From: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2014 23:36:28 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: random: Use arch_get_random_seed*() at init time and once a second
X-Git-Tag: v3.15-rc1~88^2~2
X-Git-Url: http://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=83664a6928a420b5ccfc0cf23ddbfe3634fea271;p=pandora-kernel.git

random: Use arch_get_random_seed*() at init time and once a second

Use arch_get_random_seed*() in two places in the Linux random
driver (drivers/char/random.c):

1. During entropy pool initialization, use RDSEED in favor of RDRAND,
   with a fallback to the latter.  Entropy exhaustion is unlikely to
   happen there on physical hardware as the machine is single-threaded
   at that point, but could happen in a virtual machine.  In that
   case, the fallback to RDRAND will still provide more than adequate
   entropy pool initialization.

2. Once a second, issue RDSEED and, if successful, feed it to the
   entropy pool.  To ensure an extra layer of security, only credit
   half the entropy just in case.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
---

Reading git-diff-tree failed