nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Sat, 14 May 2016 18:11:44 +0000 (11:11 -0700)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Wed, 15 Jun 2016 20:28:14 +0000 (21:28 +0100)
commit9f9aa476de1b6bd8fe179dfd9b204972c8c98791
tree5b389dc7417d6ac102ed4ef52ff0c09cd445f981
parentd4203ded7550f38e69b18c37c1e0a67064fc02a8
nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name

commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.

The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
the filenames.

Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
to generate a unique name.

This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
leaking kernel pointers to user space.

Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c