From: Oleg Nesterov Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2014 22:25:26 +0000 (-0700) Subject: fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open() X-Git-Tag: fixes-against-v3.18-rc2~137^2~137 X-Git-Url: http://git.openpandora.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?a=commitdiff_plain;h=29a40ace841cba9b661711f042d1821cdc4ad47c;p=pandora-kernel.git fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open() A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov cat /proc/self/maps >/dev/null chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet exec /proc/self/net/packet makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file->lock + cred_guard_mutex in the opposite order. It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides, this doesn't even look right if the task changes its ->mm between m_stop() and m_start(). Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to use priv->mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof) otherwise. The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do mmdrop() in fop->release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that. Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps") the new ->mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- Reading git-diff-tree failed