iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C
authorNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Fri, 6 Jun 2014 01:08:57 +0000 (18:08 -0700)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fri, 11 Jul 2014 12:33:47 +0000 (13:33 +0100)
commit9ae0f3c0d18c443a72664577bdb70fe30f796b7d
tree30dabd05d1eba045c2d6c2e72f538bdde7854069
parent4e53b9de24ecec036a8f6c8acae25e426a8bdab1
iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C

commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream.

This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.

This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:

   Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
   for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
   Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
   connection if it occurs.

Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole@calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c