[SCSI] mpt2sas: prevent heap overflows and unchecked reads
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Tue, 5 Apr 2011 16:45:59 +0000 (12:45 -0400)
committerJames Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Sun, 24 Apr 2011 16:01:59 +0000 (11:01 -0500)
At two points in handling device ioctls via /dev/mpt2ctl, user-supplied
length values are used to copy data from userspace into heap buffers
without bounds checking, allowing controllable heap corruption and
subsequently privilege escalation.

Additionally, user-supplied values are used to determine the size of a
copy_to_user() as well as the offset into the buffer to be read, with no
bounds checking, allowing users to read arbitrary kernel memory.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Eric Moore <eric.moore@lsi.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>

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