + if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; + } - if (get_user(version, &header->version)) - return -EFAULT; + if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) + return -EFAULT; - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { - if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) - return -EFAULT; - return -EINVAL; - } + if (pid < 0) + return -EINVAL; - if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) - return -EFAULT; + spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - if (pid < 0) - return -EINVAL; + if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) { + target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (!target) { + ret = -ESRCH; + goto out; + } + } else + target = current; - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + ret = security_capget(target, &pE, &pI, &pP); - if (pid && pid != current->pid) { - target = find_task_by_pid(pid); - if (!target) { - ret = -ESRCH; - goto out; - } - } else - target = current; +out: + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted); + if (!ret) { + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S]; + unsigned i; -out: - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); + for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { + kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i]; + kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i]; + kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i]; + } - if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data)) - return -EFAULT; + /* + * Note, in the case, tocopy < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S, + * we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This + * has the effect of making older libcap + * implementations implicitly drop upper capability + * bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset + * sequence. + * + * This behavior is considered fail-safe + * behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer + * version of libcap will enable access to the newer + * capabilities. + * + * An alternative would be to return an error here + * (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to + * unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts + * before modification is attempted and the application + * fails. + */ + + if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy + * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { + return -EFAULT; + } + } - return ret; + return ret; } /* @@ -101,7 +169,7 @@ static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective, int found = 0; struct pid *pgrp; - pgrp = find_pid(pgrp_nr); + pgrp = find_vpid(pgrp_nr); do_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) { target = g; while_each_thread(g, target) { @@ -118,7 +186,7 @@ static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp_nr, kernel_cap_t *effective, } while_each_pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g); if (!found) - ret = 0; + ret = 0; return ret; } @@ -135,7 +203,7 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective, int found = 0; do_each_thread(g, target) { - if (target == current || is_init(target)) + if (target == current || is_container_init(target->group_leader)) continue; found = 1; if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, @@ -172,68 +240,90 @@ static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective, */ asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data) { - kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; - __u32 version; - struct task_struct *target; - int ret; - pid_t pid; - - if (get_user(version, &header->version)) - return -EFAULT; - - if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) { - if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) - return -EFAULT; - return -EINVAL; - } - - if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) - return -EFAULT; - - if (pid && pid != current->pid && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) - return -EPERM; - - if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) || - copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) || - copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted))) - return -EFAULT; - - spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); - read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - - if (pid > 0 && pid != current->pid) { - target = find_task_by_pid(pid); - if (!target) { - ret = -ESRCH; - goto out; - } - } else - target = current; - - ret = 0; - - /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal, - we now put them into effect. */ - if (pid < 0) { - if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */ - ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted); - - else /* all procs in process group */ - ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - } else { - ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - if (!ret) - security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, - &permitted); - } + struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S]; + unsigned i, tocopy; + kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; + __u32 version; + struct task_struct *target; + int ret; + pid_t pid; + + if (get_user(version, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + + switch (version) { + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1: + warn_legacy_capability_use(); + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1; + break; + case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2: + tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_2; + break; + default: + if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version)) + return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (pid && pid != task_pid_vnr(current) && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) + return -EPERM; + + if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, tocopy + * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) { + return -EFAULT; + } + + for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { + effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective; + permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted; + inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable; + } + while (i < _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S) { + effective.cap[i] = 0; + permitted.cap[i] = 0; + inheritable.cap[i] = 0; + i++; + } + + spin_lock(&task_capability_lock); + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); + + if (pid > 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) { + target = find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (!target) { + ret = -ESRCH; + goto out; + } + } else + target = current; + + ret = 0; + + /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal, + we now put them into effect. */ + if (pid < 0) { + if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */ + ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted); + + else /* all procs in process group */ + ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable, + &permitted); + } else { + ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, + &permitted); + if (!ret) + security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, + &permitted); + } out: - read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); - spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); + spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock); - return ret; + return ret; } int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap) @@ -244,7 +334,6 @@ int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap) } return 0; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__capable); int capable(int cap) {