xfrm_user: propagate sec ctx allocation errors

commit 2f30ea5090cbc57ea573cdc66421264b3de3fb0a upstream.

When we fail to attach the security context in xfrm_state_construct()
we'll return 0 as error value which, in turn, will wrongly claim success
to userland when, in fact, we won't be adding / updating the XFRM state.

This is a regression introduced by commit fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink:
Inline attach_encap_tmpl(), attach_sec_ctx(), and attach_one_addr()").

Fix it by propagating the error returned by security_xfrm_state_alloc()
in this case.

Fixes: fd21150a0fe1 ("[XFRM] netlink: Inline attach_encap_tmpl()...")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index ede01a8..0954224 100644 (file)
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -558,9 +558,12 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net,
        if (err)
                goto error;
 
-       if (attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX] &&
-           security_xfrm_state_alloc(x, nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX])))
-               goto error;
+       if (attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]) {
+               err = security_xfrm_state_alloc(x,
+                                               nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX]));
+               if (err)
+                       goto error;
+       }
 
        if ((err = xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(&x->replay_esn, &x->preplay_esn,
                                               attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL])))