From: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2008 08:48:32 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: sysctl: allow override of /proc/sys/net with CAP_NET_ADMIN
X-Git-Tag: v2.6.27-rc1~275
X-Git-Url: http://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4ecb90090c84210a8bd2a9d7a5906e616735873c;p=pandora-kernel.git

sysctl: allow override of /proc/sys/net with CAP_NET_ADMIN

Extend the permission check for networking sysctl's to allow modification
when current process has CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and is not root.  This
version uses the until now unused permissions hook to override the mode
value for /proc/sys/net if accessed by a user with capabilities.

Found while working with Quagga.  It is impossible to turn forwarding
on/off through the command interface because Quagga uses secure coding
practice of dropping privledges during initialization and only raising via
capabilities when necessary.  Since the dameon has reset real/effective
uid after initialization, all attempts to access /proc/sys/net variables
will fail.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
---

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