sctp: Catch bogus stream sequence numbers
authorVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Fri, 4 Sep 2009 22:21:03 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
committerVlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Fri, 4 Sep 2009 22:21:03 +0000 (18:21 -0400)
Since our TSN map is capable of holding at most a 4K chunk gap,
there is no way that during this gap, a stream sequence number
(unsigned short) can wrap such that the new number is smaller
then the next expected one.  If such a case is encountered,
this is a protocol violation.

Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>

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