rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Wed, 14 Jun 2017 23:12:24 +0000 (00:12 +0100)
committerBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Sun, 2 Jul 2017 16:12:48 +0000 (17:12 +0100)
commit09c9faacebb3c1e279ec962cff3072995328ca29
tree9bc4464dfd442c5cfee0baf416f38ec9064e1c26
parenta7d519473a32267e52f1f92141240451e5403dd3
rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode

commit 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0 upstream.

This fixes CVE-2017-7482.

When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra.  This could
lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
over the end of the buffer.

Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
length.

Reported-by: 石磊 <shilei-c@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@auristor.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
[bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
net/rxrpc/ar-key.c